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1
Chapter 1
SHINING A LIGHT ON SLAVERY?
DEFINING SLAVERY
The problem of defi ning slavery as an absolute condition or a fi xed 
status has been at the heart of the politics of slavery. Liberals have 
often striven to draw bright lines between slavery as a wrong or a 
logical impossibility, and liberal autonomy as a good and a right. 
For socialists, the concept of slavery is more fl exible and the border-
lands between slavery, servitude and exploitation are more mobile 
and contested. The idea of slavery, for them both, carries what Robin 
Blackburn calls a ‘mythic potency’ that takes it beyond the facts and 
experience of history (Blackburn 1988, 269). This book is about that 
mythic potency, about the signifi cance of the status of slavery as a 
lived experience and as an idea and a political concept. Its aim is to 
explore the injustice of slavery not just as the opposite of self-owner-
ship and liberal autonomy, but also as the opposite of belonging and 
of free labour. Its particular focus is on chattel slavery, the possibility 
of defi ning a human being as an animate piece of property and then 
making that status hereditable. The chattel slave was unable to make 
a will, to bring formal criminal charges against others or to appear 
as a witness in most civil cases. A slave’s evidence was acceptable in 
court only if it had been extracted by torture. People who had been 
enslaved could be bought, sold, traded, leased, mortgaged, presented 
as a gift, pledged for a debt, included in a dowry or seized in a bank-
ruptcy. What does this mean for our political theories that take the 
autonomous individual as both their starting point and their goal? 
We have to ask, who are these chattel slaves, and what made them 
enslavable? What happened to their status as persons and as humans 
when they were enslaved? What about the people who enslaved them 
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and sought to convince themselves that it was possible (for others) to 
be both person and property? 
Part of the answer to these questions lies in thinking about the 
defi nition of slavery, and what might be taken to be its constituent 
elements. The League of Nations defi nition began with ‘the status or 
condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attach-
ing to the right of ownership are exercised’ (Ste Croix 1988, 19). As 
Blackburn points out, this defi nition does not specify that the owner 
must exercise ‘all’ the powers of ownership over their slaves, but ‘some’ 
of the powers of ownership can be exercised over people such as 
employees, spouses or children, who are not defi ned as a slaves. It has 
to be ‘the comprehensive extent of the property rights claimed by the 
slave owner’ which distinguishes slavery from other forms of owner-
ship and exploitation (Blackburn 1988, 274). Even so, this approach 
makes clear that slavery has signifi cant continuities with other forms 
of exploitation and servitude, and we need to pay attention to the 
power relations, the legal structures and institutions, and the political 
and historical contexts within which the powers attaching to the right 
of ownership are exercised. It also suggests that the idea of ownership, 
the property aspect of slavery, might not be enough to distinguish 
slavery from all other forms of dependency and involuntary labour.
Orlando Patterson’s seminal work on slavery, Slavery and Social 
Death, develops a conception of slavery as a ‘relation of domination’ 
rather than a category of legal thought (Patterson 1982, 335). His focus 
on slavery as a relation draws attention to the complexities of depen-
dence, and to the personal and institutional dimensions of slavery as 
a system of parasitism. Patterson concludes that the slave ‘was natally 
alienated and condemned as a socially dead person, his existence hav-
ing no legitimacy whatever’. On this view, the slave becomes the ideal 
human tool, ‘perfectly fl exible, unattached, and deracinated’, exist-
ing only through the master. As the slaveholder fed off the slave to 
gain the satisfactions of power and honour, the slave lost ‘all claim to 
autonomous power, was degraded and reduced to a state of liminality’ 
(Patterson 1982, 337). Patterson’s account defi nes slavery as one of the 
most extreme forms of the relation of domination, and he draws a clear 
binary distinction between total power from the viewpoint of the mas-
ter and total powerlessness from the viewpoint of the slave (Patterson 
1982, 1). For Patterson, without the master the slave does not exist as 
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an independent being, and instead becomes a dominated thing, an 
instrument for the master. Slavery, from this perspective, is not about 
the legal system or hard labour, but about this process of domination 
rooted in violence, force and powerlessness. Slavery, for Patterson, 
can be distinguished from other social relationships by its constituent 
elements of force, dishonour and permanence: ‘slavery is the perma-
nent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored 
persons’ (Patterson 1982, 13).
This has become the key defi nition of slavery in academic discourse 
and the subject of intense political debate. It is woven into this book at 
all sorts of levels, but in particular into the discussion of Hegel’s mas-
ter–slave dialectic, the meanings of slavery in Aristotle and Locke, and 
the complexities of the relation between slavery, race and agency. As 
Vincent Brown argues, Patterson’s defi nition ‘distilled a transhistori-
cal characterization of slavery’, within which slaveholders annihilated 
people’s social existence by fi rst extracting them from meaningful rela-
tions of personal status, belonging and memory, and then ‘incorporat-
ing these socially dead persons into the masters’ world’ (V. Brown 2009, 
1233). This notion of social death at the core of Patterson’s defi nition 
is, as Brown argues, an abstraction that is ‘largely unproblematic as a 
matter of theory, or even law’ (V. Brown 2009, 1236). It does, however, 
carry a danger of ‘pathologizing slaves by allowing the condition of 
social death to stand for the experience of life in slavery’ (V. Brown 2009, 
1236). People subjected to social death are almost infi nitely vulnerable 
to the will of others (D. B. Davis 1986, 15), and slaves come to symbolise 
extreme dependency with no claims or obligations to others. 
Patterson’s transhistorical characterisation of slavery is fundamen-
tally about slavery as violence, a primal act of submission that comes out 
of a state of war, leaving the conqueror with the power of life or death 
over his vanquished foe. Should he choose to enslave rather than kill his 
victim, the slave is left living under a permanent death sentence, with 
his execution suspended but never unthinkable. This state of suspended 
animation, and the subjection to violence, is the core of Patterson’s 
understanding of slavery as domination. Slaves lack legitimacy, they 
are excommunicated persons, because the ‘slave is always conceived of 
as someone, or the descendant of someone, who should have died’ 
(Patterson 1991b, 10). As Alexander Weheliye argues, Patterson’s defi -
nition ‘emphasizes mortality at the cost of sociality’ (Weheliye 2014, 
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38). For many scholars, this conception of social death risks blotting 
out ‘the lines of fl ight, freedom dreams, practices of liberation, pos-
sibilities of other worlds’ of people coded as property and as totally 
powerless (Weheliye 2014, 2). James Sweet, for example, draws atten-
tion to the slivers and slender threads of belonging, shared language, 
culture and community that the African slaves used to build fami-
lies out of nothing and to defy social death (Sweet 2013). The ques-
tion here is how to respond to these ‘miniscule [sic] movements’ and 
‘glimmers of hope’, how to give them substance and weight without 
denying the annihilation of the people who made and found them 
(Weheliye 2014, 12). This book aims to explore the relation of the 
slave to self-possession and to the category of the human through 
the canonical texts of Aristotle, Locke, Hegel, Kant, Wollstonecraft 
and Mill, and the slave narratives of Douglass, Prince and Jacobs. This 
illuminates the indebtedness of the ideas of freedom and the status 
of personhood to notions of property, possession and exchange, and 
confi rms both freedom and slavery as founding narratives of the lib-
eral subject (Hartman 1997). 
Patterson’s focus on social death, violence and dishonour, on the 
relation of domination between master and slave, means that he char-
acterises slavery as the comprehensive loss of belonging for the slave. 
It is, for him, all about powerlessness. There is, for Patterson, nothing 
in the nature of slavery that requires the slave to be a worker, and ‘in 
a great many slaveholding societies masters were not interested in 
what their slaves produced’ (Patterson 1982, 11). Slaves could be used 
as workers, and their natal alienation made their exploitation particu-
larly effective, but, for Patterson, ‘this does not in any way mean that 
slave necessarily implies worker’ (Patterson 1982, 99). This book takes 
a different approach, arguing that ideas about free and unfree labour 
as they developed in the abolition debates of the late eighteenth cen-
tury were crucial in determining the status of personhood and of the 
liberal subject. In the debates over the immediate or gradual abolition 
of slavery, the questions of fi tness for freedom and dehumanisation 
take centre stage. In the discussion of how to distinguish between ser-
vitude and slavery and whether the few could justifi ably be enslaved 
for the good of the whole, the spaces between personhood, subper-
sonhood and humanity are opened up and made visible. There are 
many different ways to guarantee the unfreedom of marginalised and 
oppressed groups, and we need to pay attention to the connections 
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and continuities between labour, morality and honour in thinking 
about the processes that transformed humanity into moral beings and 
left slaves on the outside. In thinking about slavery in social terms, 
rather than as a property relation, labour turns out to be a key vector 
in determining who counts as enslavable, worthless or abandoned, 
who can be subjected to savage, useless tortures, and who can achieve 
freedom as a unifi ed moral self.
Labour is impossible to disentangle from the ‘volatile rapport 
between race and the human’ (Weheliye 2014, 8), and the connections 
between racialisation, labour and slavery are at the core of this book. 
The grounds for justifying slavery were constantly shifting, and the 
markers of dispossession, difference and inferiority were not always 
stable (Turley 2000, 29). Through the antislavery debates of the late 
eighteenth century, as the defenders of slavery set out their justifi ca-
tions for treating some persons as property by developing doctrines 
of black inferiority, the fl uidity of race as a political concept becomes 
clear, and we can see how its ‘meaning is affected by the set of histori-
cal, social and political institutions through which race is understood’ 
(Sheth 2016, 94). As I have argued elsewhere, race formed an integral 
part of the social, political and ideological relations of power needed 
to underpin and sustain slavery (Brace 2004). This book explores some 
of the mechanics of this process by examining the colonists’ position-
ing of the Native Americans as unable to cross the threshold into a 
polite and civil world, by looking at how race and slavery were woven 
together in the late eighteenth century in imperialism, in Kant and 
Hegel, and in Haiti, and by looking at their continuing complicated 
entanglements in the prison industrial complex and in discourses 
of traffi cking. As Falguni Sheth argues, racial meanings change over 
time and across national borders, and the political question always 
has to be about which identities are visible and which identities mat-
ter (Sheth 2016).
One of the key identities that matters in the context of slavery is gen-
dered subjectivity, and the chapters in this book on women’s subjec-
tion and on the politics of traffi cking explore the connections between 
unfree labour, empire and gender. The heroic and subordinate charac-
ter of the slave, particularly the slave performing back-breaking work 
in the cotton fi elds, is often fi gured as a man, and this book explores 
the masculinity of ideas about violence, resistance and autonomy. It is 
more diffi cult to bring the fi gure of the female slave into narratives of 
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modernity, self-possession and labour, and to consider how the story 
of transforming humanity into moral beings is gendered as well as 
racialised. Women’s access to freedom, wages and marriage was formed 
and given meaning by the culture, politics and history in which it was 
embedded, and it is important to register how these meanings were 
different for the white women who endured civil and legal death and 
engulfment, and the black women who lived and worked within the 
plantation household as slaves. None of these women fi t into the mould 
of the autonomous, enlightened individual and one of the key themes 
of this book is the importance of not taking autonomy and personhood 
for granted and starting our political theories and our understandings of 
freedom and emancipation from there. The chapters on gender discuss 
the disavowal of rape and sexual subjection, and the agency and power 
of women living under conditions of oppressive freedom. The spaces 
between personhood, subpersonhood and humanity emerge as loop-
holes of retreat and assertions of the right to locomotion. The differ-
ential meanings of slavery for men and for women are made visible by 
focusing on the ‘collapsed geography’ of the household and the power 
relations within it (Glymph 2008). Women were not understood to be 
able to live as independent beings in a free, industrious society. They 
could not fi nd their way to freedom through the world or through the 
recognition of others, and instead lived lives in constant contact with 
each other within the ‘unrestraint of home’ (Mill [1859] 1997, 153). The 
struggle to fi nd a cogent sense of self was, and is, different, when women 
are forced to remain within oppressive terms of existence both within 
the home, and when they fi nd themselves on the move. Their mobility is 
rendered suspect in ways that are highly gendered, and deeply damag-
ing to their self-possession because they carry risks of vagrancy, poverty 
and indecency both in the nineteenth and the twenty-fi rst centuries. 
Migrant women’s relations of power and powerlessness are imagined 
for them, and they are judged and blamed for their own predicaments. 
This brings us up against the limits of antislavery discourse, both in the 
past and in the present.
THE PASTS AND PRESENTS OF ANTISLAVERY DISCOURSE
‘The relation between pasts, presents, and futures’, David Scott (2004, 
45) observes, ‘is a relation constituted in narrative.’ In trying to think 
about the pasts, presents and futures of slavery, this book rejects the 
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idea of a clean break between past and present, old and new, and 
instead explores what of slavery survives in the institutions of race, 
gender and nation and some of the ways in which, as Paul Gilroy 
argues, slaveries provide a fi rm rebuke to the idea of history as prog-
ress (Gilroy 1993). The prevailing discourse of modern slavery tends 
to take the idea of rupture as its starting point, and it works hard to 
relegate racial chattel slavery to the past, to seal it off from the present 
and the future and to re-imagine the slavery of the present as differ-
ent in kind. Kevin Bales, the key advocate of this approach, argues that 
this new form of slavery is a product of the global economy, driven by 
the pursuit of profi t and the vulnerability of the slaves. New slavery is 
global, temporary and non-racial in the sense that ethnic differences 
are supposed to be secondary to economic considerations. There is a 
glut of slaves on the market, and so they are now defi ned as cheap and 
disposable rather than as long-term investments. ‘Human beings’, says 
Bales, ‘have become disposable tools for doing business, the same as 
a box of ballpoint pens’ (Jensen 2001). This is framed as a distinctively 
modern problem associated with globalisation. New slavery involves 
no legal ownership, high profi ts for the slaveholders, and a surplus 
of disposable slaves. ‘Old’ slavery is equated with the Southern US 
and the production of material goods (Quirk 2006). As Stephen Hop-
good argues, there is ‘underlying Bales’s account, an under-theorised 
narrative of modernity, where bonded Indian labourers live in the 
“dark ages”, where Mauritania is “almost medieval”’ (Hopgood 1999) 
and there is little space for thinking about the more complicated 
antecedents for brutal exploitation and subordination. The danger, 
as Orlando Patterson points out, is that the defi nition of new slavery 
confl ates slavery ‘with forms of exploitation not considered slavery in 
most non-western societies or in any historically informed and con-
ceptually rigorous use of the term’ (Patterson 2012).
This book seeks to challenge the old/new split at the heart of 
the defi nition of modern slavery, and in particular the narratives of 
modernity and race that lend it much of its power. What happens if 
instead of relegating racial chattel slavery to the past we think instead 
about the afterlives and legacies of ‘old’ slavery that continue to haunt 
and inform the present? Such a focus brings us to a very different set 
of political concerns, and to a very different vision of the past and of 
human agency, culture and endeavour within which people bear very 
little resemblance to ballpoint pens. This book asks what happens 
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when we make slavery the hub of our analysis of political thought and 
our narratives of modernity rather than treating it as an unfortunate 
and embarrassing lapse from which we should turn away. The shift 
in perspective changes what the project of political theory is saying 
about key concepts such as freedom, democracy, equality and citizen-
ship by revealing the domination and violence that are ‘un-seeable in 
prevailing theoretical frames’ (Balfour 2016, 83–4). It also allows us to 
explore slavery as an idea and a political concept as well as an insti-
tution and a practice, and to understand its complex and contested 
relationship to social, economic and political relations, and to history. 
Slavery emerges as an integral part of colonialism, sovereignty and 
political thought and central to the meanings of class, gender and 
race. It remains part of the answer to the questions about which iden-
tities are visible, whose identity matters and who counts as human 
and as a person, as a subject and a citizen. Bringing slavery into his-
tory, into political thought and into the present troubles the narratives 
of progress and reminds us that change is not the same as emancipa-
tion, leaving us able to ask which problems and whose concerns are 
supposed to have been left to rest in the past (Balfour 2016, 81) and 
what is at stake in presumptions of political innocence and in claims 
to newness.
The discourse of the newness of new slavery is part of a story within 
which ‘the absence of slavery comes to be viewed as natural or normal, 
rather than remarkable’ (Quirk 2006, 585). Freedom appears as the 
innate human condition, an implicit longing within each individual and 
the inevitable outcome of liberal politics. This narrative makes it easy 
to lose sight of the distinction between freedom and unfreedom as an 
ongoing social struggle, within which ‘free status may be nothing more 
than a trench’, and the success of some in reaching this refuge ‘may 
merely reinforce the boundary between them and those who remain 
in the line of fi re’ (Binder 1995, 2022–3). As Guyora Binder points out, 
no slave-holding class ever lost out in the process of disenslavement or 
manumission. The freeing of some individuals perpetuates the slavery 
of others, and ‘[e]ven sincerely motivated moral crusades to suppress 
slavery carry risks to freedom’ (Binder 1995, 2075). This book is con-
cerned with these risks to freedom which continue to trouble mod-
ern abolitionism, and with the impossibility of reclaiming an innocent 
modernity that can disentangle freedom from slavery.
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For some, the brutal dislocation of slavery means that it cannot 
be given a history, instead the erasure of collective memory and the 
transgenerational haunting creates a ‘nonhistory’, a problem-space 
within which the past has not yet emerged as history. Writing about 
Haiti, Carole Sweeney argues that slavery rests on a core of unrepre-
sentability, a central absence, within which traces of violence, rupture 
and dislocation are ‘producing a present that is played out as repeti-
tion and recurrence, endlessly circling around a central lacuna of loss 
and dispossession’ (Sweeney 2007, 54). As a result, many engage-
ments with the pasts of slavery are about haunting stories, tales and 
memories ‘that struggle to fi nd a narrative’ or a chronology (Sweeney 
2007, 56). At the same time, recent economic history has begun to 
adopt a broader conception of the slave-economy, opening up the 
possibility of new narratives that can bring the slave trade and slavery 
in the New World ‘properly back into British and European history’ 
(C. Hall 2014, 25) in ways that problematise whiteness as an identity 
that carried privilege and power. The delineation of black men and 
women as property had, Hall argues, as ‘its counterpoint the naming 
of whiteness as a different kind of property – the property of freedom 
– access to public and private privileges, the possibility of controlling 
critical aspects of one’s own life rather than being the object of oth-
ers’ domination’ (C. Hall 2014, 28). In bringing together the histories 
of both enslavers and enslaved, we can begin to unpick some of the 
ways in which the history of slavery has been assigned to black people 
as a kind of special property (Gilroy 1993). This is coupled with a set 
of parallel assumptions about political subjectivity that ‘substitute an 
integrative ideal of whiteness for more transformative conceptions 
of freedom’ (Balfour 2016, 81). Thinking through slavery and free-
dom together in the history of political thought and in narratives of 
modernity forces us to reconsider whose property the history of slav-
ery is, and how it might be possible to forge more transformative con-
ceptions of freedom. As Jared Sexton argues, following Grandin, the 
modern world owes its existence to slavery, and that is an ‘impossible 
debt’ (Sexton 2014, 11). The impossibility of that debt means that we 
fi nd ourselves in the problem-space identifi ed by Saidiya Hartman, 
between the no longer and the not yet. This book is an attempt to 
explore some of this space between old and new slaveries by thinking 
about the pasts, presents and futures of slavery as they are constituted 
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in the ideas of Aristotle, Locke, Kant, Hegel, Wollstonecraft and Mill, 
asking how the past, present and future might emerge as history in 
political thought.
MODERN SLAVERY: KNOWING AND NOT-KNOWING
In 2000, Kevin Bales, founder of Free the Slaves, published and pro-
ceeded to publicise an estimate of 27 million slaves in the contempo-
rary world (May 2013). In 2013, the Walk Free Foundation launched 
a report titled The Global Slavery Index, which enlarged this estimate 
to 29.8 million people, and their 2014 report puts the number at 35.8 
million men, women and children. These numbers are largely arrived 
at by totting up estimates of people thought to fall into a series of 
other categories, such as bonded labour, forced labour, worst forms of 
child labour, early and forced marriage, and traffi cking. These num-
bers are important for understanding the relationship between old 
and new slavery because they allow the new abolitionists to claim 
that there are more slaves in the world today than were shipped 
across the Atlantic as part of New World slavery. In terms of sheer, 
quantifi able, human suffering, ‘the quantum of misery’, they argue 
that new slavery wins out over old slavery. The rhetoric is all about 
how pervasive slavery is in its new globalised guise; it is an evil that 
is happening all around the world. As Theresa May put it in article 
for the Telegraph in 2013, it is ‘hidden in plain sight. It is walking 
our streets, supplying shops and supermarkets, working in fi elds, 
factories or nail bars, trapped in brothels or cowering behind the 
curtains in an ordinary street’ (May 2013). The key question, as Joel 
Quirk points out, has ‘gradually become which practices and insti-
tutions are suffi ciently similar to legal slavery that they deserve to 
be legitimately classifi ed as such’ (Quirk, 2006, 566). The UN Work-
ing Group on Slavery endorses this ‘open-ended approach’, deem-
ing the forced exploitation of labour, serious hardship and serious 
deprivations of liberty to be legitimately classifi ed as slavery. All of 
these categories taken as proxies for slavery present their own prob-
lems of defi nition, and none of them straightforwardly constitutes 
what people like Bales defi ne as modern slavery. Instead, the focus 
is on the idea of a threshold, looking for practices that are as Quirk 
puts it ‘suffi ciently horrendous and/or analogous’ to be classifi ed as 
5606_Brace.indd   10 12/01/18   6:03 PM
Shining a Light on Slavery? 11
slavery (Quirk 2006, 578). The problem of the parameters of the con-
cept remains, and that ‘threshold’ is constantly being renegotiated. 
Many of these are overlapping categories, and there is no coherent 
rationale that links these disparate practices together (Quirk 2006, 
567). We can, as Quirk points out, ‘quickly end up with a multifaceted 
continuum, where concepts such as traffi cking, slavery, and servitude 
can be invoked interchangeably to highlight acute forms of suffer-
ing and exploitation’ (Quirk 2006, 577). The new slavery discourse 
is caught up in what Quirk has termed ‘classifi catory conundrums’ 
about where to draw the line between a slave and a non-slave, and 
about how to distinguish between literal and rhetorical claims of 
slavery (Quirk 2006, 598). How should we understand the entangle-
ments between the literal and the rhetorical in the writings of Aris-
totle, Locke and Hegel on the subject of slavery and enslavability? 
What did they know about acute forms of suffering and exploitation, 
and how did that knowledge affect what they understood freedom to 
mean and their constructions of subjectivity? 
This question of knowing and not-knowing structures our under-
standing of slavery both in the past and in the present, and calls on 
us to consider the place of wilful or motivated ignorance in relation 
to what we choose to remember about slavery and its place in our 
histories of freedom, enlightenment and empire and what we choose 
to label and fi ght against as instances of modern slavery. This is con-
nected to what Charles Mills has called ‘white ignorance’, which can 
take the form of individuals blocking certain truths or of the social 
suppression of pertinent knowledge, and is connected to ‘mainstream 
theorizing in political science that frames American sexism and rac-
ism as “anomalies”’, the exception rather than the norm (Mills 2007, 
17). As Mills argues in his discussion of Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, 
this is about the refusal of white people to see the black experience, 
their ‘systematic misperception’ that means that they see, in the words 
of Ellison’s protagonist, ‘only my surroundings, themselves, or fi g-
ments of their imagination’, which captures very neatly a whole set of 
criticisms of modern slavery discourse (Mills 2007, 18). 
The discourse of new slavery is all about uncovering, acknowl-
edging and confronting the ‘scourge’ of modern slavery. This is pre-
sented as diffi cult to do because it is taken to be self-evident that, 
as Theresa May put it, it is ‘scarcely credible that slavery can exist in 
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our modern age’ (May 2013). It is something that we are supposed to 
assume has been consigned to history books, belonging in a different 
century. Written into the new slavery rhetoric is the idea that slavery 
belongs to a benighted past. This is linked to a trope within new slav-
ery rhetoric that assumes that ‘we’ know about slavery in the past, but 
not about the hidden evil in our nail bars. This is a concept of slav-
ery that relies on a particular interpretation of the world and is ori-
ented towards a certain understanding, and which plays on the idea 
of not-knowing, on the supposed ignorance of its audience and their 
inability to see and bear witness. In her TED talk, Lisa Kristine says, 
‘I felt so horrible and ashamed at my lack of knowledge. It burned a 
hole in my stomach’ (Kristine 2012). To fi ll this hole, she describes her 
journey into modern day slavery, which is ‘all around us, but we just 
don’t see it’. For both May and Kristine, as self-styled new abolition-
ists, what they need to do is ‘shine a light on slavery’ (Kristine 2012). 
Theresa May introduced her Modern Slavery Bill by quoting from 
William Wilberforce: ‘[Y]ou may choose to look the other way but you 
can never again say that you did not know’ (May 2013). What they see 
when they look around, when they shine their lights, are their own 
myths, themselves and fi gments of their imagination. The concept of 
new slavery is driving their perception of other people’s exploitation 
and oppression and giving the abolitionists a conceptual apparatus 
that allows them to engage in the ‘deliberate forgetting’ of ‘old’ slav-
ery while accusing others of, and retrospectively blaming themselves 
for, failing to see what is all around them. In drawing on Wilberforce 
and the history of abolitionism in this way, May was calling on ‘feel-
good history for whites’ (Mills 2007, 30) at the same time as inviting 
them to feel bad and ashamed of their ‘ignorance’. 
This version of not-seeing is linked to presumptions of political inno-
cence which are central to the new antislavery discourse, as they were 
to the original abolitionism of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. 
Abhorrence of slavery and an inherent love of liberty are constructed 
as defi ning characteristics of what it means to be British (in particular), 
and it is this that renders the idea of slaves on ‘our’ soil ‘scarcely credible’ 
(May 2013). In this, the new abolitionists are drawing on a much older 
story of Enlightenment and abolition which is also about nation, and 
about gender. For Benezet and Sharp in the eighteenth century, slavery 
was tainting the ideals and corrupting the character of the nation. As 
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Srividhya Swaminathan argues, the debates over the slave trade were 
central in helping to defi ne the national character, setting Britons apart 
from other Europeans and creating a place for British colonial identity 
(Swaminathan 2009, 13). The debates created what Swaminathan calls 
a common morality, a national code of conduct that was applicable both 
at home and abroad. It is this delineation that a Conservative Home 
Secretary could still draw upon in the twenty-fi rst century, a shared per-
ception of cultural identity, the idea that the air in England is too pure for 
slaves, and of the superiority of English liberty and citizenship, a constel-
lation of humanity, nationality and spirituality, with the value of liberty 
vaunted as its foremost characteristic. ‘Let us’, said Elizabeth Coltman in 
1824, referring to the British, and to British women in particular, ‘whose 
moral perceptions are unblended by interest or prejudice – whose char-
ity is unwarped by partiality and hypocrisy’ be the fi rst to liberate our 
own slaves (Coltman 1824, 19). The Europe of the abolitionists in the 
eighteenth century and the ‘West’ of the abolitionists today, is a place of 
generosity and bravery, remarkable for its humanity and justice. New 
abolitionism feeds into what Anita Rupprecht has called ‘a long domi-
nant discourse of humanitarian triumph’ (Rupprecht 2008, 266). While 
‘slaves’ in India are understood by Bales to be ‘trapped by tradition’, in 
modern liberal democracies the chain of history has been broken by the 
legal abolition of slave trading and slavery in the nineteenth century. 
In this account, Europe entered history, and became the centre of the 
world, in the moment that it abolished slavery and moved out of the 
dark ages and into Enlightenment. 
Bales, in Woods’s view, is summarising the mainstream perspective 
of white civil society, which holds that slavery ended with abolition in 
1865, and its vestiges were eradicated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, so 
that any inequalities or iniquities that remain are to do with something 
other than racism, with ‘the innate inadequacies of those left behind’ 
(T. P. Woods 2013, 130). Bales’s focus on the ‘old slavery’ of the Ameri-
cas, Quirk argues, ‘sanctions the popular notion that slavery was 
chiefl y a European sin, which conclusively came to end in the nine-
teenth century’ (Quirk 2006, 530). This ignores the persistence and 
prevalence of slavery, particularly in the nineteenth century, and the 
millions of slaves who remained in servitude in Africa, Asia and the 
Middle East after its formal legal abolition in Europe and the US. 
Antislavery always had a legislative goal: legal abolition was seen as 
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decisive political action, and a clear sign of the British commitment to 
liberty. 
In its twenty-fi rst century incarnation, the abolitionist myth is more 
about the idea of a slavery that takes place elsewhere, in ‘other’ cul-
tures, where the idea of slavery is suddenly no longer scarcely believ-
able. Bales talks about how the slaves he has identifi ed in Pakistan 
have an underdeveloped understanding of the world, are too honest 
to perceive they are being trapped, and cannot grasp the idea of choice 
(Bales 2000). Tryon Woods argues that modern slavery discourse pres-
ents modern slavery as a product of African culture, a mundane feature 
of contemporary Nigeria, for example, where it is described as ‘woven 
into the fabric’ of Nigerian national life. Woods quotes from David 
Puttnam in 2004, saying ‘half of you feels sympathy, but the other half 
just wants to shake the people here and say look, this is a large, wealthy 
powerful country. Put the structures in place. Show some determina-
tion’ (Little 2004). As Woods points out, this focus on the attitudes of 
the people in the Edo delta, their lack of determination, says nothing 
about how the state has been eviscerated by the multinational energy 
industry, and provides no political or economic context that would 
link colonisation to the present. Instead, in an instance of deliberate 
forgetting and systematic misperception, modern slavery discourse 
suggests that it is African cultural defi ciencies that produce predatory 
economic processes which in turn cannot support civilised democra-
cies. Modern day slavery, Woods concludes, ‘reproduces a disabling 
historical amnesia’ (T. P. Woods 2013, 126) that is underwritten by 
anti-blackness and by ‘the specter of slavery that both haunts it and 
on which it parasitically feeds’ (T. P. Woods 2013, 120). The ahistori-
cism of the new abolitionist approach obscures the ‘ongoing calculus 
of racial slavery’s afterlife’ (T. P. Woods 2013, 122) just as it argues that 
it is shining a light on slavery.
It is possible to trace an abolitionist narrative that connects across 
from the eighteenth to the twenty-fi rst century and is united around 
trying to identify the slave as the victim, the object of sympathy, and 
in the process takes the people identifi ed as slaves and victims out-
side of history, and into a space where it is impossible to uncover the 
meanings and motivations of those involved. The disabling ahistori-
cism is to do with the insistence that it is possible to tell the difference 
between slavery and drudgery by using the market as the marker of 
freedom, by ignoring and disavowing race and racial inequality, and 
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by objectifying the slave. It helps to spend time in the company of the 
eighteenth-century abolitionists and their opponents because they 
were tackling real slavery as an institution created and constrained by 
law, and because they too were selective in their worldview, and their 
approach has an afterlife – the afterlife of antislavery needs exploring 
in conjunction with the afterlife of slavery. The discourse of new slav-
ery brings past and present into an uncomfortable relationship, and 
we need to consider carefully, as this book tries to do, how to bring the 
history of slavery back in.
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Chapter 2
ARISTOTLE AND THE STRANGENESS OF SLAVES
Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery, set out in the Politics and in the 
Nicomachean Ethics is a useful starting point for thinking about slavery 
in the history of political thought, and for introducing and developing 
some of the key themes of this book. The idea of conceiving of the 
slave as an animate tool raises a whole set of questions about the sup-
posed subhumanity of the slave and how that status is understood in 
the history and politics of slavery. I am particularly interested in the 
‘incompleteness’ of the slave, and the ways in which his or her soul 
was understood to be lacking in spirit, in the constituent elements 
required to build a free citizen. Aristotle is an important place to start 
because his arguments bring together political slavery and what Mary 
Nyquist calls psycho-ethical slavery, and because his explicitly political 
approach to slavery draws attention to the question of how we should 
theorise the relationship between slavery as metaphor and slavery as 
lived experience. Did his theory of natural slavery have anything to 
say about the lives of actually existing slaves in ancient Greece? 
Nyquist discusses the differences between fi gurative, political slav-
ery and chattel slavery, where political slavery is about the threat to 
the democratic polis and not about the condition of chattel slaves. Her 
analysis of the ‘polyvalent metaphor of slavery’ (Nyquist 2013, 5) draws 
attention to the ‘entangled interrelations’ (Nyquist 2013, 2) between 
political servitude and chattel slavery, and these entanglements are 
particularly gnarly in Aristotle’s theory. Within the polis, political slav-
ery is represented as the illegitimate domination of free, male citizens 
who expected to participate as equals in the political process, exercising 
their freedom as political agents, none of them ruling over others. Polit-
ical slavery comes about when ‘a leader fails to protect the citizenry’s 
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freedom, instead attempting to become its master’ (Nyquist 2013, 22). 
As Nyquist points out, the injustice of this political enslavement lies ‘in 
the attempt to enslave those who patently ought not to be enslaved’ 
(Nyquist 2013, 23). Participants met in the political arena as equals, but 
they were masters within their own households. Aristotle’s opposi-
tion to political slavery was not an attack on slavery as wrong in itself. 
Democratic citizens were the masters of slaves within their households, 
and the boundary between the household and the polis was crucial in 
guaranteeing the freedom of the citizen. Someone who failed to dis-
tinguish the polis from his own private household and presumed to 
treat citizens as if they were slaves became a tyrant by falling victim to 
his ‘grandiose desire for power’ and failing to maintain the boundary 
between public and private (Nyquist 2013, 38). Slavery was entangled 
in the structure of politics.
Nyquist argues that focusing on the structure of slavery within 
the household ‘has the effect of naturalizing it’ by bringing it into the 
same space as marital and parental relations, which are understood to 
be determined by nature (Nyquist 2013, 25), but at the same time to 
be social relations. The slave–master relationship within the house-
hold was ambiguous because the slave was classed as chattel and so 
‘ostensibly belongs to the same category as nonhuman animals and 
other possessions’ (Nyquist 2013, 25). As long as the master’s power 
was directed towards the fulfi lment of purely private needs, despotic 
power was justifi ed and it was accepted that the household master 
was not accountable to others for how he used his power. Free citi-
zens were the masters of natural slaves. Nyquist identifi es an opposi-
tion between those for whom slavery ‘would represent a demeaning, 
traumatic loss and those for whom it was supposed to be natural’ 
(Nyquist 2013, 26). Aristotle ‘argues at one and the same time for 
the categorical naturalness of household slavery and the unnaturalness 
for Greeks of despotism in the political sphere, associating enslaved 
barbaroi with both’ (Nyquist 2013, 49).
The big, behind-the-scenes question is about the where race fi ts in 
to these ancient conceptions of slavery. This is, of course, an anachro-
nistic question, but the construction of the barbarism of non-Greeks, 
and the ways in which they were represented as fi tted for slavery are 
fascinating and clearly have parallels with seventeenth-century nar-
ratives of the state of nature and with the eighteenth and nineteenth 
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centuries’ apologies for slavery. This brings us to the vexed and diffi -
cult question of how to make comparisons and draw parallels between 
ancient Greece and, for example, nineteenth-century America. In one 
sense, of course, this is impossible to do, but the temptation is almost 
irresistible when you read and engage with the arguments of George 
Fitzhugh, or William Harper and his defence of slave-owning in 1838, 
where he makes self-conscious use of the ancients’ theory of natural 
slavery and argues that slaveholders in Carolina should derive inspira-
tion and wisdom from the slavery model of Greece and Rome. Like 
Aristotle, Harper sees the structure of slavery as resting on the cat-
egorical naturalness of household slavery and the unnaturalness of 
attempting to enslave people who ought not to be enslaved. Harper 
uses Aristotelian arguments about natural slavery to argue that ‘society 
must exclude from civil and political privileges those who are unfi tted 
to exercise them, by infi rmity, unsuitableness of character, or defect 
of discretion’ (Harper 1838, 7). In his view, the civilised and cultivated 
man had a right over ‘the savage and ignorant’: ‘It is as much in the 
order of nature, that men should enslave each other, as that other ani-
mals should prey upon each other’ (Harper 1838, 11). Aristotle made 
the same analogy between slavery and hunting. Harper’s question 
about slavery was one that had been answered by Aristotle: ‘If there 
are sordid, servile and laborious offi ces to be performed, is it not better 
that there should be sordid, servile, and laborious beings to perform 
them?’ (Harper 1838, 33). 
As Page DuBois argues, slavery appears in classical historiographi-
cal work as a closed and static system, and that stasis needs to be 
challenged through the recognition that slavery is not monolithic, 
but has its own histories and variations (DuBois 2008, 25). In Greek 
slavery, the distinction between helotry, as the collective enslavement 
of conquered peoples who remained in their communities, and chat-
tel slavery, which brought slaves into individual households through 
traumatic displacement, was central to the complex meanings of 
slavery (DuBois 2008, 25). Then, there was a hierarchy among the 
slaves. Some were trusted members of the household, others were 
regarded as dangerous and hostile prisoners of war, and still others 
worked down the silver mines or on grand public building projects. 
There were slaves everywhere; public slaves worked in the police 
force and picked up the bodies of the dead. State slaves were used 
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as the police force to restrain, arrest and detain citizens because ‘[a]n 
important part of what being a citizen meant was not being manhan-
dled by other citizens’ (Fisher 1993, 56). Public slaves also worked as 
managers of coin, weights and measures, as keepers of the archives 
and as clerks and assistants to the council. They were paid regular 
salaries and were able to accumulate some wealth. They are there in 
the archaeological record, in literary, historical and theoretical texts. 
Once we start to think about the ancient context, what does it mean 
to conceptualise slavery as a place of no return, an order of nature, 
especially in the context of manumission? 
This means thinking about the meanings of the contested, in-
between statuses of freedom and the mobile borders between human-
ity and personhood. This is particularly interesting in the context of 
ancient Greece and the processes of manumission. Rachel Zelnick-
Abramowitz asks what it is to be a manumitted slave. That is a ques-
tion that resonates throughout this book, but is posed most sharply 
in this chapter. The question of what it means to be a slave is linked 
to the question of what it means to stop being one. What lies on 
the other side of the slavery/freedom binary that ancient Greece and 
Rome did so much to construct and defend? (Zelnick-Ambramowitz 
2005). The interesting thing is how many common themes emerge 
here, and how blurry the line is between slavery and freedom even 
as it is being drawn. In Aristotle’s theory of ‘natural’ slavery, we can 
already trace the elements of freedom, belonging and labour that 
intersect with each other to defi ne what it means not to be a slave.
THE POLIS
The fi rst and most important point to make is that Aristotle’s conception 
of nature was ‘thoroughly teleological’ (Aristotle 1995, xi). The identity of 
the polis lay in its organisation and structure, and this organisation was 
the constitution. Human beings were polis-creating and polis-inhabiting 
animals, and the city or the polis existed for the good life. The positive 
moral purpose of the city was to enable citizens to live a life of virtue 
or excellence, to make possible a life of Aristotelian moral virtue. From 
the start, as R. F. Stalley points out in his introduction to the Politics, it is 
implicit in Aristotle’s conception of the good life that not everyone can 
achieve it, and that the institution of slavery is essential in guaranteeing 
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the possibility of a good life of virtue for some. When William Harper 
looked back to the great republics of antiquity, the lesson he took from 
them was that ‘slavery is compatible with the freedom, stability and long 
duration of civil government, with denseness of population, great power, 
and the highest civilization’ (Harper 1838, 45). The fi rst natural form of 
association was the family, the next was the village and the fi nal or perfect 
form of association was the polis, which ‘while it comes into existence for 
the sake of mere life, . . . exists for the sake of the good life’ (Aristotle 1995, 
1252b7). Because in Aristotle’s teleological theory the whole was neces-
sarily prior to the part, the city existed by nature and was prior to the indi-
vidual. For Aristotle, there was a natural impulse in all men towards an 
association of this sort because man is a political animal. He is, by nature, 
what Millett calls ‘a polis-creature’ (Millett 2007, 181), and the polis has 
priority in nature over the household and the individual. This inspiring 
vision of the city-state as the fi nal or perfect form of association contin-
ues to defi ne what many political theories mean by ‘politics’, and so what 
it means to be constructed as outside the scope of the political.
The polis as an inclusive system of social ethics underpinned by 
laws and unwritten rules was a shared, dynamic enterprise geared 
to the highest goal: of living a good life. The polis was ‘a community 
of persons who associate because of their need to make a living, but 
who have as their goal the good life, i.e. a life of fulfi lment exempli-
fying the characteristically human virtues’ (Schofi eld 1999, 103). The 
exemplary humans who were members of the polis were assumed to 
be free and equal and, as Malcolm Schofi eld puts it, capable of deter-
mining their own strategies for living (Schofi eld 1999, 103). Freedom 
is rational self-direction. The free man could see for himself, through 
the exercise of his reason, the ends he ought to pursue for the sake 
of his own well-being (Walsh 1997, 499). This rational self-direction 
is connected to democratic freedom in particular ways through the 
shared capacity for deliberation. Such free men had the capacity to 
live as they wished, to share equally in public responsibility and offi ce, 
and to be treated equally before the law. They were true citizens, not 
mere subjects, meaning that they were allowed to share in delibera-
tion and decision, and that the good of the polis included their own 
good (Walsh 1997, 501). In a democratic polis, all the free inhabitants 
are ‘full citizens, sharing in decision and offi ce’, and pursuing a com-
mon good that includes their own good. The fl ourishing of a properly 
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ordered city is the highest good, and perfect freedom is to contribute 
to its fl ourishing, and to fl ourish within it (Walsh 1997, 503). 
As Schofi eld argues, these egalitarian principles opened up the 
potential for hierarchy, and some people who were not slaves, such 
as farmers, manual workers and people engaged in trade, lived lives 
that were devoted to ignoble purposes, or left them no leisure for 
noble pursuits. Such men were only able to think in terms of wealth 
and freedom, rather than of virtue and excellence, and so it was clear 
that they should be excluded from citizenship (Schofi eld 1999, 106). 
The status of manual labour was demeaning in Ancient Greece. 
Greek cities developed as communities of farmers, and the ideal citi-
zen was a soldier and an independent, nearly self-suffi cient farmer. 
As Athens developed its craft and manufacturing, farming remained 
the most respectable basis for wealth. Working the land was regarded 
as more gentlemanly and masculine than manufacture, and as a bet-
ter preparation for military action. These equal, democratic citizens 
were comfortable and materially secure, they listened to reason and 
they did not envy others (Patterson 1991b). The slave owner who was 
also a free citizen was capable of self-direction and of directing oth-
ers, and the free citizen was also a slaveholder. 
In Book 1 of the Politics, the basic unit of the polis is the house-
hold, which includes husband and wife, father and children and mas-
ter and slave. Women, children, slaves and animals are all members 
of the polis ‘constructed as a geographic, agricultural, social, religious, 
productive and reproductive community, though not as a political 
community’ (Nyquist 2013, 49). In Book 3, the polis is less inclusive, 
and the basic unit of politics is the male citizen. The polis becomes 
a political community, whose end, the good life, excludes slaves and 
animals. Against this background, slavery appears as an institution 
of benefi t to the master, and its ‘individual, private character is sud-
denly thrown into relief’ (Nyquist 2013, 49).The equality of politi-
cal rule envisaged by Aristotle creates the polis as a community of 
those who are capable of virtue, where ‘equality is secured only at the 
price of hierarchy: the subordination of those who perform the lower 
functions’ (Schofi eld 1999, 112). Women and chattel slaves were rel-
egated to the household, and placed ‘below the threshold of political 
discourse’ (Schofi eld 1999, 110). Women were incorporated into the 
oikos under the guardianship of their male kin. They were barred from 
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legal proceedings and from making contracts to dispose of signifi cant 
amounts of property, and they were not polis-creatures. Women and 
slaves were understood to be naturally subordinate beings in relation 
to free men, and free men were intended by nature to exercise per-
manent leadership over them. Women must obey because of men’s 
innate inability to command, and because the good life of the polis 
concerns only free men ‘whom women must serve as a functional 
contribution towards the males attaining perfection’ (Femenias 1994, 
170). Women played a vital role in transmitting citizenship rights and 
in contributing to the survival of the oikos. The polis depended on the 
presence of slaves and foreigners who were not members to sustain 
its own vision of itself as an inclusive system. 
THE NATURE OF RULE AND THE NATURE OF THE SLAVE
Schofi eld argues that the dominant question throughout the Politics 
is about how many forms of rule there are, and Aristotle’s answer is 
that there are several. His interest in slavery arises only in the con-
text of ‘his preoccupation with the different forms of rule’ (Schofi eld 
1999, 132). These different forms of rule are grounded in the nature 
of human beings, and slavery works at the limit, representing ‘the 
extreme case in a range of cases in natural rule’ (Schofi eld 1999, 132). 
Aristotle argued for a natural basis for the difference between slavery 
and political rule, and made a sharp distinction between rule over 
slaves and the rule of equals in the political process. 
For Aristotle, there must necessarily be a pairing of those who 
cannot exist without one another. He was aiming for the union of the 
naturally ruling element with the element that was naturally ruled for 
the preservation of both: ‘The element which is able, by virtue of its 
intelligence, to exercise forethought, is naturally a ruling and master 
element; the element which is able, by virtue of its bodily power, to 
do the physical work, is a ruled element, which is naturally in a state 
of slavery; and master and slave have accordingly a common interest’ 
(Aristotle 1995, 1252a24). Masters and slaves had a different kind of 
knowledge. Slaves were instructed in the nature of their duties, and 
could learn to be skilled and profi cient in cookery and domestic ser-
vice, but the character of their knowledge remained servile. Masters 
of slaves must simply know how to command what the slave must 
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know how to do. This knowledge, Aristotle points out, is not great or 
majestic, and many free men delegated the management of slaves to 
a steward, and spent the time they saved on politics or philosophy. 
The question then arose of whether the slave had any ‘goodness’ 
or virtue beyond that of discharging his or her function as an instru-
ment and performing his or her menial service. Did they possess 
goodness of a higher value, such as temperance, fortitude or justice, 
or did they have no virtue beyond the bodily services they provided? 
Either alternative presented diffi culties for Aristotle’s account, and 
for the theory of natural slavery. If they did possess such virtues, how 
were they different from free men? If they did not, how could they be 
characterised as human and as possessing reason? For Aristotle, the 
difference between those who were naturally ruled and those who 
naturally ruled was a difference in kind. The subject could only be 
properly ruled if he was temperate and just, and so those who were 
naturally slaves shared in goodness, but their goodness was of a dif-
ferent kind. Free men, women and slaves shared in moral goodness, 
‘but not in the same way – each sharing only to the extent required 
for the discharge of his or her function’ (Aristotle 1995, 1260a4). The 
goodness of the slave was all about his relation to his master. Slaves 
were useful for the necessary purposes of life, and to discharge that 
function they needed just a little goodness: ‘only so much, in fact, as 
will prevent them from falling short of their duties through intem-
perance or cowardice’ (Aristotle 1995, 1260a33). Slaves lacked the 
prohairesis that enabled moral choice in advance of action (Millett 
2007, 185). Prohairetic activity combined desire and intelligence and 
disclosed the character of the one who acted and allowed him to 
live a ‘life based on choice’ (Frank 2004, 96). Natural slaves could not 
engage in this kind of activity, and instead had to have their choices 
made for them by someone with foresight. The slave ‘is a partner in 
his master’s life’ (Aristotle 1995, 1260a33), and once he was placed 
in that relation, he could mirror or approximate prohairetic activity 
(Frank 2004, 96). 
It was better for masters that natural slaves existed because it 
made it possible for them to live better lives. It was an incidental 
benefi t that being enslaved was good for natural slaves, making them 
‘capable of participating in and contributing to an intrinsically worth-
while life’ (Heath 2008, 266). Dobbs argues that once we put the slave 
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relationship into its proper teleological context, it becomes clear that 
it ‘in no way involves the dehumanization of the slave’ (Dobbs 1994, 
87). For Aristotle, despotic rule exercised in accord with nature was 
not exploitative, and the slave was both ‘property and partner of his 
master’. Through his relationship to the master, the slave shared in 
a distinctively human way of life and, according to Dobbs, ‘property 
in a natural slave derives from the fact that all human beings belong 
in a life partaking in the distinctively human telos’ (Dobbs 1994, 87). 
Dobbs argues that it was the master’s responsibility to ‘bring out such 
virtue as the slave can achieve’ (Dobbs 1994, 87), and he should do 
so out of concern for the excellence of his property, not just in order 
to maximise output. The rightfulness of the master’s dominion was 
‘conditioned upon the subordination of his own conduct to the natu-
ral order’ (Dobbs 1994, 88). Dobbs reads a kind of ‘humanisation’ of 
the slave into the partnership that resurfaces in Harper’s nineteenth-
century defence of slavery when he talks about the ‘virtues of slaves’, 
which include fi delity, submission to authority and the disposition 
to be attached to superiors. The slave, he declared, had no need for 
heroic virtues or elegant accomplishments. It was for the master ‘to 
compensate for this, by his own more assiduous cultivation, of the 
more generous virtues, and liberal attainments’ (Harper 1838, 30). 
This kind of despotic rule was only justifi ed as right by nature as 
long as ‘the master’s proprietorship in the slave derives from and duly 
respects the nature of the slave qua human being’ (Dobbs 1994, 86).
Those who were fi tted by nature to be slaves possessed only bodily 
powers and the faculty of understanding ‘the directions given by 
another’s reason’. The natural slave lacked nous, and ‘has no insight 
into what is fundamental’ (Dobbs 1994, 86). In Aristotle’s schema, 
the soul ruled the body with the authority of a master, reason ruled 
the appetite with the authority of a statesman. The body should 
be ruled by the soul, the affective part of the soul should be ruled 
by the rational part, and in the same way, animals should be ruled by 
man and the female ruled by the male. For Plato, men and women all 
had the same virtues, exercised in different realms, and to be a ruler 
required the exercise of these same virtues. Anyone could (in principle 
for Plato) become a ruler, and anyone could be ruled. For Aristotle, 
virtue was different in different kinds of people, and ruling was differ-
ent in different contexts, so that ‘what it is to rule well cannot simply 
be a matter of science’ (Deslauriers 2006, 59). The master was a master 
5606_Brace.indd   24 12/01/18   6:03 PM
Aristotle and the Strangeness of Slaves 25
because he was a certain kind of person, who possessed phronesis, a 
‘practical intellectual virtue that informs moral character’ (Deslauriers 
2006, 61). The desires of a free man were informed by the dictates of 
his reason. The naturalness of slavery came from these differences in 
intellectual and moral virtues, the distribution of these ‘psychic facul-
ties’ that rendered people capable of ruling well and with authority 
(Deslauriers 2006, 62). All men who differed from others as much as 
the body differs from the soul, or an animal from a man, ‘all such are 
by nature slaves’ (Aristotle 1995, 1254b16). For these people who were 
slaves by nature, it was better to be ruled by a master. For those whose 
function was bodily service, they produced their best when they sup-
plied such service to their masters; ‘Someone is thus a slave by nature 
if he is capable of becoming the property of another’ (Aristotle 1995, 
1254b16). This defi nition of what it means to be a slave by nature 
resonates through the centuries, putting the focus clearly on the defi -
ciencies of the slave, gendering the slave as male, describing what it 
means to be ‘slavish’, not what it means to try to force someone else 
to become your property. The slave apprehended reason in another, 
but had none of his own. The defi ciency of the natural slave was 
‘his failure to actualize the fi rst-level capacity for logos he possesses’ 
(Frank 2004, 96).The part and the whole, like the body and the soul, 
had an identical interest, and the slave was part of the master, ‘in the 
sense of being a living but separate part of his body’ (Aristotle 1995, 
1255b4). Moira Walsh gives the example of her hand. It has no inher-
ent purpose and cannot direct itself, but receives its purpose ‘from 
me or my intellect, which commands it to move in a particular way’ 
(Walsh 1997, 498).
THE SLAVE AS AN ANIMATE ARTICLE OF PROPERTY
Aristotle located the slave as property within the household. Prop-
erty was part of the household, and the art of acquiring property was 
part of household management. The household had to be furnished 
with appropriate instruments if its function was to be fulfi lled, and 
those instruments were partly inanimate and partly animate: ‘Each 
article of property is thus an instrument of the purpose of life, prop-
erty in general is a quantity of such instruments, the slave is an ani-
mate article of property’ (Aristotle 1995, 1253b23). This is Aristotle’s 
most famous formulation of what it means to be a slave, the slave as 
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a living tool. The description sums up what is understood to be the 
‘problem’ of slavery: the (im)possibility of reducing a human being 
to the status of an object. As Schofi eld argues, the ‘ensouled tool’ is 
not the name for a distinct species of animal, but a way of describing 
‘a perfectly recognisable sort of human being’ (Schofi eld 1999, 128), 
just not the sort of exemplary and virtuous human being who can 
inhabit the polis. In belonging to someone else, slaves were, accord-
ing to Vincent Rosivach, ‘something less than fully human, and prob-
ably closer to animal than to free man’ (Rosivach 1999, 146). Malcolm 
Bull argues that the slave’s incomplete soul was not enslaved by the 
master’s soul, but subject to it, so that the slave was still another soul. 
Aristotle constructed ‘a justifi cation of the enslavement of those whose 
humanity is somehow incomplete while retaining an awareness that 
slavery does not obliterate such humanity as they possess’ (Bull 1998, 
4). Someone who belonged to another person worked primarily for an 
external end, with no innate purpose or reason for being, but a ‘being-
for-other’ remained a human being (Femenias 1994, 169).
Aristotle made a distinction between the slave as a slave and 
the slave as a man. He made some room for justice in every rela-
tion between humans who were capable of participating in law and 
agreement (Millett 2007, 186). Slaves needed to have a small amount 
of appropriate virtue, developed by their masters, and to be given 
reasons for their instructions. In Bull’s analysis of the multiple self in 
slavery, this means that Aristotle captured something of the duality 
inherent in the condition of the slave. Fisher argues that the idea of 
friendship with a slave as a man ‘brings out the fundamental con-
tradiction very clearly’ (Fisher 1993, 97), and is compounded by the 
‘single most glaring contradiction’, the use of manumission as an 
incentive for all slaves. The slave was, potentially at least, fully human. 
The relationship between master and slave created a community of 
interest, a relationship of friendship between the master and slave 
‘when both of them naturally merit the position in which they stand’ 
(Aristotle 1995, 1255b4). Zelnick-Abramowitz’s analysis of friendship 
draws attention to the bonds of service and loyalty, and the wish to 
benefi t the other. She argues that these relations of benefactors and 
benefi ciaries could exist between equals and between unequals, and 
philia could exist in vertical and asymmetrical relationships. Slaves 
as human beings in relations with their masters depended on each 
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other, and on social connections based on suspicion, fear, co-oper-
ation, expectations and obligations. Faithful and resourceful slaves 
expected the freedom they had been promised by their masters (Zel-
nick-Abramowitz 2005). In return for their promised manumission, 
slaves were encouraged to be loyal and diligent, and then often found 
themselves still bound by their debts and by the conditions of their 
manumission long after they were supposed to have gained their 
independence. Manumitted slaves remained ‘essential, yet outsiders’ 
(Zelnick-Abramowitz 2005, 60). 
The slave as an animate tool was an instrument of action. Aristo-
tle recognised different kinds of rationality, practical and technical. 
Natural slaves could not achieve eudaimonia, the best kind of human 
life, because it consisted in virtuous activity, beyond the scope of tech-
nical rationality. Natural slaves did not share in the practical, architec-
tonic wisdom that provided overall guidance for life (Heath 2008, 247). 
They were incapable of prohairesis and eudaimonia, of virtuous action 
or deliberated choice, because they were characterised as not able to 
reason back from a goal to the action required to implement that goal. 
The slaves’ deliberative capacity was permanently impaired. They lived 
without the guidance of a stable conception of the overall good (Heath 
2008, 251). Aristotle’s theory of chattel slavery within the private realm 
of the household made clear that slavery is about ownership: ‘While the 
master is merely the master of the slave, and does not belong to him, 
the slave is not only the slave of his master; he also belongs entirely to 
him’ (Aristotle 1995, 1254a8). It was a slave’s nature to belong to another, 
and his nature was fulfi lled only when he actually belonged to another 
person (Rosivach 1999, 146). As Zelnick-Abramowitz argues, it is crucial 
that we understand slavery as a complex set of social relations, and not 
just as a straightforward property relationship. At the same time, it is 
important that we take the property element seriously, and recognise 
that it is the asymmetry of property and ownership that Aristotle uses to 
construct his vision of natural slavery: 
Anybody who by his nature is not his own man, but another’s, 
is by his nature a slave; anybody who, being a man, is an article 
of property is another’s man; an article of property is an instru-
ment intended for the purpose of action and separable from its 
possessor. (Aristotle 1995, 1254a13) 
5606_Brace.indd   27 12/01/18   6:03 PM
28 The Politics of Slavery
The slave, as DuBois argues, is ‘a sort of uncanny object, standing at 
the blind spot of modernity where the place of the subject and that of 
object intersect’ (DuBois 2008, 31). 
The slave in this account is alive but socially dead, ‘a personality 
without personhood’ (Bull 1998, 17). The slave is at the same time both 
a tool and a human being, and Aristotle ‘inscribed the social contra-
dictions of slavery within the soul(s) of slaves’ (Bull 1998, 17). This is 
a controversial and disputed reading of Aristotle which links him to 
Hegel and to W. E. B. DuBois, but it makes an interesting point about 
social death and about what Bull calls ‘the duplicated selves formed 
through slavery’ who do not fi t the model of unifi ed, authentic indi-
viduals (Bull 1998, 18). Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery lays the 
ground for later theories based on the premise that selves that do not 
fi t or are somehow incomplete will be excluded ‘from consideration 
as moral subjects’ (Bull 1998, 18). ‘From Aristotle onwards, having a 
unifi ed moral self has been seen as a privilege confi ned to a social 
elite’ (Bull 1998, 20). Bull is making a further point about the rela-
tionship between interpersonal and intrapersonal models of slavery. 
In both Aristotle and Hegel, he argues, the master–slave dyad is an 
interpersonal relation constructed as an intrapersonal one. Freedom 
in Aristotle is the freedom of rational self-direction both within the 
polis and within the soul. Individual defi ciency, for both slaves and 
women, entails political exclusion. Not having a unifi ed moral self 
will involve not being a citizen, so that the privilege is confi ned to an 
explicitly political as well as social elite. The distinction between citi-
zens and inhabitants turns out to make the number of benefi ciaries 
of Aristotle’s inspiring vision of the polis as an inclusive system much 
smaller than we might at fi rst imagine, and opens up the question 
of the humanity of the slave, and of the process of dehumanisation.
SLAVERY AND LABOUR
The great majority of slaves in Athens were household slaves, in the 
sense that they were formally the property of an individual oikos. 
Large numbers of them worked in the fi elds, especially at harvest 
time, and the enlarged household in Athens included slave-craftsmen 
and artisans. Outside the confi nes of the household, there were hired-
out slaves and those employed in the mines (Millett 2007, 203). They 
were all part of a differentiated and hierarchical system of slavery, with 
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domestic slaves at one end of the continuum and slave miners at the 
other. As Millett and Nyquist point out, Aristotle’s main concern was 
with the potentially close relationships and the complex psychological 
interactions of the household.
In his discussion of slavery in Roman history, Keith Bradley 
describes the dehumanising process of buying and selling slaves in 
the marketplace. Slaves stood on display on a raised platform, and 
potential buyers could insist that they jump up and down or undress. 
They were subject to intense scrutiny, and had to disclose any illness, 
wounds, scars or sores, deformities, pregnancy or menstrual diffi cul-
ties. It seems, Bradley argues, a ‘reasonable inference that the physical 
examination on the castata reduced the slave to the level of an object 
– an object that was generally mute, passive, and devoid of any human 
dignity’ (Bradley 1992, 129). Bradley concludes that ‘it was as though 
the slave were in fact an animal’ (Bradley 1992, 129). Sales of oxen, cat-
tle and mules, he points out, required similar disclosure of diseases and 
defects, and jurists made no distinction between animal and human. 
This chapter and the rest of the book will return to the ‘as though’, the 
‘as if’ construction of confl ating slaves and non-human animals, but 
Bradley’s wider point about the brutality of slavery in the ancient world 
is important.
The wealth of the rich in Athens was traditionally based on small-
scale, scattered landed estates, and there is debate over how much 
slave labour was employed in agriculture. Fisher’s survey of the evi-
dence in the sources concludes that ‘all prosperous and rich Athenians 
owned some slaves, as domestics and status-symbols’ and would have 
used them for agricultural work at peak periods (Fisher 1993, 41). 
He paints a fairly fl uid picture of slave ownership, with some poorer 
households investing in slaves when they were prospering and sell-
ing them again when times got hard. Slaves seem to have cost about 
twice as much as a cow or an ox, though they were cheaper than a 
mule, and poor families would have required a sizeable loan to make 
the purchase. It may well have been worth it for them to employ a few 
all-purpose slaves much of the time, both for the labour provided and 
the status it gave them in terms of freedom and citizenship. 
Large numbers of ‘the most expendable’ slaves were employed 
in the state-owned silver mines (Fisher 1993, 49) doing the most 
unpleasant, dangerous and unhealthy work. The less dangerous work 
at the surface was done by less expendable slaves who were bought 
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or hired by the people who leased the land. Slaves were also used in 
manufacturing weapons, pots, statues, knives, lamps and clothes, and 
manufacture of such items was an important source of ‘new wealth’ 
(Fisher 1993, 50). It is interesting that slaves, even in ancient Greece, 
were associated with new as well as landed wealth. This seems to me 
to undermine some of the assumptions behind the old/new slavery 
split as it operates now. Slavery appears from the start as a fl exible, 
adaptable form of labour and source of wealth. Occupations such as 
artisanal crafts, smithing or potting were considered to be demean-
ing, and living by buying and selling encouraged double-dealing 
and misrepresentation (Fisher 1993, 100). Manufacturing warped the 
spirit of the free Greek, rendering it slavish ‘since the work was done 
inside, in the dark and crouching over, not outside in the open air 
with the upright posture of a free man’ (Cartledge 1993, 173). It was 
shameful to be poor and compelled to perform such slavish labour. 
This brings us back to Harper’s description of sordid, servile and 
laborious beings, fi tted by nature for sordid, servile and hard work. 
Like a domesticated animal, the slave-by-nature helped his or her 
master by means of their body (Rosivach 1999, 147).
The identifi cation of the slave with the body was central to what it 
meant to be enslaved in Athens, and it extended beyond their sale and 
their labour. The testimony of slaves in an Athenian court was admissible 
only if it had been extracted under physical torture. As Cartledge points 
out, this was because, by defi nition, only free men could tell the truth: 
‘Against the pristine purity of the self-controlled democratic citizen’s 
body there was counterposed ideologically the aboriginal impurity of 
the un-self-controllable servile body – a body which was controllable, 
moreover, only by the master’s whip’ (Cartledge 1993, 175). Corporal 
punishment was a central and defi ning feature of what it meant to be 
a slave. Slaves were understood to lack the moral capacity to lie or to 
tell the truth without being compelled to do so, ‘and so the truth must 
be sought from their bodies’ (Rosivach 1999, 152). Giving evidence in 
court was a signal of free status, of having witnesses who were prepared 
to vouch for your story. Open access to the courts, as Fisher argues, 
was part of what it meant to be free, and so had to be denied to slaves 
(Fisher 1993, 60). 
Slaves were often treated legally as the property of their masters 
and bought, sold, bequeathed or confi scated ‘like land or beds’, as 
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Fisher puts it (Fisher 1993, 62). They could not form sexual relation-
ships without their masters’ approval, their partners or children might 
be legally sold, and they were precluded by law from exercising in 
wrestling grounds or being the lovers of free-born boys. Slaves, Fisher 
concludes (with an implicit assumption that the slaves are male), ‘had 
to accept that their bodies might be penetrated by free males, but 
they might not themselves penetrate the bodies of the free, male or 
female’ (Fisher 1993, 62). At the same time, the law assumed that 
slaves were persons, and had some minimal honour that deserved 
to be protected. The death of a slave was treated legally as the kill-
ing of an inferior person. If the slave were killed by someone other 
than the master, the master could prosecute the killer for homicide 
(Fisher 1993, 62). It is important to remember that the process of 
dehumanisation was never complete, even where slaves were most 
closely identifi ed with property, limited to their bodies and described 
as animate tools. It was impossible for them not to be involved in 
entangled interrelations, not only of chattel and political slavery, but 
also of social and property relations.
NATURE AND SLAVERY
For Aristotle’s structure of slavery to work, to function smoothly, nature 
needed to erect a physical, tangible difference between the bodies of 
freemen and the bodies of slaves: ‘But nature, though she intends, does 
not always succeed in achieving a clear distinction between men born to 
be masters and men born to be slaves’ (Aristotle 1995, 1254a13). Nature 
was able to distinguish slaves from non-slaves, but Frank argues that 
nature ‘secures no absolute boundaries and offers no permanent foun-
dations’ (Frank 2004, 96) because nature continued to be guided and 
determined by activity. Natural beings could always be otherwise, and 
claims about their identities were claims about their activities, and our 
activities are changeable and in constant interaction with our circum-
stances (Frank 2004, 98). The contrary of nature’s intention often hap-
pened, and so Aristotle argued that slavery by nature was a matter of the 
differences between souls, so that he could conclude that ‘just as some 
are by nature free, so others are by nature slaves, and for these latter the 
condition of slavery is both benefi cial and just’ (Aristotle 1995, 1254b39). 
Aristotle made a distinction between natural slavery and conventional 
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slavery, and rejected the idea that just slavery could be based on force. 
For Aristotle, it was a question of enslavability, of who naturally deserved 
to be in a condition of slavery. If slavery became about force rather than 
desert, then it would risk enslaving men of higher rank if they happened 
to be captured and sold. The possibility of slavery as a result of war con-
tradicted the idea of natural slavery, and the categorical claim that ‘there 
are some who are everywhere slaves, and others who are everywhere 
free’ (Aristotle 1995, 1255a21). Those who were ‘everywhere slaves’ were 
barbarians. Aristotle pointed out that among barbarians, the female and 
the slave occupied the same position because there was no naturally rul-
ing element among barbarians. 
The assumption was that barbarian and slave were by nature one 
and the same. For Aristotle, barbarians were naturally slavish, and 
since most of the slaves in Athens were barbarians, Aristotle can be 
characterised as accepting that most slaves in his own society were 
natural slaves (Schofi eld 1999, 133). Athenian chattel slaves were 
barbaroi, either born outside Greece or born in Greece of forbears 
who were born outside Greece. Usually, they had names that marked 
them as barbaroi, ethnic labels that were used to denote a ‘typical 
slave’ (Rosivach 1999, 129). The Greeks’ stereotypes of different peo-
ples were a product of their interactions with them (E. Hall 1989, 
108). As the barbaroi lived for longer amongst the Greeks, the domi-
nant myths of slavery changed, and instead of being characterised 
as speaking different languages, they were coded as ‘language-less’, 
not speaking any intelligible language at all, but making the sound 
of twittering birds (Rosivach 1999, 153). Not speaking Greek became 
a sign of their intellectual defi ciency, their inability to command 
themselves and their lack of interior logos. The natural slave was 
described as always having his neck bent and slanting, and as dis-
proportionately small, ugly or tattooed. The archetypal slave was 
Aesop, a Thracian who was imagined as ‘pot-bellied, weasel-armed, 
hunchbacked, a squalid, squinty, swarthy midget with crooked legs’ 
(Millett 2007, 196). The Scythian hinterland was seen as remote, 
intractable, desolate and untamed (E. Hall 1989, 114), and its inhab-
itants were coded both as nomads, armed with powerful bows, and 
as unspoiled innocents living in a well-governed utopia. The barbar-
ians were portrayed as impudent, rash and unsophisticated, relying 
on the ‘outdated machismo’ of their monarchs that was no match for 
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the ‘covert and cunning activities of the Greeks’ (E. Hall 1989, 122–3). 
Many of the stereotypes surrounding the invention of the barbar-
ians coalesced around their inability to restrain their passions. The 
failure to control his sexual desire was the standard trait of the 
barbarian male in Greek writers. He was a tyrant who let loose the 
savage appetites in his soul (E. Hall 1989, 125). 
Edith Hall makes the important point that as well as being con-
structed as savage, violent and highly masculinised, at other times 
barbarians appear as excessively refi ned and effeminate, luxuriating 
in exotic clothing and sumptuous funerals. Their concern for comfort 
and their excessive displays of grief were part of the ‘vocabularies of 
barbarism’ (E. Hall 1989, 128) which emphasised the Greek ‘appropri-
ation of moderation’ against different kinds of extremes (E. Hall 1989, 
127) and the ‘systematic feminization of Asia’ as emotional and sub-
servient (E. Hall 1989, 157). Hall argues that the Greeks’ view of the 
barbarians was inherently contradictory, incorporating ‘the idea not 
only of primitive chaos, but of a more virtuous era, when men were 
nearer to the gods’ (E. Hall 1989, 149). The Greeks’ idea of the past 
overlaps with their conception of ‘the elsewhere’, and they lived with 
and produced a barbarian world of their own that was the home both 
of savages and tyrants and of idealised, innocent peoples with a har-
monious relation to heaven (E. Hall 1989, 149). In terms of thinking 
about the parallels between ancient Greek slavery and the slavery of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this vision of ‘the elsewhere’ 
is strikingly similar to the ways in which Africa was imagined as an 
uncorrupted state of nature and as a space of savagery and degenera-
tion. For both imperial Greece and colonial Europe and America, the 
people they enslaved came from a place of no return. Societies outside 
Europe are positioned in what Nyquist terms ‘a privative age’, a pre-
political space (Nyquist 2013, 16), without ordered social relations, ‘a 
state where slavery is at home’ (Nyquist 2013, 17). For Aristotle, man 
achieved completion as an exemplary human as part of the city, as a 
citizen (S. D. Collins 2006, 172). He ‘is worst of all when apart from 
law and justice’. In Aristotle, slaves ‘and other creatures’ were explic-
itly denied the ability to constitute a polis (Millett 2007, 182). Without 
the polis, men were rendered unscrupulous and savage. For Jill Frank, 
the distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks rested not on their 
immutable natures, but on Aristotle’s observations of the behaviours 
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of those foreigners. The proper determinant of slavery, as we have 
seen, was not foreignness, but worthiness or character and it was 
these internal characteristics and activities that could justify enslave-
ment (Frank 2004, 101–2). Asians, because they lived in hot climates 
and under hereditary tyrannies, tended not to act on their own initia-
tive. Living under tyrannies rendered them naturally slavish, and this 
brings us back to the entangled interrelations between chattel and 
political slavery that defi ne non-Greeks as natural slaves.
Rachel Zelnick-Abramowitz’s study of manumitted slaves in ancient 
Greece draws attention to the complex statuses in between freedom 
and slavery that unsettle the freedom/slavery boundary. Freed slaves 
found themselves subjected to a range of conditions, often including 
being obliged to remain with their ex-masters for a fi xed period. On 
leaving slavery, they were not wholly free, but in a state of semi-slavery, 
‘a twilight zone between the completely free and the completely non-
free’ (Zelnick-Abramowitz 2005, 6). To understand this twilight zone, 
Zelnick-Abramowitz argues that we need to defi ne slavery in social 
terms rather than as a property relationship. Manumission was a social 
transaction involving exchange and reciprocity, and social bonds that 
protracted dependence. Manumitted slaves did not become citizens, 
they were barred from taking part in the political process and from land 
ownership, and they were required to pay a poll tax that marked them 
as inferior to citizens and to metics and continued to bind them to their 
former masters. It is important to recognise here the complex social 
realities behind the binary of slavery and freedom. The metic was less 
free than the citizen; the foreigner was less free than the metic; the helot 
was regarded as less slavish than the chattel slave. Zelnick-Abramowitz 
extends Moses Finley’s spectrum of statuses at the free end, insisting 
that ‘freedom itself has different shades’ (Zelnick-Abramowitz 2005, 
38). Freedom and slavery are better conceived of as dependence and 
independence, as economic, moral, internal and external, rather than 
just as property relations. 
CONCLUSION
Jill Frank draws attention to the complex relation between nature and 
politics in Aristotle’s theory, and her arguments are important for con-
structing a historical and dynamic politics of slavery. In her view, Aristotle 
treats nature as a ‘question for politics’ (Frank 2004, 92). Human nature 
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is, at least in part, constituted politically and nature and politics are both 
changeable. This has several important effects. First, it means that citizens 
are involved in constructing their own identities through making and 
doing, ‘where doing is a kind of self-making’ (Frank 2004, 94). Citizens 
are made citizens by the collective activity of sharing a constitution and 
making institutions. The polis is an active, dynamic space, full of individ-
uals acting in concert. The fundamental difference between citizens and 
slaves is that slaves ‘are the product of citizen activity alone’ (Frank 2004, 
95). What starts off looking like a defence of a static model of slavery as 
based on unchanging constituent elements turns out to be a theory that 
it is politics that produces the institutions that help make citizens and 
slaves. Human beings and the polity itself emerge ‘as both natural and 
made’ (Frank 2004, 99). 
On this reading, human nature is vulnerable to and shaped by both 
politics and by self-determining activity (Frank 2004, 102). Aristotle’s 
defence of natural slavery ‘at the same time serves as a warning about the 
dangers slavery poses to politics’ (Frank 2004, 102). In the end, accord-
ing to Frank’s interpretation of Aristotle, Greeks can become slaves if 
they act like slaves. Even the hierarchies of the polity and the household 
are insecure and reversible. Aristotle is offering not immutability, but 
perpetual ‘boundary-setting and keeping’ (Frank 2004, 102). This is an 
important corrective to a static conception of slavery as fi xed by nature, 
and opens up for discussion what DuBois (2005, 109) calls ‘the strange-
ness of slaves’, their unsettled status at the boundary of subject of object, 
their instability as both property and partner. It shows us how problem-
atic the idea of ‘dehumanisation’ can be when it gets divorced from these 
intensely political questions of boundary-setting and keeping. It takes us 
back to Aristotle’s own emphasis on the participatory and deliberative 
character of politics and challenges us to think again about our capacity 
to see which means will lead to the given ends. In thinking about the 
spaces in between slavery and freedom, and in between the household 
and the polis, women, slaves and barbarians emerge from their privative 
state of nature into ‘a complex, cross-institutional, cross-discursive’ world 
of politics (Nyquist 2013, 27). At the same time, I am not convinced that 
the boundaries of this space are so porous that Greeks could become 
slaves if they acted like slaves, or that all the relations between master 
and slave were social rather than property relations. There is something 
about Aristotle, about the nature of political rule and the structure of 
the soul, and about the private world of the individual set against the 
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public world of the citizen, that fi xes that difference between those who 
are considered as full moral subjects and those who are lacking, dupli-
cated and incomplete. In the next chapter, the focus is on Locke and 
his understanding of the space in between slavery and freedom, and in 
particular the borderland between the state of nature and civil society. 
The social relations of slavery in the seventeenth century continued to 
be intensely political, and deeply concerned with boundary-setting and 
keeping, even as the ground shifted over the nature of slavery and the 
intersections between subject and object. 
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Chapter 3
LOCKE AND HUTCHESON: INDIANS, 
VAGABONDS AND DRONES
‘How could Locke’s passionate advocacy of universal natural rights be 
squared with an institution that annihilated these rights altogether?’ 
(Farr 1986, 263). Locke returns us to questions of slavery and war, and 
to the status of barbarians. I have written elsewhere about Locke’s 
theory of property and its relationship to colonialism, and about the 
distinction he makes between drudgery and slavery. In this chapter, 
I consider Locke’s vexed relationship to the idea and the politics of 
slavery in more detail. What is the signifi cance of his personal connec-
tions to the slave trade and to the institution of slavery in Carolina? In 
accounting for the politics behind slavery, Locke helps us to explore 
some of the links between theory and practice, and between ideology 
and context. In studying these links, what emerges is an ambiguity and 
a complexity that is perhaps unexpected from a modern perspective 
within which slavery is regarded as a universal wrong and natural rights 
as underpinning our understanding of that wrongness. This chapter is 
not about resolving the contradictions that emerge, but about explor-
ing what they mean for the politics of slavery. Neither is it my aim to 
condemn or to exonerate Locke as an individual, but rather to think 
about how his involvement in the slave trade fi ts with his wider theory 
and worldview and about how later reactions to and interpretations 
of his theory have shaped how we give slavery a history and how we 
think about it as a political relation.
LOCKE’S THEORY OF SLAVERY
In 1668, Locke was appointed secretary to the Lords Proprietors of 
Carolina and helped to write its Fundamental Constitutions, which 
granted every free man absolute power and authority over his ‘Negro 
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slaves’, and at the same time made it lawful for slaves to choose their 
own congregations and guaranteed their freedom of conscience. Their 
baptism allowed for the existence of Christian slaves, who remained 
subject to the civil dominion of their masters. In 1671, Locke took out 
shares in the new Royal African Company and in 1672 he was part 
of the company of merchant adventurers trading in slaves with the 
Bahamas. In 1673, he became secretary to the Council of Trade and 
Foreign Plantations and served until 1674. The Two Treatises was fi nally 
published in 1689, and in 1696 he was appointed commissioner of the 
Board of Trade, dealing in particular with slavery in Virginia. Through-
out his career, as James Farr argues, Locke had intimate knowledge of 
colonial life, slavery and the slave trade (Farr 1986, 269). 
Chapter IV of the Second Treatise, ‘On Slavery’, tells us that a man 
cannot by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to anyone. 
He cannot put himself under the arbitrary power of another because 
‘No body can give more Power than he has himself; and he that can-
not take away his own Life, cannot give another power over it’ (Locke 
[1689] 1991, §23). Slavery, according to Locke, is a forfeit. It is possible 
for an individual to forfeit his life by some act that deserves death, and 
his conqueror can then choose whether to put his captive to death or 
to delay his execution and instead ‘make use of him to his own Service’ 
(Locke [1689] 1991, §23). This is not an injury to the enslaved because 
‘whenever he fi nds the hardship of his Slavery out-weigh the value of 
his Life, ‘tis in his Power, by resisting the Will of his Master, to draw on 
himself the Death he desires’ (Locke [1689] 1991, §23). The only pos-
sible agency that the slave can exercise as the protagonist in his own 
life is to engineer his own death. The deferral of death is not about 
preservation, but is simply a part of the victor’s right to kill: ‘From 
the enslaved’s perspective, it results in an infi nitely prolonged social 
death accompanied by the ongoing threat of physical death’ (Nyquist 
2013, 346). For Locke, this is the perfect condition of slavery, which is 
the state of war continued between a lawful conqueror and a captive. 
Farr locates Locke’s just-war theory of justifi ed slavery in the tradi-
tion of natural law, and makes the link back to Grotius in particular. 
Grotius argued against Aristotle that no man is by nature the slave of 
another, but he proposed that men could become slaves ‘by a human 
Fact’, such as agreement, crime or conquest (Farr 2008, 502). Locke 
adapts Grotius’s argument to limit the idea of slavery by rejecting the 
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possibility of slavery by agreement, and by arguing that conquerors in 
a just war could not enslave whole populations or impose slavery on 
subsequent generations.
For Locke, slavery was not possible by agreement because no one 
can hand over to another ‘that which he hath not in himself, a Power 
over his own Life’ (Locke [1689] 1991, §24). Slavery was the ultimate 
consequence of coercive force, and never of consent. For Locke, slav-
ery existed as a matter of fact when ‘a conqueror subdues his enemies 
and forces them to exist under absolute bondage’ (Farr 1986, 270). This 
means, as Farr points out, that slavery is not in all cases categorically 
unjust. The ‘act that deserves death’ was committed by a free, equal 
and rational being who violated the natural rights of other free men 
(Farr 1986, 271). In this, Locke was refuting Aristotle’s claim that by 
nature some are free and others slaves. Enslavement had to be the 
result of unjust action and aggression, and only a just war could jus-
tify slavery (Farr 1986, 272). Locke was arguing for ‘the (im)possibility 
of voluntarily electing degraded, unfree human status’ (Nyquist 2013, 
348). Freedom is something that can only be taken away by force, ‘by 
coercive conversion into enslavement’ (Nyquist 2013, 351). As Mary 
Nyquist argues, slavery and the state of war need to be understood as 
mutually constitutive. In the state of war, the aggressor uses force to 
subjugate and enslave the victim, and the criminalised captive is never 
shown to consent to enslavement.
The Lockean individual may legitimately destroy a man who makes 
war on him for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion. It 
is reasonable that the liberal subject has the right to destroy anything 
that threatens him with destruction, and the would-be destroyers are 
not under the ‘ties of the Common Law of Reason’ but live according 
to the rules of force and violence, and so may be treated as ‘Beasts of 
Prey, those dangerous and noxious Creatures, that will be sure to destroy 
him, whenever he falls into their Power’ (Locke [1689] 1991, §16). The 
hostile aggressor, as Nyquist points out, appears even more threaten-
ing in the plural. In response to this aggressor, Locke constructed ‘the 
Euro-colonial civil subject’ in the singular, as an individual who cannot 
part with his freedom, but who can hold the power of life and death over 
his ‘criminalized counterpart’ (Nyquist 2013, 343–4), the thief who uses 
force when he has no right, who introduces a state of war ‘and is aggres-
sor in it’ (Locke [1689] 1991, §18). The liberal subject cannot voluntarily 
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transfer the power over his own life that he does not have, but at the 
same time he comes to hold ‘despotical’ power over the enslaved, substi-
tuting the threat of death as a means of extracting labour.
The victor, the liberal subject, is a slaveholder and Locke defends the 
slaveholders’ legitimate power over their slaves. In the Fundamental 
Constitutions of Carolina, Locke assumed the existence of slavery and 
affi rmed the slaveholders’ power of life and death. The planter in the 
West Indies and the freeman of Carolina were understood to have the 
legislative power of life and death over their ‘Negro slaves’. This ‘des-
potical’ power was a function of ownership and was operated in order 
to impose labour discipline. It could only obtain outside of civil society 
where it was ‘as limitless as the state of war itself’ (Nyquist 2013, 346). It 
was a legitimate form of power, unlike tyranny – the power of the con-
queror over the conquered in an unjust war – but it was incompatible 
with civil society. Despotical power was a relation between individuals, 
a private power, exercised within the household but with its origins in 
the military power of the victor in warfare (Nyquist 2013, 333). In this 
sense, the institution of slavery was ‘categorically not political’ (Nyquist 
2013, 332). The slave was not granted the possibility of legitimate politi-
cal resistance because just-war slavery was not a political act but one 
that took place outside of civil society. Enslavement occurred in a state 
of war, separated off from civil society. As soon as there was a compact 
between the conqueror and the captive, and power and obedience were 
regulated by consent, the state of war and slavery ceased ‘as long as the 
Compact endures’ (Locke [1689] 1991, §24).
The slavery that just war could justify was limited, and Locke explic-
itly ruled out the seizure of wives and children, who were taken to be 
innocent victims: ‘They made not the War, nor assisted in it’ (Locke 
[1689] 1991, §183). The children, whatever may have happened to their 
fathers, were free. The conqueror had no right of dominion over the 
children. Their lives and their futures could not be forfeited. Land, too, 
had to be protected, and the destruction of a year or two’s produce 
was the ‘utmost spoil’ that could be taken, leaving intact the perpetual 
inheritance of land ‘where all is possessed, and none remains waste to 
be taken up by him, that is disseiz’d’ (Locke [1689] 1991, §184). The 
conqueror had no right of dominion over those who joined him in the 
war, or over the posterity of his enemies (Locke [1689] 1991, §185). Farr 
argues that this means Locke ruled out hereditary slavery, or slavery as 
an institution, as unjust, and placed severe constraints on what counts 
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as ‘just slavery’ (Farr 1986, 273). The African slave trade and chattel 
slavery in the seventeenth century lay far beyond these limits and was 
unjust because of the ways in which slaves were captured, the enslave-
ment of women and children, and the inheritance of slavery as perma-
nent bondage. For Farr, this means that Locke cannot have regarded 
Afro-American slavery as a justifi able institution, and he cannot have 
regarded the slave raids to capture black Africans as just wars (Farr 
1986, 276). Farr’s point is that ‘Locke could have been explicit about 
tying new world slavery to just wars, had he wanted or intended’ (Farr 
2008, 505). Instead, his focus was on England and the Whig resistance 
to Stuart absolutism as ‘the site in mind’ (Farr 2008, 506), and from that 
site his restrictions on Grotius make sense. Farr concludes that Locke 
‘was making a case against “slavery” on his island, not for slavery in the 
new world’ (Farr 2008, 507). Throughout the reception history of the 
Second Treatise, Farr argues, ‘no one thought Locke succeeded in justifying 
slavery in America’ (Farr 2008, 515). This approach tends to de-politicise 
or at least de-racialise Locke’s theory of just-war slavery, and as Nyquist 
argues, allows slavery to escape from being a political institution by 
placing it outside the boundaries of civil society.
LOCKE AND THE INDIANS
Farr then goes on to consider the question of Locke’s racism, and points 
to Locke’s silence and the lack of evidence of his ‘assessment of black 
people’ (Farr 1986, 277). Farr is intrigued by Locke’s opinions of American 
Indians and his positive assessment of their natural reason and modes of 
government. He cannot be counted as a degeneracy theorist, and he says 
nothing about black Africans morally deserving their slavery (Farr 1986, 
280). In assessing Locke’s racism in 2008, Farr gives weight to the spe-
cifi cally racialised reference to ‘Negro’ slaves in the Carolina Constitution, 
but does not fi nd in Locke a racist doctrine or theory that normatively 
justifi ed slavery on the basis of race (Farr 2008, 510). Farr concludes, along 
with John Dunn, that Locke was guilty of immoral evasion and of living 
with a glaring contradiction that made him ‘strangely indifferent’ to the 
lives and liberties of the people made slaves in the new world (Farr 2008, 
516). In order to understand what was going on, we have to read Locke’s 
work in the context of the threat of royal absolutism, his rejection of sov-
ereignty by conquest and his justifi cation of political resistance. ‘For this 
fi ght’, says Farr, ‘the shores of Africa and America were out of sight and 
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out of mind’ (Farr 1986, 285). In saying nothing, he ‘averted his eyes from 
the glaring contradiction between his theories and Afro-American slav-
ery’ and invested alongside his patrons (Farr 1986, 281). This turning aside 
is interesting. For some, it means that we too can sigh and move along, 
leaving the question of transatlantic slavery to one side and focusing on 
Locke’s attack on absolutism in Britain. For others, it means that we need 
to interrogate Locke’s theory of slavery more creatively and fi ll in some of 
the gaps ourselves. Both these approaches assume that we are being con-
fronted with some kind of contradiction within the theory, a problem that 
needs solving. In this chapter, I want to take a slightly different approach 
by arguing that we need to understand Locke’s theory in the context of 
a process of racialisation, and the seventeenth century as a transitional 
phase in the development of the social imaginary of slavery. We need 
to pay attention to the interplay between the material conditions of the 
actors and the cultural and ideological processes within which they oper-
ated (Garner 2007a). By focusing on the questions of enslavability, civil 
society and humanness, Locke’s ‘strange indifference’ to Afro-American 
slavery emerges in a different light. 
In Nyquist’s analysis of Locke’s account, non-Christians living out-
side Europe are habitually charged with the kind of monstrous crimes 
that convert them into beasts of prey and noxious creatures. Africans, 
she argues, are ‘more or less expected to enter readily into Locke’s state 
of war, since in “hard” versions of the privative age they are basically 
already there’ (Nyquist 2013, 360). In her reading of Locke on America, 
Nyquist argues that he shares the dominant early modern view that 
the people already living there ‘inhabit a precivil temporality or priva-
tive age’ (Nyquist 2013, 336), a view that animalises and criminalises 
the indigenous people and provides a rationale for taking their lives. 
The process of racialisation, the opposition between the subject and the 
slave, and the legitimacy of despotic power operating outside of civil 
society, meant that fi rst Native Americans and later Africans could be 
‘construed as subhuman, monstrous transgressors’ (Nyquist 2013, 337). 
This is part of what David Armitage has identifi ed as a well-developed 
‘colonial reading’ of Locke’s political theory and of the Second Treatise 
in particular (Armitage 2004). It rests on the argument put forward by 
Martin Seliger that war between the planters and the natives was inev-
itable, and that the indigenous people’s defence of their ‘waste’ land 
turned them into aggressors and the Europeans into the ‘just conquer-
ors’ (Seliger 1968, 115). Taken further into the African context, slave 
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raids count as just wars. On this reading, Locke’s theory is taken as 
underpinning settler colonialism and the erasure of Indigenous territo-
rial claims to land (Hoogeveen 2015, 122). On the whole, here and else-
where (Brace 2004), I endorse this ‘colonial reading’, but in relation to 
slavery, we need to consider a more complicated and nuanced picture 
of these subhuman, monstrous transgressors. 
It is important to remember that early modern English people ‘did not 
think of the world in modern racialized terms’ (Guasco 2007, 390). As 
Michael Guasco points out, their encounters with indigenous peoples 
in America were conditioned by questions of national identity, natu-
ral philosophy, and environment rather than by biological differences. 
William Uzgalis argues that Locke provides a non-racist account of the 
differences between peoples because the differences he saw between 
Englishmen and those in other lands were ‘purely cultural’ (Uzgalis 2002, 
83, 87). In his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke made clear that pagans 
could be strict observers of the rules of equity and the laws of nature, 
and argued that they should not be turned out of their lands and inheri-
tance on the grounds of religion. Uzgalis argues that Locke’s account of 
the reason required to exercise rights of life, health, liberty and property 
is less Eurocentric than others, such as Barbara Arneil and James Tully, 
claim. Native Americans in the state of nature were human, reasonable 
people ‘in the full sense of that term’ (Uzgalis 2002, 89), living according 
to the law of nature without violating the rights of others. Men became 
fully human when they conformed to natural law by thinking for them-
selves and acting on their reason. The wilderness in which they lived was 
like the sea, the last great commons, and Europeans could settle on the 
Indians’ hunting grounds as long as they left enough and as good for the 
natives, but they were not entitled to appropriate agricultural land. Native 
American land that was tilled and cultivated, but not fenced counted as 
property for Locke (Uzgalis 2002, 91). Uzgalis interprets Locke as sug-
gesting that there was ‘enough room in America for both colonists and 
Native Americans’ (Uzgalis 2002, 95).
Locke focused on reason as the measure of how the individual attains 
his status as a full moral being, and he drew a distinction between some-
one exercising unrestrained liberty and exercising a liberty constrained 
by moral judgement (Marden 2006, 93). Reason depended on ideas, 
and ideas depended on the environment, and this approach ‘poten-
tially placed a crippling limitation on the scope of refl ection possible in 
underdeveloped societies’ (D. Carey 2006, 70). The conditions of their 
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existence meant that they risked missing out on a range of ideas of great 
importance. They were not dispossessed of their reason, but their lives 
left them ‘so little Use of it, that one cannot but wonder how the Soul 
can be depressed into so low a Degree of Brutality’ (D. Carey 2006, 89). 
Some categories of people had such major natural or cultural disabili-
ties that they were incapable of self-control, and were fi gured as lacking 
in virtue and competence, and so in the moral worthiness that would 
entitle them to rights and designate them as human (Marden 2006). 
They failed to use their minds and expand their horizons, thinking only 
about the ordinary wants of the body: fi shing, hunting, dancing and 
revenge. They lived ‘mued up within their own contracted Territories’ 
(D. Carey 2006, 89), their freedom restricted by the contingencies of life, 
and their use of reason unreliable. When Locke considered the ‘primi-
tive’, he concluded that their notions were few and narrow, borrowed 
from the objects they had the most to do with, and their heads were 
fi lled with ‘Love and Hunting’ according to the fashion of their tribes. 
A ‘wild Inhabitant of the Woods’, he decided, would seldom mention 
general propositions or abstract maxims, or be capable of innate specu-
lative principles (D. Carey 2006, 87). At the same time, and importantly 
unlike African slaves, they were active men, and apt to learn, according 
to Richard Ligon in 1647, but also craftier and subtler than ‘the Negroes’ 
(Guasco 2007, 403).
As Nancy Hirschmann argues about landless workers and women, 
Indians were positioned as less rational than landowners because the 
pragmatic realities of their lives created a disjuncture between their 
natural potential and what they could actually do with their reason 
(Hirschmann 2008). Even the most advanced minds among primitive 
peoples ‘would lack an array of thoughts extending beyond their circle’ 
(D. Carey 2006, 90) because they did not take part in conversation with 
thinking men, balancing rival positions in the search for truth. Like 
women and landless workers, their minds could not achieve the ‘compre-
hensive enlargement’ (D. Carey 2006, 91) required to underpin right rea-
son, positive liberty and self-mastery. They were bracketed together with 
women, children and idiots, and their relationship to reason and so to 
liberty had to be understood as ‘uncertain and incomplete’ (Hirschmann 
2008, 116). In Locke’s essay on the Conduct of Understanding, Indians 
are not characterised as being born with worse understandings than 
the Europeans, and their exercise of reason remained possible, but to 
‘achieve suffi cient moral sophistication one needed to enter a polite and 
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civil world’ (D. Carey 2006, 91). A more improved English man had the 
benefi t of living in a superior society, and the diligence and industry to 
pursue higher conceptions of the divine. Unlike Aristotle’s natural slaves 
with their deformed souls, there was nothing intrinsically slavish about 
the Amerindians, but their circumstances made them potentially enslav-
able, in ways that set them apart from Europeans. 
Brad Hinshelwood argues that the context of Locke’s theory ‘was not 
the coasts of Africa, but instead the forests of Carolina’ (Hinshelwood 
2013, 564), and in particular the Indian slave trade. For Hinshelwood, 
Locke should be read as developing a just-war theory that works hard 
to protect the property and freedom of those outside the confl ict by 
placing clear limits on justifi able slavery. He did so in the context of 
the proprietors in Carolina trying to balance their interests with Indian 
rights (Hinshelwood 2013, 568). Early in the development of the colony, 
the Indians acted as trading partners and advisers, but where the colo-
nists found themselves, or at least their servants and their crops, under 
attack, they sometimes took Indians prisoner and shipped them to the 
West Indies as slaves (Hinshelwood 2013, 569). For some colonists, this 
trade was a way of making a quick profi t compared to the burden of 
trying to make money from the land. The settlers failed to develop a 
cash crop for the colony, and turned instead to this alternative source 
of income. During the 1670s, the settlers in Carolina were involved in 
confl ict with the Coosa and fought wars with the Westo, and ‘began to 
speak of Indian slavery in just-war terms that resonate with Locke’s 
theory of slavery’ (Hinshelwood 2013, 569). The colonists, Hinshelwood 
argues, were careful to portray their slaves as captives taken in just wars, 
and their own actions as punishment.
According to Hinshelwood, Locke maintained an interest in Carolina, 
and its agricultural improvement in particular, during the late 1670s and 
the 1680s, while he was writing the Second Treatise. The textual evidence 
(from a change in his citation style that helps to date the composition of 
the chapters of the Second Treatise) suggests that Locke was working on 
his theory of slavery in 1682 at the same time as he was revising the Fun-
damental Constitutions after a ‘devastating war spurred by the Indian 
slave trade that had seriously undermined his patron’s interests in the 
colony’ (Hinshelwood 2013, 574). Shaftesbury regarded war for trade as 
illegitimate, but a defensive war against Indians who destroyed crops 
was justifi ed. In this context of wars in the colony, most of those who 
were enslaved were male warriors who were shipped to Barbados, so 
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that hereditary Indian slavery ‘was not a concern for Locke and the Pro-
prietors’ (Hinshelwood 2013, 576). In other words, this form of enslave-
ment met Locke’s criteria for justifi ed, limited slavery because women 
and children were largely unaffected, and the land and property rights 
of later generations and of those who did not take part were left intact. 
From his analysis of Locke’s involvement in Carolina, Hinshelwood 
concludes that the conditions there ‘provide an example of real-world 
practices that the theory could work to justify’ (Hinshelwood 2013, 580). 
The Carolinian context allows us to understand why Locke attempts to 
legitimate slavery, and to see that he was supportive of at least some of 
the forms of slavery that were practised there (Hinshelwood 2013, 581). 
For Hinshelwood, this allows us to restore the colonies to our under-
standing of Locke’s theory of slavery, ‘while avoiding the interpretive 
problems that arise from linking the Second Treatise to African slavery’ 
(Hinshelwood 2013, 582). 
People in the seventeenth century did not regard the indigenous 
inhabitants of America as a separate race in the modern sense of the 
term, but that was not enough to make them ‘safe’ or to secure them 
against enslavement. The grounds for justifying slavery were like shift-
ing sands, moving between essence and circumstance, and proving 
the instability of otherness. On Locke’s account, where, in the begin-
ning, all the world was America, America ‘exists as kind of embryo’. 
The Indians gave the Europeans an insight into the development of 
civil societies: ‘they show us our history’(D. Carey 2006, 95) rather than 
creating their own. The Indians were subjected to a narrative in which 
their current practices would be transformed into those of Europe. 
The salient differences between Amerindians and Europeans were not 
fi xed and incommensurable but ‘temporary and occasioned by histori-
cal situation’ (D. Carey 2006, 95). The Indians found themselves in a 
temporal trap, unable to leave the state of nature, but still a part of the 
passage of history. 
In the late seventeenth century, English government offi cials rec-
ognised that if the English wanted Indian land they would have to buy 
it, and treat the Indians as the owners of their land (Banner 2005, 10). 
Their claim to property could not come from conquest, and in the end 
much of the land acquired by the settlers came to them through pur-
chase. The colonists in America found Indians who were farmers and 
owners of their land, but who moved on when their soils were depleted 
and they were allocated new fi elds by the village chief. In comparison to 
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the cramped conditions of England, Indian farmers had more space and 
more room to move. In terms of property rights, the ideas of occupa-
tion, use and cultivation were highly contested. It was not that Locke’s 
theory of property denied the Indian’s claim to the deer that he killed, 
but there were doubts over whether indigenous activity extended to 
resources such as land (Ypi 2013, 164). If the American Indians were 
landowners, did they own their hunting grounds as well as their fi elds? 
What about the lands that lay fallow, waiting to be cultivated when 
the soil depleted? What about the waste land? Did the whole of North 
America belong to them? 
The settlers were inconsistent in their claims, often starting by rely-
ing on narratives of honourable conquest and ending up relying on 
purchase or gift as the basis of exchange. By the early nineteenth cen-
tury, settler Americans came to think of the Indians as nomadic hunters 
and they constructed them as only owning the land they cultivated and 
not their hunting grounds. Their mobility and their use of space meant 
that they were seen as not actually needing the land: ‘land simply did 
not relate to their culturally specifi c ends in a way that was relevant 
to ground property claims’ (Ypi 2013, 165). De Vattel argued that the 
Native Americans had no reason to complain if other more industri-
ous and populated nations came to take possession of parts of their 
land because the ‘people of those extensive tracts rather ranged through 
than inhabited them’ (Ypi 2013, 165). Gradually, the property rights of 
the indigenous peoples were weakened as the colonists rethought the 
legal relationship between Indians and their land. The courts decided 
that their claim to occupy the land should not carry with it ‘a permanent 
right to exclude needy settlers’ (Ypi 2013, 166). The indigenous people 
had a duty to receive the colonists. Like their grasp of reason, their hold 
on their land was uncertain and incomplete. They had interests in the 
realm of right, but they were structurally incapable of making the right 
choices in the realm of virtue (Hirschmann 2008). The right of occu-
pancy replaced the idea of Indians as landowners, and the government 
took over from the tribes as the fee simple owner of the land. The free-
dom of the Indians was a social relation, determined for them by others, 
and by their material conditions as well as by the cultural and ideologi-
cal processes that were constructing the social category of whiteness 
to exclude them (Garner 2007b). Their relationship to the land was not 
fi xed or static, but it was intimately connected to their access to civil 
society and to ‘humanness’ as a political category. 
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As Stuart Banner points out, the story of colonisation was about the 
power to establish legal conventions and rules to enforce land trans-
actions (Banner 2005, 6). Colonialism involves ‘both the subjugation 
of one people to another and the political and economic control of 
a dependent territory (or parts of it)’ (Ypi 2013, 162). It grants certain 
prerogatives to colonists but denies them to natives, allowing one side 
to place constraints on acquisition and decide the extent, limits and 
enforcement of property rights (Ypi 2013, 167). For Ypi, the wrong of 
colonialism lies in the kind of political relation it exemplifi es, and in 
particular the establishment of a form of association that ‘fails to offer 
equal and reciprocal terms of interaction to all its members’ (Ypi 2013, 
178). The colonial injustice at stake then becomes not the wrongful 
taking of territory but ‘the establishment of an objectionable form of 
political association’ (Ypi 2013, 187). To understand the wrong, Ypi 
argues, we need to focus on the terms of political interaction between 
colonisers and colonised. We also need to recognise, as Nyquist argues, 
that through this process, indigenous people were placed outside poli-
tics and the possibility of resistance (Nyquist 2013, 367). In terms of 
slavery, this is about recognising that slavery is not a static institution. 
We need to think about it as a cultural construction that emerges out 
of ‘negotiations between Europeans and indigenous peoples, rulers 
and ruled, and men and women’ (Guasco 2007, 389). Michael Guasco 
argues that the case of Indian slavery also allows us to see that the 
early settlers in America justifi ed and understood the enslavement 
of Indians in different ways from their simultaneous enslavement of 
African peoples (Guasco 2007, 390). Locke certainly fi ts this pattern 
in keeping the different slaveries distinct, and his approach highlights 
the dynamic histories and power relations that underpin slavery. In 
early Anglo-America, Indian slavery was ‘a problem related to the con-
struction of legitimate Anglo-American societies’ (Guasco 2007, 390). 
This legitimacy question was simply not raised in the case of enslav-
ing Africans for their labour, but the enslavement of Indians unsettled 
assumptions about who could be enslaved and for what ends, and 
about the enterprise of colonialism. 
In part, what was at stake was differentiating British colonialism from 
Spanish cruelty and destruction. This involved opening up the possibility 
that ‘Indians could be enslaved but, unlike Africans, only for reasons that 
might be applied to the English themselves or the inhabitants of other 
recognized nations’ (Guasco 2007, 395). There were moments when 
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indigenous people emerged as ‘candidates for Christian instruction and 
inclusion in the Anglo-American community’ (Guasco 2007, 398), usu-
ally on the basis of their status as trading partners and as allies against 
Spain. The possibility of justifi able enslavement was linked to the idea of 
just-war slavery as punishment (which, as Guasco says, was often under-
stood as redemption), and to a whole set of stories about military origins 
and defeat, rather than about bodies naturally fi tted for hard labour. Even 
where indigenous people were taken captive, such as the Pequot Indi-
ans in 1637, the English distinguished them from Africans. When they 
needed to bring the Pequots closer to enslaved Africans, they labelled 
them as cannibals and as ‘negros’. As Guasco points out, this was not 
about ethnic confusion or confl ation, but about aligning the Indian with 
‘the defi nitive slave in the broader Atlantic world’ (Guasco 2007, 399). It 
was part of their punishment, of their social death and of their gener-
alised dishonour to be rebranded as ‘cannibal negros’. The plan was to 
train them up in the principles of religion and then ship them back to 
New England to convert their compatriots to Christianity. In this sev-
enteenth-century context, slavery was treated as ‘an agent of conversion’ 
(Guasco 2007, 399), carrying within it the seeds of redemption. This was 
only possible in a world where the indigenous Americans had something 
in common with the Englishmen who enslaved them, and certainly 
shared reason and humanity with them. The enslavement of the Pequot, 
according to Roger Williams, should have normative limits: it should only 
be temporary, and it should include instruction in Christian morality. This 
kind of slavery within strict limits was ‘their path to salvation’ (Guasco 
2007, 400). Guasco argues that this was part of a wider ‘utopian concep-
tion of slavery’ within which enslavement was used as part of the criminal 
justice system, as a means of punishing not only Indians but also English 
settlers, such as William Andrews who assaulted his master in Massachu-
setts in 1638 (Guasco 2007, 401). In other words, enslavability could be 
extended to the English poor. 
ENSLAVING THE ENGLISH POOR
This possibility of enslaving the English poor opens up all sorts of ques-
tions about the construction of the social category of whiteness that was 
in transition in the seventeenth century. As Steve Garner makes clear, 
it took generations for ‘free labour’ to refer unequivocally to whites and 
‘unfree’ labour to blacks. Not being white and being black were two 
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different things in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when 
the national and the racial coexisted, and Irish indentured labourers in 
the Caribbean, for example, found themselves subject to direct social 
control through a pass system and the withdrawal of the right to bear 
arms (Garner 2007b). The Irish’s hold on their whiteness was tenuous, 
but unlike black, Mexican, Asian and Native American people, they 
were ‘always salvageable for whiteness’ (Garner 2007b, 126), and could 
potentially be incorporated into the dominant element of society. Their 
access to whiteness was mediated through their labour and their rela-
tionship to the market as whiteness became a kind of property. Slavery, 
indenture and the free market were infl uential in specifying and assign-
ing whiteness and blackness, and these processes of racialisation were 
about differentiating Indians from ‘Negroes’, and both from Europeans. 
The eighteenth-century schemes for enslaving the English poor were 
about slavery as conversion and redemption, but also about the fragil-
ity of some people’s grasp on their status as members of civil society 
(Locke [1697] 1997).
Locke was harsh in his analysis of the character of the poor, and 
attributed their growing numbers to the relaxation of discipline and the 
corruption of manners. As Hirschmann puts it, ‘Locke believed that peo-
ple were poor because they were lazy and corrupt’ (Hirschmann 2002, 
336). He regarded the poor as a burden on the public, due to their lack 
of industry and virtue, and his proposals to reform the poor laws centred 
on setting the poor to work and making them useful to the public. This 
involved distinguishing the deserving from the undeserving, those with 
moral worthiness from those without. The fi rst step towards setting the 
poor on work ‘ought to be a restraint on their debauchery’ (Locke [1697] 
1997, 184) by suppressing brandy shops and unnecessary alehouses. 
The impulse behind Locke’s proposals for reforming the poor law was 
to ease part of ‘the burden that lies upon the industrious for maintain-
ing the poor’ (Locke [1697] 1997, 184). His answer to poverty was work. 
Vagrants and ‘begging drones’ were characterised not only as idle, but 
also as fraudulent and dishonest, and as an inferior order of men (Hun-
dert 1972, 6–7). They pretended that they could not get work, and lived 
‘unnecessarily upon other people’s labour’ (Locke [1697] 1997, 184). His 
proposals for amending the poor law included compulsory labour and 
punishment for the able-bodied, to correct them through discipline and 
close supervision. Unlawful male beggars living in a maritime county 
were to be taken to a seaport town, ‘there to be kept at hard labour, 
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til some of his majesty’s ships . . . give an opportunity of putting them 
onboard, where they shall serve three years, under strict discipline’ 
(Locke [1697] 1997, 186). He also recommended that the children of 
poor families should be put into ‘working schools’, a euphemism for 
working in wool-spinning factories, to allow both parents to work for 
wages and the children not to be a burden on the parish. They were 
to be paid not in wages, but in food, or more specifi cally bread and 
water, and warm gruel in the winter (Hirschmann 2002, 338). This diet 
fi ts with Locke’s wider recommendations for children’s upbringing and 
education, and, as Hirschmann points out, these strictures were about 
building health, mental discipline, reason and character, rather than 
about punishment (Hirschmann 2002, 339). Locke’s scheme aimed to 
accustom the children to work, inculcating habits of sobriety and indus-
triousness, and rooting out irrationality. Like the Native Americans, the 
English poor were not constitutionally irrational, they possessed the 
capacity for natural reason, but their ‘poverty was evidence of a failure 
to use their God-given rationality’ (Hirschmann 2002, 339). Drones who 
lived off the labour of others found that their reason deteriorated from 
lack of use, and they no longer reached the threshold of full person-
hood. Their failure to work was ‘both an indication and further cause 
of their irrationality and idleness’ (Hirschmann 2002, 342). True and 
proper relief of the poor consisted of fi nding work for them and taking 
care they did not live parasitically on the labour of others (Locke [1697] 
1997, 189). The failure of the poor lay in their passivity, their lack of 
self-discipline and their failure to seek out property, even in their own 
person, where ‘seeking property is not just the most fundamental of 
rights, it is the essence of human individuality’ (Hirschmann 2002, 348).
It is important to bring Locke’s scheme to force the poor to work 
together with his theory of slavery because it helps to explain some-
thing of his ‘strange indifference’ towards Afro-American slavery. In 
the Essay on the Poor Law, it is possible to see how labour is treated as 
the property not of the poor themselves, but of the industrious. People 
needed to be restrained from living off the labour of others and making 
themselves a burden on the public. The short step in Locke’s thought is 
not from just wars to slave raiding expeditions, but from three years of 
forced labour to permanent bondage. The common denominator is the 
idea that some people are so incapable of using their rationality that 
they have to be forced to work. The contradictions in Locke’s thought 
are not about his personal involvement in the slave trade or about his 
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racism, but about emerging conceptions of civilisation, ‘humanness’ 
and civil society. His theory reconfi gures the intersection between sub-
ject and object, and enters the complicated space in between slavery 
and freedom where the meanings of personhood and humanity were 
pulled apart. 
In the early to mid-eighteenth century there were several projects 
to promote slavery in England. They fi tted into the utopian conception 
of slavery as a tool for improvement and the public good, and as an 
effective and useful punishment for criminals. The reformers targeted 
‘vagabonds’ and vagrants whom they characterised as drunk, cursing 
and blaspheming, and as incapable of productive work. There were 
proposals to employ them, to set them to work hedging and ditch-
ing. Reformers drew on the distinction between the deserving and the 
undeserving poor, fellow citizens and vagabonds, and focused on con-
trol over the labour of the underclass. They proposed a limited version 
of slavery for the English poor. Servants under such a scheme, Francis 
Hutcheson argued, would retain all the rights of mankind and be able 
to hold them against their masters, ‘excepting only that to his labours, 
which he has transferred to his master’ (Hutcheson 1755, 200). The 
masters would have no power of life and death over the slaves, and the 
servant remained subject to the law rather than to the arbitrary power 
of the master as an individual. They would have a right to obtain sup-
port and to defend themselves by violence against ‘any savage useless 
tortures, any attempts of maiming them or prostituting them to the 
lusts of their masters, or forcing them in any worship against their con-
sciences’ (Hutcheson 1755, 201). These limits to violence distinguished 
this scheme from true slavery, and Hutcheson argued that this kind of 
slavery, used as punishment or to discharge a debt, had ‘a just founda-
tion’ (Hutcheson 1755, 202). It was an effective way to promote general 
industry and to restrain idleness. Slavery was a proper punishment for 
people who ruined themselves and their families through intemper-
ance and other vices, ‘and made them a publick burden’ (Hutcheson 
1755, 202). Hutcheson suggested that there could be a trial period of 
seven years enslavement after which people could be set free if they 
were found to have acquired the habit of diligence. If not, ‘they should 
be adjudged to slavery for life’ as a useful punishment (Hutcheson 1755, 
202). For both Locke and Hutcheson, slavery was legitimate as long as 
the enslaved had in some way forfeited their liberty and therefore the 
idleness of poor and masterless men, their refusal to seek property or 
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to activate their property in the person, justifi ed forcing their labour 
out of them. Rozbicki argues that this ‘should make us sensible of the 
deep, taken-for-granted, elitist rather than universalist meaning of lib-
erty used in the whole argument’ (Rozbicki 2001, 38). For Rozbicki, this 
combination of natural rights and slavery should not be viewed as a 
contradiction or an inconsistency. We need, he says, to think about slav-
ery and liberty not as ideas but as specifi c social relations. If we do so, 
he argues, we uncover a ‘deeply hierarchical understanding of society’ 
based on the master/servant dichotomy within which liberty ‘continued 
to be largely understood as class privilege, applicable in full only to a 
group entitled to it by property, reason, and virtue’ (Rozbicki 2001, 39). 
This conception of servitude was about maintaining social order 
through subordination to the patriarchal authority of the elites, who 
sustained a notion of freedom that could contain inequalities that 
were regarded as just and justifi able (Rozbicki 2001, 39–40). Within 
this scheme of freedom and subordination, servants and slaves ‘had no 
sovereignty over their rights, nor were these rights separate from their 
duties as a lower, labouring order’ (Rozbicki 2001, 40). Vagabonds and 
‘begging drones’, those who failed to seek property even in themselves, 
were regarded as almost a different order of beings, ‘virtual outsiders’ 
who were irrational and morally depraved. Beadles, Locke suggested, 
should be authorised to seize upon any stranger begging in the streets 
(Locke [1697] 1997, 197). Beggars needed to be saved from themselves 
through servitude and, if necessary, a system of state-sponsored slavery. 
The few were enslavable for the good of the whole. It was an approach 
that ‘amplifi ed class distinctions’ and reinforced hierarchical social rela-
tions (Rozbicki 2001, 44) through an emphasis on punishment, work 
and moral reformation. 
In the early eighteenth century, the distance between servitude and 
slavery was easily travelled. Rozbicki concludes from his analysis of 
early eighteenth-century proposals for slavery as poor relief that slav-
ery within Britain was not necessarily regarded as socially and legally 
anomalous. This in turn means that Rozbicki assigns race a relatively 
small role in legal decisions about slavery during the eighteenth cen-
tury. By understanding liberty as a social relation, he argues that we 
can see its contemporary meanings as involving ‘a spectrum of free-
doms, assigned in various manners and degrees to different ranks of 
society’ (Rozbicki 2001, 47). It should come as no surprise to us that 
such a tradition was able to accommodate the enslavement of all kinds 
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of non-rights-bearing individuals deemed not to be morally com-
petent. In this context, slavery was ‘an act of charity’ to promote the 
public good. It was possible to imagine a form of slavery that did not 
violate individual rights or liberties, since no crime ‘can change a ratio-
nal creature into a piece of goods void of all right’ (Hutcheson 1755, 
202–3). Slavery could be legally and morally justifi ed, even in England 
and even within the natural right tradition, providing it was a response 
to damage, debauchery or debt. 
NEW WORLD SLAVERY
The connections between slavery, punishment and the state were 
complex and by comparing the proposals to enslave the English poor 
with the actual enslavement of black Africans in the Caribbean in the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries we can see to the end of 
the ‘spectrum of freedoms’ and into a form of slavery that was under-
stood to change a rational creature into a piece of goods. There is, of 
course, a difference between being forced to labour for the state for 
three or seven years and being subjected to permanent slavery. Some 
of that difference is to do with the role of the state. The slaveholder’s 
power of life and death over his slaves was ‘legally considered a del-
egation of state authority’ (Paton 2001, 927). The 1664 slave code in 
Jamaica gave the master legal authority to decide on the guilt and pun-
ishment of his slaves, even when the misdemeanour had been com-
mitted against somebody else. A free person would inform the owner 
or the overseer who would then take responsibility for the punishment 
or prosecution of the slave. Slaveholders who took their slaves to court 
were probably hoping for punishments of mutilation, transportation 
or the death penalty, which they could not impose themselves, and for 
which they would be compensated (Paton 2001, 935). Planters could 
hire state employees, the ‘common Whipman’, to fl og their slaves on 
their behalf. Slave courts operated sporadically throughout the year 
in Jamaica and were presided over by local property holders, usually 
major planters. Diana Paton argues that while the courts in England in 
the eighteenth century were designed to dramatise ‘the majesty and 
essential justice of the law’ and to demonstrate the idea of equality 
before the law, the Jamaican court system was set up to tell ‘a differ-
ent story, one centered on the division of the population into free and 
enslaved’ (Paton 2001, 928). Paton’s argument is that in Jamaica the 
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planters’ control was fragile and needed constant support, so that their 
participation in slave trials as magistrates, freeholders and prosecutors 
was about affi rming and legitimising ‘their private power to punish’, 
asserting their fairness and control (Paton 2001, 936). Like the citi-
zens of ancient Greece, the planters in Jamaica needed to be able to 
show that they were not tyrants who had fallen victim to the grandiose 
desire for power and failed to maintain the boundaries between public 
and private. The procedures of the courts, and the social relations of 
punishment, operated differently in different contexts, and being the 
captive of a conqueror had different implications for enslaved Africans 
in Jamaica, Indians in America and for labourers in England. It would 
be diffi cult to deny that one of the registers of difference at work here 
was race, even in the seventeenth century.
Slave offences punished by the Jamaican courts were mainly property 
crime, often thefts of sheep, and other ‘status offences’ that could only 
be committed by slaves, such as the crime of running away. Planters 
prosecuted slaves who escaped for more than six months, and those 
who were said to be ‘in rebellion’ (Paton 2001, 930). The 1696 slave code 
specifi ed that fugitive slaves who ran away for more than twelve months 
were to be declared rebellious and could be sentenced to transporta-
tion. The slave codes in the Caribbean were built on the principle that 
violence by slaves against white people was more serious than violence 
among slaves or between white or free people. In the Code of 1674, the 
relevant crime was assault on a ‘white Christian’ and in 1677 the offence 
became ‘assault on a white person’. As Paton points out, the principle of 
whiteness is clearly salient. These laws, along with the punishment of 
runaways, extended the English legal principle that murder by a subor-
dinate of the person who had legitimate authority over them was con-
sidered to be ‘petit treason’, ‘a crime analogous to treason against the 
state’ (Paton 2001, 931). The violence of subordinates was presented as a 
threat to the social order, and the punishments infl icted were a response 
‘not to murder per se, but to the murder in particular of a propertied, 
elite, white man’ (Paton 2001, 931). 
Punishments involved the public infl iction of pain on the body, cre-
ating a spectacle of suffering, particularly through fl ogging, but also 
through permanent disfi gurement and dismemberment, cutting off 
ears, slitting nostrils, amputating feet (Paton 2001, 937). African slaves in 
the Caribbean were subjected to the ‘savage, useless tortures’ Hutcheson 
promised to protect the enslaved British poor from enduring. In Jamaica, 
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sentences of fl ogging ranged from 39 to 117 lashes, while in Britain 
the usual range was from two to twelve lashes (Paton 2001, 938). It is 
signifi cant that fl ogging was understood as fundamentally degrading 
and dishonouring, an ‘ignominious sentence’ that was associated with 
enslavement (Paton 2001, 939). European convicts were much less likely 
to be permanently mutilated than slaves in New World slave societies. 
Attacks on bodily integrity and this spectacular suffering ‘had come to 
signify by the eighteenth century that the convict was a traitor, a rebel 
against legitimate authority’ (Paton 2001, 939). Almost any crime the 
slaves committed could be interpreted as treachery and resistance. At 
the same time, punishment produced ‘an arbitrary, haphazard, and dis-
criminatory justice, whose primary goal was to display and reinforce the 
absolute power of master over slave’ (Da Costa 1994, 231), and slaves 
were construed as not only outside the boundaries of civil society, but 
even beyond the reach of natural law where punishment was limited to 
reparation and restraint. The schemes for enslaving the British poor were 
different in that they were about using slavery as punishment, rather 
than punishing slaves. The proposed projects were about shaming and 
dishonour for the convicts, reaffi rming the boundaries of the moral com-
munity and of civil society, disgracing the individual and intimidating 
others. Their ‘utopian’ goals were about gaining assent to the power of 
the state, addressing the ‘public burden’ and improving the public stock. 
They were aimed at reassuring the industrious that their property was 
safe and protected by civil society and at reforming the idle and the list-
less. They could not be characterised as haphazard, or as arbitrary. The 
power exercised by the West Indian planter, on the other hand, was a 
different form of rule that was understood to be based on brutal domi-
nation rather than a social contract: ‘The displays of the mutilated body 
parts of convicted slaves were less about gaining assent to the power of 
the state than they were about emphasizing the extent of that power’ 
(Paton 2001, 944). 
This makes the mid-seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century a 
very particular moment in the development of the idea of race, and in 
the social relations of slavery. In thinking about the colonial context 
of Locke’s writings, for example, it is important to assign race, or, bet-
ter, racialisation, more than the small role it plays in Rozbicki’s analy-
sis. It helps us to understand, as Nyquist argues, what it meant for the 
Amerindians to be shut out of civil society and denied the possibility of 
political resistance. It also helps, I think, to explain the signifi cance of 
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the differentiation between Indians and African slaves in the colonial 
records, and of turning the enslaved Pequot into ‘Negro cannibals’. At 
the same time, it is important to hear the warnings in the accounts of 
Farr and Uzgalis and not to turn to racism too quickly to explain Locke’s 
theory or the basis of slavery. Instead, enslavability needs to be placed 
in the context of the division between the state of nature and civil 
society, in terms of both space and time, so that slavery and freedom 
emerge as social and historical relations that need to be understood 
within their cultural, economic and intellectual contexts. The indige-
nous peoples of America demonstrated an ‘inability to overcome space’ 
(Beckmann 2005, 86) which also left them suspended in time, showing 
us our history rather than creating their own. They were not yet treated 
or understood as a separate race, but they lived in ‘strange places that 
are located in the world but not in history’, as Hegel later described 
Africa (Purtschert 2010, 1044). As states of nature, America and Africa 
were not historical places, because the historical had to be marked as 
European (Purtschert 2010, 1046). 
CONCLUSION
In seventeenth-century America, the indigenous peoples were not 
treated as though they were natural slaves or ensouled tools, but the 
just-war justifi cation of slavery was exercised over them and criminals 
were condemned to slavery (Guasco 2007, 402). The idea that slavery 
could be a just punishment or means of redemption posed new dan-
gers to liberal politics. This fi ts with Locke’s approach to the slave trade 
within which slave raids did not count as just wars, women and chil-
dren should not be taken captive, and hereditary slavery was positively 
unjust. Without an unjust act, there could be no just enslavement. This 
was a shift in the politics of slavery, away from Aristotelian notions of 
natural hierarchy. Within Locke’s view of natural rights was the idea 
that all human beings had ‘a capacity, and therefore a right, to attain 
the moral status attributed to “humanness”’ (Marden 2006, 97). They 
could only be prevented from that attainment by individual failings 
or by cultural and environmental disadvantage, not by their inherited 
status or their natures. This slavery-within-limits was not about dis-
counting the possibility of slavery altogether, nor about fi xing slavery 
as an institution. The ground shifted as the Indians began to resist the 
colonists, and in particular once that resistance became violent, and as 
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the plantation system came to dominate the Atlantic economy. By 1710, 
the promotional literature for migrants coming to Carolina declared 
that two ‘Negro slaves’ were required in order to live comfortably, and 
suggested to newcomers that they could start out as overseers until 
they could establish their own plantations (Hinshelwood 2013, 579). 
As Hinshelwood points out, the change refl ected the shift to rice as 
the staple crop of the colony after the 1690s. As a consequence of the 
infl ux of West African slaves cultivating rice, enslaved Africans imported 
by Barbadians became the majority population in Carolina. This was 
a process that shifted the social relations of power in the colony and 
was accompanied by new, racialised meanings of whiteness and black-
ness. At the same time, the colonies became places to transport and 
reform vagabonds, beggars and criminals through servitude. In this 
context of swirling hierarchies and privileges, and shifting meanings 
of moral worth and punishment, the indigenous people’s insecure grip 
on their freedom and their identity meant that they could fi nd them-
selves enslaved. As Nyquist puts it, racialisation is ‘a refl exive, relational 
process that generates heritable liberties along with heritable slavery, 
voluntary servitude along with slavery, juridical innocence alongside 
incapacity or criminality’ (Nyquist 2013, 367). The result of this refl ex-
ive, relational process is that legitimate political resistance became ‘a 
privilege that is tacitly racialized’ (Nyquist 2013, 367), and the liberal 
subject was able to disavow any kinship with the enslaved, who were 
understood to be neither persons nor citizens, and so unable to ground 
political resistance.
Locke’s approach to the justifi cation of slavery and its colonial con-
text draws attention to what Marden identifi es as the problems of 
making ‘certain positive human attributes the measure of eligibility for 
rights-bearing status’ (Marden 2006, 86). Defi ning humanness through 
reason ‘encompasses both a universal logic and one that is exclusionary’ 
(Marden 2006, 87). In this natural-rights logic of slavery, what emerges 
is not just the ‘strangeness of slaves’ but the roots of Locke’s ‘strange 
indifference’ towards them. Rationality defi nes human beings, but not 
all human beings properly exercise this capacity. Once this universal/
exclusionary logic is recognised as being at the heart of the theory, it 
becomes clear that this is not a question of resolving contradictions or 
solving puzzling silences. In the eighteenth century, a commitment to 
equality did not entail a rejection of social hierarchy. The American rev-
olutionaries attacked hereditary privilege, but accepted subordination 
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based on capacity, disposition and virtue (Marden 2006, 89). Thinking 
about Locke and slavery should return us to the dangers slavery poses 
to politics, and remind us of the inseparability of slavery from perpetual 
boundary-setting and keeping. The assumption behind human-rights 
language in its American manifestation was that most people would 
fall short of the standard of ‘humanness’. Rights meant moral worthi-
ness and access to equality of opportunity. It was clear that unequal 
industry and virtues necessarily created unequal rights. Marden argues 
that ‘in practice different people would enjoy different rights’. The right 
to realise human potential, by entering into a civilised moral world, was 
universal, but the actual enjoyment of civil rights depended on reaching 
that standard (Marden 2006, 90) and crossing the threshold that sepa-
rated the state of nature from civil society. 
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Chapter 4
EMPIRES OF PROPERTY, PROPERTIES OF EMPIRE
The threshold between the state of nature and civil society was central 
to the boundary-setting and keeping of the imperial project, as the pos-
sibility that some were everywhere slaves and others were everywhere 
free became a question for empire and for global property relations. 
This chapter explores the relationship between property, slavery, moral-
ity and the law at the end of the eighteenth century, as we move from 
Locke to Haiti. As Stephanie Smallwood points out, there is a tendency 
to treat slavery and freedom as fi xed, stable categories ‘when, in fact, the 
fuzzy boundaries and unclear content of these categories was precisely 
what fuelled debate about “slavery” and “freedom” in the eighteenth 
century’ (Smallwood 2004, 289). This more historicised and dynamic 
approach to the idea of slavery is about trying to understand how ideas 
about property, slavery, humanity and enlightenment were forged 
together, and the tensions and frictions between them. As Smallwood 
argues, this is in part about recognising how the rise of slavery in the 
Americas was dependent on the nature of freedom in Western Europe, 
as slavery was built on a foundation of market relations and freedom 
on ‘understandings of property underwritten and authored by slavery’ 
(Smallwood 2004, 297). Eighteenth-century conceptions of self-owner-
ship, universal rights and the rise of revolutionary antislavery grew out 
of the epistemological relationship between global markets and free-
dom that was informed by ideas of slavery and empire. Smallwood’s 
argument focuses on commodifi cation as a political process and a dis-
cursive system that crowded out other systems of representation and 
became the fullest expression of slavery. In the process, freedom was 
reduced ‘to the ability to whittle things (and people) down (from all that 
they might be) to their own-able characteristics’ (Smallwood 2004, 297). 
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In his speech to the House of Lords on the second reading of the bill 
for the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, Sir Thomas Plumer spoke in 
support of the West Indian planters. He stressed the legality of the slave 
trade, its foundations in the Royal Africa Company in the seventeenth 
century and John Locke’s involvement: ‘What, my Lords! Are we to be 
told that these men did not understand plain principles of humanity 
and justice?’ (Plumer 1807, 11). He was responding to the links made by 
antislavery discourse between humanity, justice and property, arguing 
that the ownership of others was itself corrupting, not just for the slaves 
but for the planters as well. For the abolitionists, the planters’ owner-
ship was corrupt and cankered, and so unrestrained and unimproving. 
Both the West Indian planters and the enslaved Black Africans were 
somehow unable to husband themselves and to improve their property. 
In 1823, when the slave trade had been abolished but slavery contin-
ued, James Cropper contrasted the stability of landed income with ‘the 
unjust and uncertain tenure of property in the persons and lives of . . . 
fellow men’ (Gladstone 1824, 7).
This chapter explores that unjust and uncertain tenure in the 
persons of others as it was debated, contested and affi rmed in pam-
phlets, letters, sermons and speeches in the 1790s as the West Indian 
planters responded to the anti-slavery movement. The Legislature, 
they argued, had entered into an implied engagement with the 
planters to secure their property and to permit the continuance of 
the slave trade. Mr Baillie, speaking in the 1792 debate in the House 
of Commons, maintained that abolishing the African slave trade ‘will 
be an absolute breach of the compact that ties the colonies to the 
mother country’ (Debate 1792, 54), and would be met with univer-
sal resistance. The laws in existence had guaranteed the security of 
the lives and fortunes of British subjects living in the West Indies in 
the same way as those living in Great Britain, so that ‘their property 
cannot be meddled with or diminished in any shape whatsoever, 
without full and ample compensation’. The end of the African slave 
trade would breach the property rights of the slave traders and owners 
and bring ‘an end to every species of improvement in all our Islands’ 
(Debate 1792, 54). These debates illuminate the ‘consensual limits 
to enslavability’ as liberty became the hegemonic ideal in north-
western Europe (Drescher 2002, 12). In England, the concept of the 
free man, able to alienate his labour through contract and to seek his 
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own property, was embedded in law, practice and culture. He owned 
a ‘self-property’ in his labour as an individual. He was protected from 
being downgraded to chattel status by living in the ‘zone of freedom’, 
so that he ‘retained bundles of rights and mechanisms of protec-
tion and publicity that were not available to most African labourers’ 
(Drescher 2002, 14). Even where the demands for labour were most 
intense, Seymour Drescher argues, ‘metropolitan norms were never 
suffi ciently altered to accommodate the permanent bondage of Euro-
peans’ (Drescher 2002, 14). Drescher argues that the zones of free-
dom and unfreedom coexisted separately until the later eighteenth 
century, when they began to impinge on one another as Black slaves 
moved from the periphery to Europe and ‘generated continuous fric-
tion over the metropolitan status of colonists’ claims to their property 
in persons’ (Drescher 2002, 19). These tensions and frictions are the 
subject of this chapter.
PROPERTIES OF COLONIALISM
The zones of freedom and unfreedom that were being drawn up and 
contested in the eighteenth century rested not just on the self-property 
of European labourers and the chattel status of African labourers, but 
also on the rights to property, land and territory in the New World. The 
story of property and empire was a story of dispossession, of the power 
of the state, and of a ‘waving line’ of enslavability – as we saw in the 
chapter on Locke. In the eighteenth century, Kant’s theory of property 
rights held that no one living outside the state could legally possess any 
land, so that rights of ownership in the state of nature could never be 
anything more than provisional until they were sanctioned by public 
law. This opened up the legal and moral space for the colonial powers 
to take over the lands of the native inhabitants and leave them without 
redress. Practical reason, in Kant’s account, required people to obey the 
legitimate authority in power, irrespective of its origin or the ways in 
which its property was acquired. A subject could lodge a complaint, 
but not offer resistance. Spencer argues that this combination of fac-
tors meant that the colonial masters had the right, according to Kant, 
to encourage immigration and the settlement of colonists against the 
opposition of indigenous peoples. Only the colonists’ legally sanctioned 
private ownership of land needed to be respected, and rebellion, even 
in defence of indigenous property, was always illegitimate. In effect, this 
5606_Brace.indd   62 12/01/18   6:03 PM
Empires of Property, Properties of Empire 63
meant that Kant placed no effective limits of the sovereign’s use of vio-
lence, and the balance of power always leant towards state authority 
over minority nations (Spencer 2015). Indigenous peoples and minor-
ity nations were left without ‘any real protection for their autonomy as 
peoples’ (Spencer 2015, 386).
Spencer argues that Kant placed a duty on all people living in a 
stateless condition to leave the state of nature and enter into civic rela-
tions under the coercive apparatus of the state. It was the only way for 
individuals to establish security from each other. Kant expressed con-
tempt for all those who tried to live outside the strictures of the state, 
either as savages or as pirates, who ‘prefer the freedom of folly to the 
freedom of reason’ (Spencer 2015, 376). By 1778 Kant was arguing that 
the American Indians were too weak for hard labour, too indifferent 
for industry, and incapable of any culture. This was an important shift 
in Enlightenment thinking about indigenous peoples that moved away 
from relating to them as active men and trading partners, and drew 
on Rousseau’s account of humans as ‘self-making (and self-enslaving) 
agents’ (Muthu 2003, 13).
For the earlier writers on indigenous peoples, the Amerindians 
were depicted as living in communal societies without private prop-
erty, hierarchies or inequalities. They were understood to be living 
natural, simple, equal and uncomplicated lives, infl uenced mainly by 
the climate and by nature itself. As Sankar Muthu argues, this was a 
‘nearly acultural understanding of New World peoples’ which ‘leaves 
the work of the creation and maintenance of these societies largely 
to fortune and nature’ (Muthu 2003, 17). This conception of ‘natural’ 
peoples could then be used as a critical tool to expose the injustices 
of more ‘artifi cial’ societies and to think about Europe in terms of its 
own savagery and barbarity. Muthu argues that these accounts also 
entailed a ‘temporal claim’ within which the New World represented 
the earliest stage of human history, an ‘infant world’ in contrast to 
the decrepitude and moral bankruptcy of a European civilisation that 
was now in decline (Muthu 2003, 23). Infl uential early eighteenth-
century accounts of Amerindian societies saw the people in them as 
living simpler lives than Europeans, structured by equality and inde-
pendence, embodying values of innocence, tranquillity and commu-
nal existence, balanced somewhere between the primitive and the 
civilised in a ‘relatively peaceful and content middle state’ (Muthu 
2003, 35). In this carefully calibrated state, they were accorded a 
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degree of humanisation, but their mental capacities were judged to 
be at an elementary level because they were unable to ‘go beyond the 
simple association of basic ideas’ (Muthu 2003, 42). This meant that 
their ideas about property were judged to be underdeveloped since 
their wants were simple and easily met, and they were not driven by 
competition and greed.
For Diderot, problems arose when modern travellers and commer-
cial agents ‘arrive[d] in foreign lands animated principally by the spirit 
of conquest’ (Muthu 2003, 85). Driven by tyranny, guilt, ambition and 
curiosity and then unmoored from their own cultural contexts, they 
became ‘unleashed tigers’ who had a catastrophic effect on the non-
European peoples they encountered because they were no longer 
moderated by their own rules of conduct (Muthu 2003, 86, 92). They 
allowed the grandiose desire for power to take over. Any limits that 
had been placed on slavery by Locke’s theory were lifted. In this new 
commercial and colonial context they became what Ottobah Cuguano 
called a ‘bramble of ruffi ans, barbarians and slave-holders, grown up 
to a powerful luxuriance in wickedness’ (Cuguano 1787, 24). Cuguano, 
who was kidnapped by slave-traders in what is now Ghana when he 
was thirteen, characterised the slave trade as based on ‘brutish barbar-
ity and unparalleled injustice’, carried on in the colonies with insidi-
ous, cruel and oppressive avidity. The longer the trade continued, the 
slavers grew more abandoned, until ‘nothing in history can equal the 
barbarity and cruelty of the tortures committed under various pretences 
in modern slavery’ (Cuguano 1787, 3). Their actions were inimical to 
every idea of justice, equity, reason and humanity, and meant that they 
‘must eventually resign their own claim to any degree of sensibility 
and humanity’ (Cuguano 1787, 3). Slave traders, away from home, had 
made themselves into ‘robbers of men, the kidnappers, ensnarers and 
slave-holders, who take away the common rights and privileges of oth-
ers to support and enrich themselves’ (Cuguano 1787, 4). They acted 
against every precept and injunction of Divine Law and contrary to the 
golden rule of doing as they would be done by. They cast themselves 
off not only from their local contexts, but also from any limits to their 
property and from the universal bonds between men, the ties that were 
supposed to secure them against injury and violence. They were left, 
Cuguano argued, with no scruples for dealing with the human species, 
so that they became ‘not only brutish, but wicked and base; and . . . their 
aspirations are insidious and false’ (Cuguano 1787, 5). 
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Antislavery arguments from Christianity grew out of this idea that the 
slave traders had transgressed the moral law, and created for themselves 
an immoral conception of property as conquest, based on force and 
dispossession. Europeans had, according to Granville Sharp, attacked, 
destroyed, driven out, dispossessed and enslaved the poor ignorant 
heathen in many parts of the world, without being able to produce ‘an 
authentic written commandment from God for such proceedings’, and so 
had to be regarded as lawless robbers and oppressors who had reason 
to expect severe retribution from God for their tyranny and oppression 
(Sharp 1776, 13). Their accumulation of property was reinterpreted as 
a process of civilisation that hid from view the dispossession of whole 
groups of people who came to be labelled as barbarians. For Sharp and 
Cuguano, the process of civilisation for some actively created the ‘bar-
barity’ of others by taking away their property. ‘Or can the slave-holders 
think’, Cuguano asked, ‘that the Universal Father and Sovereign of 
Mankind will be well pleased with them, for the total transgression of 
his law, in bowing down the necks of those to the yoke of their cruel 
bondage?’ (Cuguano 1787, 23). Thomas Gisborne argued that through 
the slave trade Europe contributed to retaining vast regions of Africa ‘in a 
state of barbarity and ignorance’ (Gisborne 1792, 16). He attributed this 
barbarity to the Europeans’ spirit of conquest, and their deliberate poli-
cies to destroy the security of African life ‘by keeping every individual in 
momentary fear of being seized by a lurking enemy, or even by his own 
kindred, and hurried on board a slave-ship’ (Gisborne 1792, 16). The 
colonists and slave traders fomented continual, bloody and unprovoked 
wars and encouraged the savage tyranny of the princes, perpetuating 
iniquitous laws and customs, and failing to diffuse the religion of Christ. 
They were, William Belsham argued, ‘engrossed by one fatal passion, the 
rage of accumulating wealth’ (Belsham 1790, 11). Diderot used the exam-
ple of the English arriving in India as traders and staying on to become 
absolute rulers. He saw this as a process of losing principles, of the ‘moral 
blindness’ of the imperial project and its accompanying atrocities that 
made him ‘freeze with horror’ (Muthu 2003, 90). It was, as he saw it, this 
spirit of conquest and moral blindness that had led the imperial pow-
ers to develop African slavery, ever more dehumanising non-Europeans 
and creating the conditions for more barbaric cruelty, undermining the 
general will of humanity so that ‘[i]n order to repeople one part of the 
globe that you have laid waste, you corrupt and depopulate another’ 
(Muthu 2003, 93).
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Diderot’s account of the catastrophic effects of empire on non-Euro-
pean peoples was relational and global, and he attributed the moral 
blindness and the spirit of conquest to Europeans’ self-serving failure 
to recognise the right to property as universal, and instead to insist that 
America was a terra nullius, an uninhabited land, untrammelled by any 
legitimate property claims. As William Innes, ‘a West-India merchant’ and 
plantation owner, said about Africa, sounding remarkably like Hobbes 
as he stripped away any workable rules of conduct, laws, customs or 
collective practices that may have existed there: ‘Without religion, with-
out morality, without agriculture, manufactures, arts and sciences, it is 
impossible for the inhabitants of the Gold Coast to avoid those evils 
which involve slavery’ (Innes 1792, 12–13). In such a situation, Innes 
argued, slavery became inevitable, and European slavery was to be pre-
ferred to the savage and despotic African version. Many of the Africans 
traded by Europeans had, claimed James Adair, been prisoners of war, 
‘who formerly having been sacrifi ced to personal or political resentment, 
have, since the intercourse with Europeans, been preserved as lucrative 
objects of commerce’ (Adair 1790, 144). Commodifi cation emerges from 
this account as a step towards freedom, part of a political process that 
made Africans fi t for market exchange by whittling them down to their 
own-able characteristics and removing them from contexts of barbar-
ity and ignorance (Smallwood 2004). Cuguano was careful to contest 
this slavers’ vision of Africa and its social relations. Even if Africans were 
dispersed and unsociable, that could be no warrant for the Europeans 
to enslave them. The continent of Africa, he pointed out, was vast, and 
divided into kingdoms and principalities governed by their respective 
kings and princes who ruled over their free subjects. When the Africans 
sold one another, they were ‘only ensnared and enlisted to be servants’, 
Cuguano insisted. Echoing the limits that Locke placed on slavery, he 
pointed out that they did not sell their own wives and children – ‘noth-
ing can be more opposite to every thing they hold dear and valuable’ 
(Cuguano 1787, 27). For Cuguano, the governments of Christian nations 
were supporting and countenancing unlawful traffi c and piracy, and 
stepping outside the Lockean contexts for limited slavery: 
This seems to be a fashionable way of getting riches, but very 
dishonourable; in doing this, the slave-holders are meaner and 
baser than the African slaves, for while they subject and reduce 
them to a degree with the brutes, they seduce themselves to a 
degree with devils. (Cuguano 1787, 21) 
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Their intention was not improvement or redemption, but to advance 
their own ease and profi t.
COLONISTS’ PROPERTY
Defenders of the slave trade interpreted their way of getting riches 
very differently, putting it into the context of economic and social 
advancement, and insisting that their intention was improvement. 
They saw the growing demand for sugar as integral to the progress of 
civilisation, spreading through Russia and the north of Europe as their 
artifi cial wants increased and they made ‘rapid advancements towards 
refi nement’ (Anon 1792, 23). For the proslavery thinkers, Europe’s 
crusades had given way to colonisation, and ‘Wars are becoming more 
humanized, private property more sacred; and prisoners, that used to 
be condemned or enslaved, are now exchanged.’ The principles and 
objects of government were better understood, ‘rights better defi ned, 
property and wealth increasing, and better protected’ (Anon 1789, 2) 
through this process of commodifi cation. In this more positive account 
of the colonial encounter, Europe was positioned as having been slow 
and gradual in its improvements, and so Europeans should not expect 
too much from Africa ‘in its present crude and enslaved state, with-
out arts or civilization, and having a cultivation so limited’. Africa had 
much to learn to be prepared to receive the seeds of civilisation and 
emancipation (Anon 1789, 2).
This process of civilisation and refi nement was not only about what 
went on elsewhere. It was also central to the empire at home, and to 
the colonial dynamic of histories of consumption and new forms of 
culture and consciousness (De Groot 2006, 171). The profi ts from the 
slave trade were woven into the fabric of British property relations, 
particularly for the elite, and the zone of freedom was a zone of habits 
shaped by what De Groot terms intimate and extended links with a 
growing number of colonies (De Groot 2006, 171). William Innes, for 
example, held a half share in the Albion, Nigg and Lancaster estates 
in British Guiana, and left legacies of around £200–300 each to a series 
of individuals in Scotland, and an annuity of £100 a year to two of 
his nieces (UCL 2017b). The West India merchants owned ‘estates in 
progress’ and had expended large sums of money on them ‘upon the 
faith of Parliament’, which had declared the wisdom and propriety of 
the trade, and invited foreigners and British subjects to ‘embark their 
capital in it’ (Plumer 1807, 13). Abolition would, they protested, arrest 
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the progress of improvement and destroy what had been done, caus-
ing private property to ‘fall into decay’ (Plumer 1807, 17). The knock-on 
effect would be to damage Britain’s trade by taking away an important 
market for all kinds of manufactured goods, from shoes and stock-
ings to implements of husbandry, provisions and luxuries, ‘every shil-
ling of which centers [sic] in Great Britain’, where the planters also 
spent the surplus revenue of their estates and educated their children 
(Debate  1792, 55). The trade to Africa, they concluded, should be 
encouraged rather than abolished. Some agreed that the slave trade 
was an evil, but not an evil of such magnitude ‘as to justify the ruin of 
our colonies, our trade, and our manufactures’ (Anon 1792, 42). The 
planters and merchants who were opposed to abolition regarded it as 
a risky venture with uncertain outcomes that would involve them in 
irretrievable ruin and bring only uncertain and unimportant advan-
tages to the slaves. Instant and unqualifi ed abolition was regarded as 
a dangerous experiment in a world that was so powerfully shaped by 
colonial production and domestic consumption, and so unprepared for 
emancipation. 
In 1823, after the abolition of the slave trade but before the abolition 
of slavery in 1833, James Cropper argued for the introduction of unre-
stricted free trade, but this was read by John Gladstone as an attack on 
the property rights of the West India planters whose title to their slaves 
was ‘as strong and valid as the law of the land can make it’ (Gladstone 
1824, 70). Any interference with or injury to their property by the pub-
lic would require full compensation, because ‘[t]o admit the principle of 
requiring any higher title than that which the law recognises, would be 
to strike at the root of all property throughout the kingdom’ (Gladstone 
1824, 70). The law had to be binding on those that made it, ‘and, to inval-
idate or alienate the rights or property of the Planters, for the purpose of 
either real or presumed benevolence, would be to recognise a principle 
of general spoliation’ (Gladstone 1824, 100). In the question of compen-
sation, the slave was no party to the arrangement because ‘that is between 
the proprietor and the Legislature only’ (Gladstone 1824, 70). The zone of 
freedom was rooted in these property rights and agreements made at 
the centre, in the laws of the state. Immediate abolition was represented 
as an existential threat to the law and to property. 
In Innes’s vision of gradual emancipation, the piety and goodness 
of the world ‘would wear away Slavery’ in the Caribbean by degrees, 
as it had in Europe (Innes 1792, 30), replacing it with the indentured 
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servitude of ‘native Cultivators’ who would labour the ground and 
reduce the need to import slaves from Africa (Innes 1792, 29). This 
gradualist approach was designed to protect the property rights of the 
slave owner, to ensure ‘that no violent loss or disaster would accrue to 
the Planter, who, on the system of Slavery, and the faith of repeated 
laws, embarked his capital, his industry, his hopes in this world’ (Innes 
1792, 30). In this defence of the West Indian planter, he appears not 
as a gambler or a speculator, but as an industrious investor with a 
legitimate stake in slavery as a system of commerce endorsed by the 
state. Rather than condemning their absenteeism, Innes defended the 
transnational identity and the mobility of the West Indians. The West 
India planters, merchants, sailors and others were citizens of both 
Britain and the Islands ‘which . . . are as a summer-house to England, 
since so great a number of its inhabitants are in the habit of going and 
coming between them’ (1792, 65). The planters were, in his view, ‘as 
warm Friends, as any of the British Empire, to the highest degree of 
Liberty, consistent with Order and Good Government, and the wid-
est range of Humanity – Humanity not to Africans only, but also to 
Europeans’ (1792, 88). Most of the natives of the West Indies were 
sent to England to receive a liberal education ‘and imbibe those senti-
ments of liberty and independence, which are every where to be met 
with in that happy country’. There was, Richard Nisbet argued, no rea-
son to think that a few years residence in the West Indies ‘will make 
them, totally, forget humanity, that fi rst and noblest characteristic of 
English-men’ (Nisbet 1773, 16). 
There were some problems with this picture of the West Indian 
planters as people of skill and ‘unceasing, but unavailing industry’, 
contributing to sustaining a sinking empire (Adair 1790, 202). Their 
own habits of industry were brought into question by the issue of 
absenteeism. The principal proprietors were described by Sir Thomas 
Plumer as ‘the most opulent persons who possess estates [and] do not 
themselves reside upon the spot’ (Plumer, 1807, 22). The great major-
ity of planters were not absentees, but those who owned the largest 
plantations often were. The likely number of absentee proprietors in 
the late eighteenth century was between 150 and 155, or between 3 
and 6 per cent of the white population, but more than a third of them 
owned estates of over 2,500 acres, meaning that they held 24.4 per 
cent of the land (Burnard 2011). Adair identifi ed one set of absentee 
slave owners as proprietors who came to the West Indies to waste their 
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fortunes and leave their estates to unprincipled men on such low sala-
ries that they were tempted to embezzle. The inevitable consequence 
was ruin, and ‘hence it is that their estates sometimes fall into the hands 
of strangers, even taylors and hucksters’ (Adair 1790, 199). As Trevor 
Burnard argues, absentee slave owners were demonised as socially 
harmful, hampering development, leaching money out of the colony 
and fostering slave rebellion. The absentees symbolised Jamaican fail-
ure ‘to become a tropical version of British society’, to be civilised as 
well as rich. Absenteeism was taken to signal a lack of commitment to 
the colonies and ‘an indifference to improvement’ (Burnard 2004, 192). 
The positive benefi ts of absenteeism were ignored, and patriotism was 
equated with settlement. West Indian planters struggled to give their 
property the permanence that was attached to revenues that derived 
from a landed estate in Europe (Draper 2010, 3). They were struggling 
for the recognition of West Indians as true Englishmen, since English 
identity was becoming inextricable from the claim to be a friend to 
liberty and humanity. Absentee landowners were ‘tied to the colonies 
but not of them’, members of British society, but seen as ‘West Indian’ 
(Draper 2010, 17). Their Englishness was compromised, and needed to 
be defended.
Slave ownership was transmitted through inheritance and marriage 
settlement, and more indirectly through annuities and legacies, such as 
those left by Innes to his nieces, spreading through the undergrowth of 
landed property norms, not always tainted, but not always visible. The 
absentee slave owner was ‘an essentially liminal fi gure’ (Draper 2010, 7), 
suspended between the stability of landed property and the ‘terribly frag-
ile’ foundations of mobile property (Pocock 1975, 441). They were funda-
mentally engaged in the ‘circulation and exchange of substantive things as 
insubstantial commodities’ (McKeon 2005, 26) in the virtual market that 
crossed the globe as well as in the very real slave markets. A small number 
of elite white West Indian men had access to upper-class white wives as 
‘genealogical capital’, but many other planters and their surrogates only 
had access to black concubines (Green 2006, 16), making it harder for 
them to keep their property within the extended family and ensure its 
racial ‘purity’ (Green 2006, 40). The planters’ hold on their landed property 
was not enough to ground their own settled Englishness because the West 
Indies were fi gured as a morally suspect, ‘disturbing place’, full of death, 
violence and hybridity (Burnard 2011, 186). The planters, like the slaves, 
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were affected by the heat, making them licentious and slothful, addicted 
to vice and luxury. They were not invited into the ‘space of gentlemanly 
conversation’ that connected the pursuit of self-interest to the fundamen-
tal demand to act for the benefi t of others and to promote the common 
good (Klein 1994, 36). It was diffi cult for them to come to terms with the 
unpredictability and riskiness of their colonial property, and to insist on 
the absolute power to punish, and at the same time to ground their British 
identity as solid, independent individuals who could engage in commerce 
and improve the world. 
The property relations underpinning the zone of freedom did not 
always feel stable and secure. The slave owners argued that they were 
struggling with their debts to keep their heads above water, and the abo-
lition of the slave trade would sink them into the ‘abyss of ruin’, dragging 
the British empire along with them (Adair 1790, 202). In Antigua and the 
other colonies, a considerable portion of the land was unfi t for cultivat-
ing sugar cane. In Adair’s narrative of excess and decline, the planter 
became comparatively wealthy ‘by the fruits of his limited industry’, but 
that meant that his merchant in England advanced him more money and 
he was ‘seized with the rage of becoming a sugar planter’ (Adair 1790, 
214–15), building expensive sugar works and buying slaves as rapidly as 
possible. In this account, there is something excessive about the sugar 
planters’ relationship to property, a desire to use money to exceed the 
bounds of their industry, a determination to become ‘rich and indepen-
dent with all possible expedition’ so that they could return to England 
and educate their children there (Adair 1790, 215).Their attitude towards 
their estates and their slaves was stigmatised as archetypally aristocratic, 
‘over and against the emerging norms of bourgeois self-discipline and 
systematic, impersonal justice and punishment’ (Draper 2010, 48). In 
pursuing the goal of wealth and independence, the planters bought 
too many adult men as slaves, and pushed them beyond their strength 
before they were ‘seasoned’. The planter’s haste to get rich meant that 
he was often ruined: ‘many great and irremediable evils have arisen from 
the ambition of the planter to become a manufacturer of sugar’ (Adair 
1790, 216). Depictions of their wealth were undercut by ‘undercurrents 
of decadence and corruption coded as luxury’ (Burnard 2011, 192), and 
they were in turn coded as non-British by their lack of self-restraint, their 
‘rage’ to monopolise rather than to improve. Their response was to try 
‘to constitute themselves as “proprietors”, as owners of land rather than 
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as owners of slaves’ (Draper 2010, 80), and it was this strategy that was 
undermined by the constant references to their absenteeism and their 
fatal, passionate, overattachment to wealth. West India property never 
became the equivalent of metropolitan landed property; it ‘offered nei-
ther the stability nor the social cachet of English land’ (Draper 2010, 184). 
The West India planters were fi gured as lacking the qualities of rational-
ity, industry and improvement that could sustain a just and certain ten-
ure. They were shut out of the Lockean vision of rational improvement 
and limited slavery.
CONTESTING PROPERTY RIGHTS
The antislavery writers worked hard to unsettle the basis of the slave 
owners’ property rights in their slaves by arguing that, even if their 
ownership was embodied in the law, they had no moral right to claim 
such a property. ‘Purchase’, Joseph Woods argued, ‘transfers no title but 
that which the seller possessed, namely power. If indeed power always 
implies right, the Europeans may, with a safe conscience, oppress and 
destroy the negroes at pleasure’ (J. Woods 1784, 16). If, however, as they 
claimed, the personal benefi t of the slave was the primary object of the 
slave merchant, then ‘those philanthropists who engage in this traffi c, 
from such noble and generous motives, must consider the previous 
consent of the Slave as absolutely necessary to give validity to the pur-
chase’ (Belsham 1790, 10). Woods argued in 1784 that it was incumbent 
on the ‘individuals concerned in this species of property to satisfy the 
demands of reason and conscience by relinquishing it’ (J. Woods 1784, 
23). He did not hold out much hope. Experience had taught that ‘it is 
too deeply entangled with motives of interest and habits of power to be 
voluntarily abandoned’ (J. Woods 1784, 23). The law needed to change 
to help the planters ‘overcome the temptation to persevere in what is 
known to be wrong’ (J. Woods 1784, 23). 
The slave owners were taking advantage of another’s wickedness, 
and seeking to profi t from the crimes committed by others. If an indi-
vidual had been unjustly reduced to a state of slavery by the contingen-
cies of war, ‘no subsequent purchase can convert the wrong into a right; 
as the receiver of stolen goods, knowing them to be so, is equally culpa-
ble with the thief’ (J. Woods 1784, 29). In the same way as Locke argued 
that it was impossible to transfer the right of life and death to another 
person, these abolitionists insisted that no right existed to alienate from 
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another his liberty, and every slave purchase was a contradiction to 
the original inherent rights of mankind. Their account of natural rights 
could not be made compatible with slavery. For Gisborne, it was a ques-
tion of conscience, about the impossibility of ever knowing ‘whether 
that liberty is justly forfeited’ and so justly at the disposal of the seller 
(Gisborne 1792, 13). Most slaves, Gisborne went on to point out, were 
the victims of avarice, treachery and rapine, kidnapped by their own 
countrymen and relations, stolen by the emissaries of the Europeans, 
or ‘captured in wars commenced at their [European] instigation for the 
purpose of obtaining slaves’ (Gisborne 1792, 14). The African slave trade 
derived its support and its very existence from ‘unbounded oppression 
and injustice’ (Gisborne 1792, 15), and ought to be instantly and univer-
sally abandoned. It was the duty of the legislature to pass an immediate 
act of abolition to prevent individuals from acting as principals, abettors 
or accomplices in such a system of iniquity and oppression.
The burden of restoring their ‘alienated rights’ to the Africans should 
not rest solely on the planters’ shoulders. Woods accepted that they had 
pursued this ‘iniquitous traffi ck’ under the patronage of Britain and the 
costs of its abolition should be borne ‘by all who share in its advantages’ 
(J. Woods 1784, 23–4). The advocates of immediate abolition contested 
the basis of slavery in legal property rights. Engagements between the 
legislature and the West Indian owners could not be binding ‘since they 
could not have been performed without fl agrant injustice to the Afri-
cans, the invasion of whose rights the British government never was, 
nor ever can be, authorised to promote’ (Gisborne 1792, 19). It could 
not, Gisborne argued, be in the interests of the kingdom to be supported 
by ‘depriving unoffending foreigners of their rights’ (Gisborne 1792, 
21). It was a momentous truth, he asserted, ‘and a truth little regarded’ 
that ‘the rules of morality are as binding on nations as on individu-
als’. ‘What would have been robberies and murders, if committed by 
a single highwayman, are they not still robberies and murders though 
the perpetrators have previously coalesced into a troop, a society, or a 
nation?’ (Gisborne 1792, 21). Antislavery writers used their belief in the 
innate liberty of all men to argue that if slavery could not be allowed 
in England, how could it exist on British soil anywhere? (Swaminathan 
2009, 88). In the aftermath of the American Revolution, ‘the slave trade 
became the issue through which British writers could reclaim the con-
cept of liberty from the American revolutionaries’, and in that process 
of reclamation, they narrowed the location of their critique to the West 
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Indies (Swaminathan 2009, 94). In this antislavery discourse, designed 
to contest the basis of the zone of freedom in property rights, the state 
was obliged to promote Christian liberty, ‘to create a national con-
science, strongly dependent upon their defi nition of Christian moral-
ity’ (Swaminathan 2009, 99). In Gisborne’s account we can also see the 
global reach of antislavery as it built a new understanding of the scope 
of rights that had to account for the natural liberty of Africans and the 
shared humanity of Africans and Europeans. They argued that rather 
than increasing civilisation, the enslavement of their fellow creatures 
was a stain on the national character of the British (Swaminathan 2009, 
95). Antislavery writers made clear that ‘the whole substance perhaps, 
of the most wealthy English or Scotch slaveholders would not suffi ce 
to pay what is due, in strict justice, to those that have laboured in his ser-
vice, if the reward is to be proportioned to their sufferings’ (Sharp 1776, 
58). Quoting from James 5: 3, Sharp told the slaveholders that, despite 
having been encouraged and protected by the government, their gold 
and silver was cankered, and they would be punished for withholding 
wages and defrauding labourers who were worthy of their hire. 
The antislavery impulse was to repudiate planter societies as ‘exem-
plars of profi teering run amok’, their property tarnished by the unregu-
lated pursuit of private gain and by the colonists’ refusal to consider 
the public good (C. L. Brown 2006, 81). They had tainted not only West 
Indian society, but also their own national inheritance and the stabil-
ity of the British economy. Henry Brougham talked about the ‘wages 
of national guilt’, and asked whether the defenders of the slave trade 
were trying to vindicate a mercenary murder on the grounds that it 
had been profi table (Brougham 1804, 32). It had been argued that the 
African trade opened up a wide channel for the benefi cial investment 
of capital, and that abolition would be a serious blow to the commercial 
resources of the country. Brougham responded that the profi ts of the 
slave trade had proved to be extremely uncertain and speculative, with 
the few succeeding at the expense of the numerous failures of others. 
The slave trade, he concluded, was one of the ‘gambling trades’, with 
uncertain profi ts and remote benefi ts (Brougham 1804, 34). In eradi-
cating the stain of the slave trade, ‘a traffi c founded in treachery and 
blood’, the state should not be afraid of disappointing the expectations 
of men ‘who had arranged their plans with the hopes of fattening upon 
the plunder of the public character and virtue’ (Brougham 1804, 51). 
The objections to abolition from commercial policy amounted to the 
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claim that religion and morality were subservient to avarice and luxury, 
‘and that it is better thousands of poor unoffending people should be 
degraded and destroyed in the most abject slavery, than that the inhab-
itants of Europe should pay a higher price for their rum, rice, and sugar’ 
(J. Woods 1784, 18–19). The right to property in the zone of freedom 
emerged from this discourse not as a birthright, but as something to be 
earned through ‘a demonstrated capacity for just dealings with fellow 
subjects’, and the reputation for oppressing Africans damaged metro-
politan opinion of colonial rights (C. L. Brown 2006, 126).
IMMEDIATE VERSUS GRADUAL ABOLITION
The campaign against the slave trade enjoyed what Christopher Leslie 
Brown has called ‘moral prestige’, and it became an indicator of indi-
vidual and collective merit, and the ground for a new kind of heroism 
based on spectacular feats of charity and displays of service to injured 
humanity. For all the campaigners, and especially the Evangelical 
reformers, it was a way ‘to bring morals into politics’ and open up the 
space for moral reform (C. L. Brown 2006, 437, 389). At the same time, 
this space was still governed by the ‘waving line’ and the mobile border 
between slavery and freedom, and the abolitionists themselves often 
reinforced the fuzziness of the boundary and the unclearness of the 
content of the categories of slavery and freedom. Abolition had the 
capacity to mean different things to diverse participants. Gisborne, like 
many other antislavery writers in the 1790s, was caught between his 
condemnation of the slave trade and his acceptance of certain forms 
of slavery. He thought that those who argued that slavery could not be 
reconciled with justice had gone too far. The possession, sale or trans-
fer of a slave was not, for him, ‘in every instance an act of usurpation’ 
(Gisborne 1792, 11). Such an assertion would take you beyond sober 
argument, and beyond the arguments of Locke and Hutcheson, and 
risk undoing the principles of punishment and the transfer of rights 
between masters and servants:
For if natural justice permits a man to be deprived, in certain 
cases, of his limbs or his life, can it universally forbid the exaction 
of his labour? And if one man is entitled to the service of another, 
does not justice allow him to give or sell that right, like any other 
of his rights, to a third person? (Gisborne 1792, 12) 
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There were dangers in the doctrine of universal property rights, in 
breaking down the distinction between the zones of freedom and 
unfreedom and shifting the consensual limits to enslavability. Gisborne 
was expressing his fear of the power of self-property in labour, and of 
the impingement of freedom into spheres of unfreedom. 
William Innes argued for recognition of the complexities of holding 
a tenure in others, and against drawing a bright line between slavery 
and other conditions:
. . . but let not our Reformers attempt the total Abolition of Slavery 
until they have shewn that there is not, and that there ought not 
to be, a diversity of conditions; that there ought not to be, in the 
moral world, such a waving line, as that which, rising and falling 
with hill and dale, both beautifi es and blesses the face of external 
nature. (Innes 1792, 10)
This ‘waving line’ made possible, even for Gisborne, the idea of honest 
purchase from the ‘proper owner’ either in Africa or in the West Indies 
of a slave the buyer believed in his conscience to have been deservedly 
condemned to slavery (Gisborne 1792, p. 12). Such a transaction, in 
Gisborne’s view, would not violate justice. If the slave owner continued 
to believe, in good conscience, that his slave deserved to be a slave he 
was not unjustly exacting the labour of the slave during the term for 
which he was condemned, even if that term was life. Once Gisborne 
had allowed that not every act of possession of sale or transfer was 
a usurpation, and that labour could be bonded for life, his argument 
began to accommodate permanent bondage. The slave owner could 
dispose of his slave to any person he had reason to think would treat 
him properly without acting unjustly. James Ramsay, an infl uential 
abolitionist, argued for the education and gradual emancipation of the 
slaves. He too was against the indiscriminate freeing of slaves. As an 
Anglican minister on St Kitts, he had taken slavery as he found it (as 
he put it), and made a point of making his slaves’ lives comfortable 
and communicating the gospel to them. In a letter to James Tobin, he 
described how he treated his slaves well by feeding and clothing them 
properly and not forcing hard work or unseasonable hours on them. 
They had the opportunity for instruction, and some were ‘deemed wor-
thy of baptism’ (Ramsay 1787, 22). When he left the island, those who 
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‘were judged worthy of freedom’ were manumitted, and the rest were 
sold to masters they chose themselves or to people noted for their 
humanity. ‘They were not’, he assured his readers, ‘sold with sang froid; 
the necessary disposal of them gave me more uneasiness, than every 
other circumstance attending my removal [from the island]’ (Ramsay 
1787, 22). He was worried about slaves who were freed too abruptly. 
Someone who had been enslaved for a long time, he argued, needed 
fi xed employment and to be part of a family ‘in order to demean him-
self properly, and be happy in his new state’ (Ramsay 1787, 22). He 
gave an example: ‘One woman, whom I hastily freed, [who] though 
otherwise sensible, having no check on her conduct, has, I am told, 
turned out worthless and abandoned’ (Ramsay 1787, 23). ‘I wish 
improvement and privilege to go hand in hand,’ he concluded (Ramsay 
1787, 22). His abolitionist views, in particular his eyewitness accounts 
of overwork and punishment, and his racially integrated religious ser-
vices alienated him from his fellow members of the plantocracy, but 
his arguments about improvement and privilege brought him close to 
their proslavery accounts of what it meant to be ‘fi t for freedom’. Slave 
owners saw themselves as holding enslaved people in check, steward-
ing their self-property for them. Throughout the slavery debates, and 
forward into the debates over incarceration and traffi cking, there is this 
constant sense of the enslaved being unworthy of freedom, the risk of 
worthlessness and abandonment, as if the slaves could not root their 
property in the person properly, as if their own tenure in themselves 
was uncertain without it being grounded in labour, industriousness 
and a family. 
In the dynamic debates of the 1790s, much of the argument was 
about how to end the slave trade and close the gap between Britain’s 
vision of itself as a civilised, humane and Christian nation, valuing 
liberty above all else, and the practices of colonial slavery. Both sides 
needed to tackle this question, and the answer ‘immediate abolition’ 
was not predetermined, even for some of the antislavery activists. Innes, 
the West India planter, argued for ‘a gentle and progressive alteration’, 
for slow and gradual progress through ‘limited slavery’ (Innes 1792, 15), 
where slaves were invested with certain privileges and protected from 
arbitrary cruelty, towards emancipation. Gradual abolition would meet 
with little opposition: ‘In order to perfect the Emancipation of Slaves, 
it is necessary, in the fi rst place, that they be capable of being made 
5606_Brace.indd   77 12/01/18   6:03 PM
78 The Politics of Slavery
good members of civil society’ (Innes 1792, 19). The ‘Negroes’ needed 
preparing by enlightening their minds and improving their understand-
ings before they could obtain their liberty (Anon 1792, 38). Freedom, in 
other words, was contingent on this kind of membership of civil soci-
ety, and in particular on understanding the boundaries between liberty 
and licentiousness, between ‘reasonable sway and despotic rule’. Those 
who failed to understand these crucial, civilising binaries were likely to 
abandon themselves to ‘the most infernal intoxication and excess’ (Innes 
1792, 20–1). Their ownership of themselves was precarious and easily 
undermined not just by external arbitrary power but by their own inter-
nal dispositions and failures of reason and conscience.
Advancement towards civilisation and liberty needed to be gradual. 
Innes advised the abolitionists to go to the West Indies and the coast of 
Africa to implant principles of morality, to teach the ‘Negroes’ the content 
of liberty and their duties to God and man, ‘and, in a word, to set their 
minds free before their bodies’ (Innes 1792, 11). Otherwise, the aboli-
tionists were pursuing a course of conduct ‘calculated to rouze them to 
an Insurrection, and act all over again the horrors of St Domingo’ (Innes 
1792, 11). A general sympathy with the enslaved Africans and indigna-
tion at their wrongs ‘cannot but feed the secret sparks of latent discon-
tent and revenge, and threaten some sudden eruption’ (Innes 1792, 41). 
The barbarity and ignorance of those on the west coast of Africa and the 
indolence and licentiousness of the slaves in the West Indies meant that 
they could not ground the obligations and the duties involved in being 
their own masters, in exercising rational freedom and seeking their 
own property. Their precarious tenure over themselves, their propensi-
ties both for confl ict and for submission, meant that they had not fully 
understood the meaning of property and its foundations in reason and 
conscience. They needed to be set free gradually, minds before bodies. 
Their habits of industry, ingrained and developed as enslaved persons, 
would render them worthy of a freedom that did not call into question 
the distribution of good fortune and rouse them to revolutionary fervour, 
but would instead allow them to develop towards increased productiv-
ity and moral improvement. In Gisborne’s antislavery account, freedom 
was a prize to be ‘held up to the spirited Negro, to be gained by industry 
and good behaviour’ (Gisborne 1792, 31). The hope that he would gain 
his freedom would encourage the restraint of vice, the display of vir-
tue and, above all, his industry, until eventually his ‘habits of industry 
will render him worthy of Freedom’ (Gisborne 1792, 31). The politics of 
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slavery had shifted their ground again to hold out the possibility of free-
dom as an achievement and a prize.
HAITI: THE FRAIL VESSEL OF UNQUALIFIED DEMOCRACY
It was the proslavery writers who pointed out the dangers of the doc-
trine of ‘one blood’ and equality, but their fears of the revolution in Haiti 
were shared by many radicals, and expressed in the ‘subdued abolition-
ism’ of the Radical Dissenters which meant that they were willing to 
tolerate mitigated slavery until religious and political liberty had been 
established (Page 2011, 764). For the proslavery John Collins the revolu-
tion in Haiti served as a particularly dire warning of what would happen 
if slaves who were not suffi ciently improved to be worthy of freedom no 
longer felt themselves to be inferior. The French National Assembly’s 
declaration that ‘elevated those of mixed blood to the rank and immu-
nities of citizens’, sowed ‘a germe [sic] of discord which has unfolded 
itself, and produced that harvest of disorder’ in St Domingo. The slaves 
there ‘imbrue their hands in blood, which philosophy had told them 
was no better than their own’ (J. Collins 1792, 43–4). The experience of 
the French colonies after the Revolution showed the dangers of ‘the frail 
vessel of unqualifi ed Democracy, ready to be agitated, tossed, and over-
set by every popular gale’ (J. Collins 1792, 45). Without enlightenment 
and rationality, freedom degenerated into licentiousness and became 
the greatest of evils, as had happened in St Domingo, where the insur-
rection had been excited ‘by instilling into the negroes the novel doc-
trines of the rights of men, inimical to all society – Rights of savages is 
the more proper epithet’ (Anon 1792, 15). The danger, the anonymous 
author of Observations on Slavery went on, was that by teaching people 
(or at least men) that their natural rights were equal, they would come 
to expect ‘an equal right to the possession of the good of fortune’ (Anon 
1792, 15). From there, they would question their obligation to labour 
‘for the support of the rich’ and ask whether the rich had ‘a superior 
natural right to their wealth’ (Anon 1792, 15), pulling apart not only the 
basis of corrupt West Indian slavery, but of ‘reasonable’ slavery and of 
commerce as well.
Haiti was the fi rst state to guarantee liberty to all its inhabitants, 
and to challenge the assumption that in practice different people 
would enjoy different rights. Their act of rebellion was ‘the decisive 
moment in which they secured their equal status in the human race’ 
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(Kaplan 1998, 49) and realised the truth that to be fully human meant 
having the desire for freedom and autonomy. Their ‘self-liberation’ 
made clear, Buck-Morss argues, that the French Revolution was not 
simply a European phenomenon, ‘but world-historical in its implica-
tions’ (Buck-Morss 2009, 39). In 1794, the French state was forced to 
acknowledge the abolition of slavery in Saint-Domingue and then 
expand that abolition to all the French colonies (Buck-Morss 2009, 37). 
Saint-Domingue was ruled by free former slaves from 1794 to 1800 
when they defeated the British military and drafted a constitution that 
incorporated racial equality. In 1804, after the struggle with Napoleon, 
Dessalines took the fi nal step of declaring independence from France 
and establishing a new nation of black citizens. The slaves’ action laid 
bare the social and economic foundations of the colony and of the 
world (Fick 1998, 1). This was more than a rebellion, it was ‘the begin-
ning of a historical struggle toward a stage of human emancipation, 
waged collectively by almost one hundred slaves in arms’ (Fick 1998, 2). 
Slaves were making history, forcefully making their presence felt, 
claiming their right to human potential by seizing power and control 
over the politics of resistance rather than by waiting to have their civil 
rights bestowed on them. 
For twelve years from 1791 onwards, the slaves struck out against 
their oppressors, organised into mobile slave bands, and carried out 
highly effective guerrilla warfare using captured French weapons, 
sword spikes, clubs and torches. Their force came from their strength in 
numbers and their destructive power. Carolyn Fick points to the devas-
tation of 200 sugar, 1200 coffee and several dozen indigo plantations by 
slaves who destroyed machinery and burnt the crops so that production 
had to cease entirely (Fick 1998, 2). Their struggle took place against a 
complicated backdrop of revolutionary wars in Europe and the spread 
of global imperialism which brought the zones of freedom and unfree-
dom into direct confl ict with each other. Haitian society was made up 
of white planters agitating for self-government and free trade, free 
people of African descent who aimed for legal and civil racial equality 
with whites, and the slaves who fought to achieve their own freedom 
(Fick 1998, 3; Geggus 2002). On the island, there were 500,000 slaves, 
40,000 whites and 30,000 free people of colour. This was, as David 
Patrick Geggus points out, an unusually large free non-white popula-
tion, and it included rich planters who had been educated in France 
as well as recently freed African slaves, but was mostly made up of 
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artisans and smallholders and women who were petty traders and the 
mistresses of white men. The slave population was the largest in the 
Caribbean, and in 1785–90 ‘an average of more than 30,000 manacled 
Africans were imported each year’ (Geggus 2002, 7), meaning that the 
slave society was highly segmented and shot through with differences 
in language and levels of assimilation. On the lowland sugar planta-
tions about half the adults were Creoles, producing their own food and 
marketing the surplus, making a ‘slave elite’ of domestics, artisans and 
slave-drivers (Geggus 2002, 72). The rebel slaves and their leaders found 
themselves at the centre of a complex web of aims and aspirations, of 
shifting and opposing interests and of fi nely-grained differences in sta-
tus and privilege. Their struggle, Carolyn Fick argues, was less about the 
principles of liberty and democracy and more one that was ‘grounded in 
the daily material realities of plantation life and labour’ (Fick 1998, 4). In 
1791 their framework was about liberation from slavery and it gradually 
became clear that this would have to be liberation on their own terms, 
not accepting freedom as ‘a fatal and venomous gift’ when the whites 
chose to grant it (Fick 1998, 5). 
Throughout the thirteen years of warfare, revolution, foreign occu-
pation and popular insurrections, the slaves broke new ground and 
adjusted their strategies and alliances to adapt to the changing military 
situation (Fick 1998, 6). In some areas, when the plantations were aban-
doned the freed slaves appropriated land for their own use, expanding 
their cultivated plots, gathering wood and using draft animals to take 
their goods to market. Even after the proclamation to abolish slav-
ery in 1793, the plantation system remained intact in Haiti. General 
emancipation was achieved by stages and emerged from the heart of 
slavery and the plantation regime. It was, Fick argues, an incremen-
tal and pragmatic process, at times focused on trying to change the 
form of slavery through cutting the number of working days or abol-
ishing the whip, but the rebels gradually increased their demands as 
they emerged as ‘the peasant base of what would eventually become 
the Haitian nation’ (Fick 1998, 9). The French Commissioner Sonothax 
intended to convert the slaves into ‘profi t-sharing serfs who were to be 
tied to their estates and subject to compulsory but remunerated labor’ 
(Geggus 2002, 15). They were not to be allowed to till their own soil or 
become smallholders within a subsistence economy. Saint-Domingue 
was still a French colony, and parts of it were controlled by the enemy 
powers of Spain and Britain. France needed the plantation system to 
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meet the needs of a war economy, to generate revenues through the 
export of goods, and to provide a peasant army (Fick 1998, 10). 
In this zone of unfreedom, the revolution was in part a battle over 
land ownership and improvement. They were searching for new ways 
of stabilising property through the state, of divorcing production from 
the fatal passion of gambling and re-instilling the morality of work. 
The slaves were still legally bound to the same plantations and mas-
ters, and they resisted through vagrancy and going on strike, while the 
women demanded equal pay and rights. In June 1793, for example, it 
was decreed that insurgents should be granted freedom in exchange for 
military service. Women were defi ned as non-combatants and so could 
not take this route to freedom. Instead, they were offered marriage to a 
free man as the basis of their emancipation in order to strengthen the 
ideal of the republican, patriarchal and patriotic family (Colwill 2009, 
115). The leaders of the revolution in Haiti supplemented the plantation 
system of control with attempts to make the patriarchal family the cen-
tre of post-slavery society (Garrigus 2007, 148). The labour codes they 
established brought together the private morality of the family with 
public order and economic progress, disciplining both to be productive 
and ‘civilised’. The family was supposed to act as a kind of school for 
workers, to turn ex-slaves away from their attachment to peasant farm-
ing and ‘inculcate obligations to the plantation system’ (Garrigus 2007, 
146). The narratives of freedom and the logic of citizenship were both 
gendered (Colwill 2009, 115).
Years later, Toussaint Louverture was also driven by the need to 
prove that free labour could be as effective as slave labour, and that 
the economy could function to sustain an autonomous (if nominally 
French) state. He needed the revenue to maintain a strong government 
and a strong army, and these were generated by exporting cash crops 
grown under the large plantation system, maintained through a coer-
cive work code and military supervision (Fick 1998, 11). The 1801 Con-
stitution enshrined freedom from slavery, but stopped short of claiming 
sovereignty for the people and declaring independence. Article 3 stated 
that there could be no slaves in the territory, and servitude was for-
ever abolished. ‘Here’, it went on, ‘all men are born, live and die, free 
and French’ (Fischer 2004, 229). Slavery was abolished in the territory 
of Saint-Domingue, and all men regardless of colour were declared 
eligible for all employments. The only distinction between people 
was to be based on virtue and talent, and the law was the same for all 
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‘whether in punishment or protection’ (Aristide 2008, 47). Catholicism 
was declared the state religion, marriage was sanctioned as both a civil 
and a religious institution, divorce was prohibited, and the plantation 
system was brought under the special protection of the state. Property 
was proclaimed to be sacred and inviolable, and each person had the 
‘free right to dispose of and to administer property that is recognised as 
belonging to him’. At the same time, Article 14 stated that the colony 
was ‘essentially agricultural’, and could not suffer ‘the least disruption 
in the works of its cultivation’ (Aristide 2008, 48). Each cultivator and 
each worker was entitled to a share of the revenues from cultivation, 
but ‘every change in domicile on the part of the cultivator threatens the 
ruin of the crops’ (Aristide 2008, 48), so the workers continued to be tied 
to the plantations. 
Louverture’s moral focus was on the necessity of work, and on the 
importance of cultivation. In the Constitution, he authorised the slave 
trade because the island needed people to cultivate it. They would be 
brought to Saint-Domingue as slaves, but freed when they landed 
(James 1980, 215). The people were no longer slaves, but they were 
bonded to their plantations with no option to change their estate or 
their occupation. They worked under ‘slave-like conditions’ for the colo-
nists who had been allowed to return, for the mulatto elite in the south, 
or for the state, which leased the plantations back to black military offi -
cers and generals (Fick 1998, 11). This contributed to the creation of a 
black ruling class and ‘complications were arising already’ within a state 
where distinctions of rank were supposed to have no place (James 1980, 
201). The plantation system was enforced by military district inspectors 
and the rural police who apprehended vagabonds and runaways. This 
was, as Fick argues, a reinforcement of the repressive plantation sys-
tem (Fick 1998, 12), using the army to impose a forced labour regime. 
The state was attempting to prove that the end of slavery would not 
be a serious blow to commerce, and that without the fatal passion and 
infl amed ambition of the planters, the profi ts would not be leached out 
of the system and the plantations could form the basis of permanent 
property rights and a stable economy. Henri Christophe’s monarchi-
cal constitution continued to guarantee the plantation economy and its 
exports through militarised agriculture, long hours of work, and forcing 
the elites not to be absentees. Thefts were punishable by death, workers 
needed passes to travel, and the military police were hired directly from 
Africa (Fischer 2004). It was an approach that increased exports of sugar 
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and cotton, and proved in some ways to be remarkably effi cient, but 
it created a yawning gap between the elites, who controlled both the 
plantations and the state, and the mass of agricultural labourers who 
‘now saw little hope of ever making their freedom and their lives mean-
ingful by acquiring a parcel of land for themselves’ (Fick 1998, 12). They 
were not granted the right to seek property for themselves. ‘No doubt 
the poor sweated’, C. L. R. James concludes of this period of 1801–2, 
‘and were backward so that the new ruling class might thrive’, but 
they were better off than they had been, and cultivation was improving 
(James 1980, 201). At the same time, state and nation, Fick argues, fol-
lowing Trouillot, were split apart by their incompatible ideals of liberty, 
and by their different notions of the meaning of liberation and that of 
property. Independence, when it was fi nally declared by Dessalines in 
1804, confi rmed the end of slavery but also sanctioned the existence 
of the state ‘and in that, the gap between leaders and masses became 
virtually unbreachable’ (Fick 1998, 13). 
The great shift that was brought about by the revolution in Haiti was 
the idea that the spirit of liberty could be universal, that it could, as Susan 
Buck-Morss argues, cross the line between slaves and freemen, the zone 
between freedom and unfreedom. The slaves achieved self-consciousness 
by proving that they were ‘subjects who transform material nature’ (Buck-
Morss 2009, 54) and who were willing to risk death rather than remain 
enslaved. The revolution showed that the goal of liberation from slavery 
could not be the subjugation of the master, but had to be the elimina-
tion of slavery as an institution. Fischer characterises modernity itself as a 
‘heterogeneous, internally diverse, even contradictory phenomenon that 
constituted and revolutionised itself in the process of transculturation’, 
so that what happened in the Caribbean in the Age of Revolution was 
a struggle over what it meant to be modern, what counted as progress 
and what was meant by liberty (Fischer 2004, 24), as we will explore in 
the next chapter on Hegel. The struggle over the meaning of property 
in a plantation economy shows how even the radical antislavery of the 
Haitian revolution was infl ected by understandings of property and free-
dom underwritten and authored by slavery. Questions of modernity, 
progress and liberty were inseparable from what it meant to be enslaved, 
as universal freedom emerged as the opposite of slavery.
For C. L. R. James, the Caribbean was ‘the paradigmatic instance of 
the colonial encounter’ (Scott 2004, 126) because there were no non-
modern foundations, no deeply embedded institutions for the colonial 
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powers to struggle against or negotiate. Slavery had been preserved 
in the modern system and the ‘plantation in the Caribbean was at the 
advanced front of modern capitalism’ (S. Hall 1998, 23). For James, slav-
ery needs to be seen as central to capitalist modernity, and he insists that 
we should not understand the Caribbean people as traditional Africans 
decimated by the middle passage and plantation slavery. Instead, he 
argues that nothing could be turned back, and the people of the Carib-
bean had been ‘transformed into a kind of prototypical, modern people’ 
who were ‘violently inserted into the most advanced ideas of the time’ 
(S. Hall 1998, 23).The rage of the sugar planters and the drive to exceed 
the bounds of their industry meant that when the enslaved people 
arrived, they entered directly into the large-scale agricultural planta-
tion system. James characterises the sugar plantation as both civilising 
and demoralising, forcing the slaves to relate to each other and to their 
masters in distinctively new ways, informed by modern ideas about 
property, freedom, progress and time (Scott 2004, 128). The plantation 
was a modern regime, with slaves living and working together in gangs 
in the sugar factories, bringing them, James argues, closer to a modern 
proletariat than any other workers at the time (Scott 2004, 129). Their 
conditions were unjust, demeaning and brutal in distinctively modern 
ways, operating through modern disciplinary techniques, forms of sub-
jectivity and rationality. Stuart Hall suggests that this was what excited 
James about the Haitian revolution, seeing ‘the backwardness of slavery 
existing inside the forwardness of modernity’ (S. Hall 1998, 23).
CONCLUSION
The complications of the debates over the abolition of the slave trade in 
the 1790s show us some of entanglements of the relationship between 
property, slavery, morality and the law. The unjust and uncertain tenure 
that owners held in their slaves in the zone of unfreedom undermined 
the stability of their landed property in the metropolitan centre, but also 
drew attention to the uncertain tenure that slaves held in themselves. 
The radical antislavery of the Haitian revolution was itself a contest over 
land and ownership, which at the same time as affi rming the enslaved 
people as agents of change and subjects in their own right also drew 
attention to the fuzzy boundaries and unclear content of the catego-
ries of slavery and freedom. The zones of freedom and unfreedom were 
brought together in ways which showed the borders between them to 
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be constantly in motion, continuously adjusted. The ‘waving line’ in the 
moral world between slavery and freedom created ‘spaces of mobility 
and uncertainty’ with many crossing points, breaking points and con-
stant fl ows (Konrad 2015, 3). Within this ‘vigorous exchange zone’, we 
need to make sure that we do not fall into the trap of assuming that 
freedom developed as an immutable framework, and that the border-
line between slavery and freedom was fi xed by the abolition of the 
slave trade, or even by emancipation. Instead, we can use the concept 
of the ‘system of borders in motion’ to explore humans as liminal beings 
witnessing, confronting, negotiating and accommodating the zones of 
freedom and unfreedom, and the meanings of property, slavery and 
modernity (Konrad 2015) in many different contexts, in particular in 
forging ideas about the master–slave relationship and the meanings of 
free and unfree labour, but also in confronting the limits to the univer-
sality of freedom as the opposite of slavery.
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Chapter 5
HUMANITY, HEGEL AND FREEDOM
This chapter takes us back to the waving line at the border between 
slavery and freedom, and to the emergence of universal freedom as the 
opposite of slavery as the slaves in Haiti materialised as subjects who 
could transform the world. Ideas about freedom in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries developed in the contexts of slavery 
existing inside the forwardness of modernity, and of shifting relations 
of domination and subordination between Europeans and the rest of 
the world. This is a complicated space where the revolutionary events 
in Haiti swim in and out of focus, sometimes thinkable and sometimes 
unthinkable, and the slaves themselves appear as liminal beings in 
Hegel’s master/slave dialectic (Hegel 1976) until Frederick Douglass 
brings them forcefully to life. As Paul Gilroy has shown, it is important 
to consider the relationship between master and slave as characteristi-
cally modern, and to explore the ways in which ‘the universality and 
rationality of enlightened Europe and America were used to sustain 
and relocate rather than eradicate an order of racial difference inherited 
from the premodern era’ (Gilroy 1993, 49). This association of modernity 
and slavery is, for Gilroy, a fundamental conceptual issue that deeply 
unsettles the idea of history as progress and shows us how plantation 
slavery ‘provided the foundations for a distinctive network of economic, 
social, and political relations’ (Gilroy 1993, 55). The conditions of this 
modern social life were understood to deform and dehumanise indi-
viduals, and in the process, the humanity of the human came to be 
understood as an achievement, rather than a species-specifi c character-
istic (Scott 2004, 91). This entailed new understandings of freedom and 
history which, as David Scott argues, introduced new ways of thinking 
about the failings of social institutions and suggested that the sources 
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of those failings could be historical and, therefore, changeable (Scott 
2004, 92). In the revolutionary moment at the end of the eighteenth 
century, the clash of the zones of freedom and unfreedom created shift-
ing and unstable ground for slavery and for modernity, and the new 
sense of humanity that was forged by Kant, Hegel and Douglass did not 
always light a clear path to freedom. 
THE DOCTRINE OF BLACK INFERIORITY
The starting point for Enlightenment theories of rationality and uni-
versality that focused on the person is Kant’s assertion that you can-
not sell yourself into slavery because your person is your entitlement 
to set your own purposes, and slavery is an annihilation of legal per-
sonality, turning people into objects, rendering them incapable of 
undertaking obligations and taking away their rightful power to bind 
themselves (Ripstein 2009, 135). For Kant, wrongly convicted prison-
ers must choose execution over becoming slaves so that they do not 
become merely the tools of others. People who choose to become slaves 
alienate their freedom and conceive of themselves as things. In Kant’s 
view, as human beings we cannot relinquish our capacity to consent 
because that would undermine our status as rights-bearers. We can-
not will ourselves to stop being. People cannot consent to be enslaved 
because by giving up their personhood they would not be bound by 
the commitment they made as people. The contract to be a slave would 
be void because it would constitute a complete renunciation of rights, 
undermining our inherent dignity and incomparable worth. A man can 
never treat himself as a thing, and he cannot ‘rob himself of his free-
dom, which would happen if he were willing to hand over the total-
ity of his forces for the arbitrary, absolute, unpermitted use of another’ 
(Kant [1920] 1997, 348). At its core, on this interpretation, enslavement 
is a matter of dishonour and the denial of autonomy (Altman 2011). As 
individuals, we have duties to ourselves that relate to ‘the correspond-
ing right of humanity in our own person’. Any transgression of these 
duties means that we ‘make ourselves unworthy of the possession of 
our person that is entrusted to us, and become worthless, since the 
preservation of our worth consists solely in observing the rights of our 
humanity’. In losing our inner worth, we can ‘at most be regarded as 
an instrument for others, whose chattel we have become’ (Kant [1920] 
1997, 350). It is, as Kant says in relation to begging, ‘a man’s obligation 
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to exert himself to the utmost to remain a free and independent being 
in relation to others’ (Kant [1920] 1997, 351). In this account of worth 
and humanity the signifi cance of personhood is linked to the triumph 
of moral egalitarianism, and equality of moral status is taken as the 
norm and as the basis for legal and political equality. As Charles Mills 
argues, that means that who counts as a person becomes the central 
question (Mills 2002, 1997).
The core assumption in this analysis is that the opposite of slav-
ery is the capacity for self-legislation. The slave becomes someone who 
lacks autonomy and rational freedom, whose person is the property 
of another person. The enslaved individual is somebody who cannot 
exercise sovereignty, virtue or free will and is subject to an owner’s 
authority. Under this kind of defi nition, the risk is that slavery comes 
to be understood as a fi xed status, one that attaches to servile minds, to 
people lacking in morally good dispositions or unable to exercise vigi-
lant government over themselves. It feeds into a binary between slave-
holder and slave that allows for the possibility that one can extinguish 
the other and reduce them to the status of an object or a commodity, 
entirely under their command. Those who choose to become slaves and 
alienate their freedom emerge from this narrative as lacking in dignity 
and honour, as worthless and degraded from rational freedom. This 
has particular implications for understanding slavery in terms of social 
death, but also for thinking about slavery in the context of the slaves’ 
social subordination and capacity for resistance and violence. This then 
raises the question of what happens when this capacity for autonomy, 
self-legislation and freedom is not universal, but is instead racialised. 
The debates over how to interpret Kant’s thoughts on race reveal 
the impossibility of fi xing race or social death as static conceptions 
of the world. Vivaldi Jean-Marie argues that Kant’s exclusion of non-
Europeans from his discourse constituted an indirect justifi cation of 
the slave trade and of dehumanisation. It is not just that Kant himself 
failed to condemn the Atlantic slave trade, but that the paradigm of 
humanity in Kant and the wider Enlightenment is based on the under-
lying premise of European citizenship and masculinity, and freedom 
from forced labour. Only European men were fully equipped to be able 
to overcome self-incurred tutelage and deploy their rational, public 
freedom. The Haitian revolution then appears as a moment of reas-
sessment, ‘a defi ning process for both the European Enlightenment 
and the African Diaspora’ (Jean-Marie 2013, 243) that was successful 
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‘because it took place within the blind spot of the Enlightenment con-
ceptual apparatus’ (Jean-Marie 2013, 247). The ideal subject of enlight-
enment was the propertied European man, and Kant constructed a 
racial hierarchy with European men at the apex, and black people at 
the bottom. In Jean-Marie’s assessment, Kant constructed one of the 
most ‘systematic accounts of race prior to the fl ood tide of racial think-
ing accompanying late nineteenth century imperialism’ (Jean-Marie 
2013, 244–5). He talked about Native Americans as lacking in culture 
and the ‘drive to activity’ to make themselves work, and as having a 
half-extinguished vital energy. Negroes, he added, were capable of 
being trained to be slaves, but incapable of any other form of education 
(Kleingeld 2007). The Negro could be disciplined and cultivated, but 
never genuinely civilised. Drawing on proslavery tracts by James Tobin, 
Kant constructed a racial hierarchy in which Native Americans were 
too weak for hard labour and unfi t for any culture (Bernasconi 2002, 
148). Humanity as a whole could make progress even if many humans 
could not, and some races did not contribute to or benefi t from his-
torical progress, but were left behind. Kant’s thinking was central to a 
European enlightenment that ‘defi ned European humanity in contra-
distinction to the inhumanity of slaves in the European colonies’ (Jean-
Marie 2013, 246). For Robert Bernasconi, the question is ‘Why were so 
many Enlightenment thinkers apparently unable to articulate the new 
sense of humanity without at the same time drawing the boundaries 
within humanity more rigidly and explicitly than before?’ (Bernasconi 
2002, 146). How can the endorsement of racial hierarchy fi t within a 
theory of universal human equality?
For Charles Mills, the answer is that Kant intended the categorical 
imperative and the principle of right to apply to whites only, so that ‘his 
so-called universalism is in reality no more than white egalitarianism’ 
(Kleingeld 2007, 583). Mills argues for a symbiotic relation between lib-
eralism and racism, where racism is the dominant tradition and liberal 
egalitarianism is racially infl ected from the start: ‘race is not in contradic-
tion to but in symbiosis with Kant’s moral-political-teleological discourse’ 
(Mills 2014, 150). The idea of the person that emerges so triumphantly 
from Kant’s theory ‘is linked with a subperson as fi gure and ground, sym-
biotically related’ (Mills 2002, 6). In Mills’s analysis, personhood needs 
to be understood primarily as a status, and its attainment requires more 
than simple humanity. Not all adult humans are persons by virtue of 
being humans, and while, for Kant, all rational human beings are worthy 
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of respect, it is ‘not a priori that all humans are rational beings (in the 
requisite full sense)’ (Mills 2002, 24). Kant, in other words, makes internal 
differentiations in the category of human beings, and partitions human-
ity by creating an intermediate status, and a much fuzzier categorisation 
between person and thing. This mobile border is full of contradictions, 
inconsistencies, paradoxes and ambiguities, but, for Mills, the process 
through which humans transformed themselves into moral beings was 
racialised from the start. Natural slaves must be subpersons in a theory 
that is based on autonomy, and that autonomy is taken to be already 
accomplished for those whose personhood was never in question, who 
were never close to the borderline with thinghood.
In the debates over slavery in the late eighteenth century, the pro-
cess of partitioning and drawing internal distinctions within the cat-
egory of human beings was highly contested, and the complications 
of ‘universalizing and particularizing at the same time’ are clear (Mills 
2002, 28). Britons and others had, as Roxann Wheeler points out, ‘mul-
tifaceted ways to adjudicate the boundaries of human similarity, and 
these changed over time’ (Wheeler 2000, 240–1). In particular, it is pos-
sible to trace some of the processes of ‘epidermalisation’ coming out of 
multiple and coexisting defi nitions and meanings of complexion. Skin 
colour, as Wheeler points out, was not the only ‘register of difference’ for 
much of the eighteenth century (Wheeler 2000, 5). Differences of civic 
status, of Christianity, virtue and rank, persisted as visible distinctions 
in dress, manners and language. Human characteristics were under-
stood to be formed over time by external forces working on the body. 
Cultural, educational and environmental change were understood to 
affect both appearance and behaviour. Wheeler identifi es confusion in 
contemporary usage after the 1770s as ‘color was shifting out of an elas-
tic climate/humoral sensibility and onto a more rigid anatomical model’ 
(Wheeler 2000, 26). New discoveries about anatomy and the nervous 
system connected the body to the mind in different ways, and created 
an anatomical body that was ‘more solid than its porous counterpart, 
the humoral body’ (Wheeler 2000, 27). Wheeler detects a gradual shift 
at the end of eighteenth century, so that human differences began to be 
understood as less superfi cial, less changeable and more of a refl ection 
of inferiority than they had been before. At the same time, in the 1770s, 
minds as well as bodies came to be regarded as affected by climate, so 
that black Africans were understood to be incapable of strong exertions 
and relaxed in their mental powers. In the 1770s and 1780s, there was 
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a growing sense that bodily, intellectual and cultural differences might 
be connected and racialised to justify political and economic subordina-
tion. In this time of fl ux at the end of the eighteenth century, slavery was 
not inextricably linked to skin colour, but was primarily understood as a 
political and economic condition, caught up in ideas and debates about 
civil society, property ownership, education, Christianity, improvement 
and commerce. ‘Over the century, Europeans’ self-perception broadly 
shifted from defi ning themselves in relation to each other, Muslims 
and the naked, pagan savage to distinguishing themselves from black 
Africans’ (Wheeler 2000, 48). Gradually, the colour of the skin became 
‘a surface indicator of the presence of deeper physico-biological causal 
mechanisms’ (Mills 2002, 23). In Kant’s view, humans had the capacity 
to adapt to different environments, and the racially signifi cant adapta-
tions were the ones which ‘once triggered by different environments, 
[were] unfailingly heritable’. There was, for Kant, some inner structure 
that explained racial characteristics, rather than their being the tem-
porary effects of interaction with the environment, and skin colour 
is the most signifi cant of these hereditable traits (Allais 2016, 13). In 
Kant’s account of germs and seeds as the source of differentiation and 
hierarchy between the races, ‘it is the mechanisms of the body that are 
responsible’ for the defi cient culture of the inferior races, and he insists 
that they permanently fi x the character of the races (Mills 2014, 132).
In 1792, the author of Observations on Slavery asserted that much 
ingenuity of argument had been used to prove the idea that Negroes 
and whites had sprung from one common stock, but that nothing con-
vincing had been offered to make the case. Agreeing with Kant, he 
argued that such a ‘degeneracy’ could not have been the result of exter-
nal causes, and while he admitted that the effects of climate on the 
complexion of the skin were very considerable, the difference between 
the Negro and the white remained remarkably striking (Anon 1792, 
33). The form of the whole head, he went on, and particularly the face, 
‘is in the negroe very peculiar; totally unlike the rest of the human spe-
cies, but which gives to the negroes an amazing general likeness’. The 
short black hair ‘or rather wool, of the negro’ was another striking dif-
ference (Anon 1792, 34). Having set out these physical differences, the 
author turned to the question of mental faculties. Still with a focus on 
the environment, he pointed out that every circumstance had tended to 
depress the powers of black Africans and prevented their abilities from 
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coming into action. Their spirit, he said, had been worn down by tyran-
nical governments and by indolence, which was the constant effect of 
a hot climate. However, he went on, all other nations had at one time 
or another surmounted these obstacles, pressing forward to the degree 
of perfection of which they were capable. ‘Negroes’, by contrast, ‘have 
always submitted to their chains’ (Anon 1792, 35). They had lost their 
capacity for self-legislation and with it their inherent dignity. The impli-
cations of such loss were clear. ‘Does not all this argue for some natural 
inferiority of mental endowments?’ he asked, and if so, ‘where is the 
hardship of destining them to servile employments, provided we treat 
them with kindness and attention’ (Anon 1792, 36). 
Those who were opposed to the African slave trade needed to coun-
ter the idea that bodily, intellectual and cultural differences could be 
racialised by arguing against the proposition that slaves had submit-
ted to their chains, and against the existence of natural inferiority in 
mental endowments. For its detractors, the African slave trade was a 
fl agrant violation of the most sacred and fundamental laws of justice 
and humanity. First, its advocates were falsely alleging that the Negroes 
were an inferior and subordinate race of men. William Belsham bor-
rowed ‘from the language of Shylock’ to contest this argument, asking 
whether a Negro has not eyes, hands, organs, affections and passions. 
Are they not fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons and 
subject to the same diseases? (Belsham 1790, 6). His emphasis was 
on the theory of shared origins within which the diversity amongst 
humankind was ‘technically insignifi cant’ (Wheeler 2000, 15), and on 
the fundamentally important ways in which all human beings are the 
same. In a similar vein, John Beatson declared that the idea that there 
are distinct races of men ‘can never be admitted even for a moment, by 
those who believe in Divine revelation’ (Beatson 1789, 11). Humans, he 
insisted, derive their origin from the same source, ‘partake of the same 
common nature’, are equally possessed of immortal souls and endued 
with the same faculties for pleasure and pain (Beatson 1789, 12). Differ-
ences between them are explained by climate, habits of life, diet, edu-
cation and other accidental circumstances, and not by any unfailingly 
hereditable internal characteristics. He condemned the use of the term 
‘Negro’ as degrading, an ‘invidious appellation’ designed to cut the link 
of brotherhood, ‘and have it thought that the blood of such men is not 
congenial with your own, but that they are marked for slavery’ (Beatson 
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1789, 26). He went on to assert the personhood and moral equality 
of the black Africans by asking his readers to consider their fungibility 
with Europeans (at least in theory) once it was clear that accidental cir-
cumstances and injustice could have worked the other way:
But, supposing that some opprobrious appellation were fi xed 
on us, taken from our colour or exterior appearance, and for 
this reason we were treated as an inferior species in the rank 
of beings, and, like the beasts we use, were on that account 
doomed to be the mere instruments of severe labour, having no 
will of our own, and wholly under the lawless discretion of a 
stranger: Should we not feel an essential injury was done to us? 
Should we not be conscious that our just and native rights were 
violently encroached on? (Beatson 1789, 26)
William Dickson argued that from his observations he had never seen 
any mark of inferiority in the Negroes, or any mark of superiority in 
the whites. There was, he insisted, no connection between intellect and 
colour: ‘A man may associate his idea of blackness with his idea of the 
devil, or with his idea of stupidity, or with any other of his ideas that 
he thinks proper; but he ought not to reason from any such arbitrary 
associations’ (Dickson 1789, 62). There was, for Dickson, no connection 
between the colour of the human skin and the faculties of the human 
mind. Apologists for slavery who inferred natural inferiority from the 
colour and features of the Africans were making vulgar arguments and 
basic errors. The climate, he conceded, had an effect on human hair, 
for example, ‘But what, I pray, has the hair of the head to do with the 
intellect?’ He was scathing about French apologists for slavery who, he 
claimed, insisted that creatures who were all over black and had fl at 
noses ought not to be pitied: ‘Admirable reasoning! Just as if a man 
should say, A poor, old woman is full of wrinkles and, therefore, ought 
to be burnt as a witch’ (Dickson 1789, 82). As Lucy Allais argues, rac-
ism that involves Kantian disrespect entails rational incoherence, and 
‘the racist will hold views in tension with other views to which they 
are rationally committed’ (Allais 2016, 24). For Dickson, no conclusion 
could be drawn from the external or internal peculiarities of the bodies 
of black Africans. Long observation and comparison with whites should 
mean that ‘a man may be satisfi ed that the one is as rational and intel-
ligent, ceteris paribus, as the other’ (Dickson 1789, 72). 
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William Belsham’s account of the slaves’ social subordination like-
wise called on the proponents of the slave trade to explain what proof 
they had of the intellectual inferiority of the Africans, and then argued 
that their putative inferiority should give them an additional claim 
to indulgence and protection, rather than result in their exploitation. 
Power did not imply the right of oppression (Belsham 1790, 8) and 
freedom was intrinsically a matter of social relations. Dickson, too, 
was clear that it was European pride, avarice and tyranny that had 
kept the Africans in ‘a state so brutish as to give sanction to a doubt, 
whether the slave and his haughty lord partake of the same common 
nature!!’ (Dickson 1789, 59). At the same time, and despite their pro-
testations, the antislavery writers struggled with the idea of Africans’ 
intellectual inferiority. There was, they could see in every nation, ‘a 
very considerable disparity between man and man, in the degree, and 
the exertion, of the intellectual faculties’ (J. Woods 1784, 13) and they 
needed to fi nd an explanation for these defi ciencies that did not lie 
in permanent, hereditable characteristics. ‘But the inferiority which 
is attributed to the whole race of negroes probably arises from that 
depression of mind which accompanies the state of slavery, and from 
the discouragement thrown in the way of every liberal inquiry, rather 
than from any original, intellectual defect’ (J. Woods 1784, 13). The 
Africans ‘in their low state of civilization’ could not be expected to have 
arrived at any great attainment in the arts. Woods used the examples 
of the letters of Ignatius Sancho and the poems of Phyllis Wheatley 
to show that ‘they are neither defi cient in the feelings of humanity, 
nor the powers of understanding’ (J. Woods 1784, 14). He reported to 
his readers that Africans were well acquainted with the planets, inge-
nious in the mechanical arts, and had the capacity for the administra-
tion of civil government. Having made these claims for the intellect 
of Africans, he then went on to say that, even granted the inferiority 
contended for by the slave traders, ‘they cannot be denied to be men’ 
(J. Woods 1784, 15). The probable means of removing their ignorance, 
he concluded, would be patient and gentle instruction, ‘administered 
gradually as their unenlightened minds are capable of receiving it’ 
(J. Woods 1784, 15). There was, he said, no proof that the Negroes 
would not be equally tractable with the whites under mild and gener-
ous treatment. When ‘put to a trade which happens to coincide with 
the bent of their genius’, they became ‘as good, and, sometimes, better 
artifi cers than white men’ (Dickson 1789, 72).
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The debates between proslavery and antislavery thinkers encapsu-
lated both the new sense of humanity and the impulse to draw new 
boundaries within humanity. In their discussions of hair, epidermalisa-
tion and intellect, they were tackling questions of debasement and infe-
riority, and delineating the fuzzy space between person, subperson and 
thing. They were also considering what it meant to become worthless, 
to lose all inner worth and to be regarded as an instrument for others. 
Dickson argued that the decisive proof that Negroes were, and were 
recognised as, ‘rational moral agents’ was there in the slave codes and 
the laws regulating slaves because ‘laws are enacted to govern rational, 
moral, accountable beings only’. If we suppose that slaves are not moral 
agents, how can the ‘the pretended superior race’ infl ict exemplary pun-
ishments on them, and give them more severe punishments than whites 
for the same crimes? This was not something it would make any sense 
to do to brutes (Dickson 1789, 77). The passions of the Africans proved 
to Dickson that they were not created to be slaves, and ‘Those who com-
plain of the passionate vindictive tempers of the Africans cannot surely 
be aware that they are demonstrating the utter repugnancy of slavery to 
their nature’ (Dickson 1789, 79–80). In focusing on their resistance, as 
well as their rationality and morality, Dickson rejected the social death 
of slavery and the subpersonhood of African slaves. He drew attention 
to the contradictions of treating persons as property, and insisted that all 
adult humans were persons. At the same time, even for him, the trans-
formation of humans into moral beings was complicated by questions 
of debasement and inferiority. He suggested that the people who were 
currently enslaved could not bear any sudden alteration in their condi-
tion. They needed to be made sensible of their value and dignity as men 
and to be converted to Christianity before they were converted to free-
dom. Sudden emancipation of the slaves would be too dangerous, ‘little 
short of disbanding legions of ignorant, lawless beings to destroy the 
property and the lives of a small number of settled inhabitants’. Perhaps, 
he concluded, ‘the present generation of adult slaves . . . must be left to 
die in their chains, which are riveted into and have irretrievably debased 
every power of their souls’ (Dickson 1789, 92).
The link between the signifi cance of personhood and moral egalitari-
anism was not always easily drawn in the context of slavery and aboli-
tion, and the question of who got counted in the moral community and 
the status of slaves as rights-bearers was complicated and fraught even 
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for the abolitionists. The threshold for full autonomy was undecided and 
unstable, and the antislavery struggles to come to terms with the debase-
ment and the low state of civilisation of the Africans they wanted to free 
show us that the border between person and subperson was another 
space of contradiction and inconsistency, for Kant and for Hegel. Hegel’s 
discussion of the process of transforming humanity into moral beings 
through the master–slave dialectic returns to the question of making our-
selves unworthy of the possession of our person, and of what it means 
to be brought into subordination. In Hegel’s account, this process could 
only be understood intersubjectively as ideas about humanity and per-
sonhood develop through time and history, and in the context of our 
standing in relation to others. 
HEGEL AND THE MASTER/SLAVE DIALECTIC
Hegel’s parable of the relationship between lordship and bondage was 
written in Jena in 1805–6 and published in 1807 (Hegel 1976), by which 
time, Susan Buck-Morss argues, slavery had become the ‘root meta-
phor of Western political philosophy, connoting everything that was 
evil about power relations’ (Buck-Morss 2009, 21). The focus on slavery 
as the exercise of absolute, arbitrary power over individuals who owned 
a property in their person that could not be taken away from them cre-
ated a political view of slavery as the opposite of freedom. During the 
eighteenth century, slavery came to be understood as the ultimate form 
of arbitrary power and as the most grievous loss of freedom we can 
experience as human beings. While the question of who counted as a 
rational, moral being was contested, at the same time a powerful binary 
emerged between slavery and independence as freedom came to be 
understood as non-domination, as not being subject to the arbitrary 
will of another, and in particular not living under the threat of force or 
violence. In this account, the question of ‘who counts’ gets pushed out 
of view by a theory based on autonomy that is taken as already accom-
plished (Mills 2002). The slaveholders became the epitome of arbitrary 
power, lacking in self-control and rationality, and imposing a regime of 
terror on their slaves. In this republican and political analysis of slavery, 
the basis of their power lay in violence, in the attempt to impose their 
rule by force. As Buck-Morss points out, the understanding of freedom 
as the universal Enlightenment value ‘began to take root’ just as the 
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economic practice of slavery was increasing and intensifying, so that by 
the mid-eighteenth century it ‘came to underwrite the entire economic 
system of the West, paradoxically facilitating the global spread of the 
very Enlightenment ideals that were in such fundamental contradiction 
to it’ (Buck-Morss 2009, 21). As William Fox declared in 1791, ‘We, in an 
enlightened age, have greatly surpassed in brutality and injustice, the 
most ignorant and barbarous ages: and while we are pretending to the 
fi nest feelings, are exercising unprecedented cruelty’ (Fox 1791).
As we have seen in our discussion of Locke and his involvement in 
the slave trade, this paradox was in part about the structures of know-
ing and not-knowing that underpinned eighteenth-century society 
and made it possible for thinkers to make moral evasions and live with 
glaring contradictions in order to maintain a ‘strange indifference’ to 
the lives and liberties of the people being enslaved in the New World. 
The slave-driven colonial economy, as Buck-Morss points out, con-
tinued to operate behind the scenes and behind men’s backs as they 
formulated their theories of freedom as a natural state and an inalien-
able right (Buck-Morss 2009, 22). Again, rather than treating this as a 
paradox, we need to look at slavery and liberty as specifi c social rela-
tions, and explore the mobile borders of humanity to see what it meant 
to reach the standard of humanness and cross the boundary into civil 
society. These social relations were being transformed by sugar pro-
duction, and it was becoming increasingly diffi cult to treat slavery as a 
relation within the household with its origins in military force. Slavery 
was moving defi nitively onto the public, global stage. Sugar produc-
tion demanded what Buck-Morss calls a ‘seemingly infi nite supply of 
slaves’, and within France by the mid-eighteenth century twenty per 
cent of the bourgeoisie were dependent on slave-based commercial 
activity (Buck-Morss 2009, 29). The understandings of humanity that 
emerged in the early nineteenth century were underwritten by the eco-
nomics of racial slavery, and this symbiotic relation of sugar to progress 
generated its own contradictions and affected perceptions of the shape 
of freedom and its edges. 
In the face of these economic realities, political philosophers continued 
to write as if their concerns with the meaning of freedom and the signifi -
cance of independence and autonomy could fl oat free of the real world of 
slavery and exploitation. Rousseau declared all men equal, and regarded 
private property as central to the development of inequality, but never 
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discussed French slavery for economic profi t. For Neil Roberts, Rousseau 
presaged the ‘pitfalls of enlightenment’ as he aligned freedom and slavery 
as an ‘inextricable couplet’ (Roberts 2015, 196). As Buck-Morss argues, 
a complicated set of disciplinary boundaries between intellectual his-
tory and philosophy allowed the ‘embarrassing facts’ to disappear quietly 
under the radar (Buck-Morss 2009, 34). They come back into view in the 
context of colonial revolutions, and in particular in the face of revolution-
ary upheaval in Saint-Domingue where the slaves ‘took the struggle for 
liberty into their own hands’ (Buck-Morss 2009, 36) under the banner of 
‘liberty or death’. Haiti was the Latin American country most frequently 
mentioned in German newspapers at the start of the nineteenth century. 
We need to remember the existence of a European reading public and 
the ‘countless newspapers’ that circulated in a situation of ‘cosmopolitan 
and open communication’ (Buck-Morss 2009, 44), within which Minerva 
had a circulation of around 6,000 copies by 1809 and was read by King 
Wilhelm III of Prussia, Goethe, Schiller and Hegel. Wordsworth’s sonnet 
about Toussaint Louverture was published in the Morning Post, a fashion-
able daily newspaper with a circulation of about 3,000 copies a day (Sack 
1993, 16). The events in Saint-Domingue did not take place in silent 
isolation, or on a small island at the edge of the world. Enlightenment 
critiques of colonial slavery emerged in relation to problems of colonial 
governance, fugitive slaves, high mortality rates and the violence of mas-
ters. Thinkers like the philosophes in France adapted their arguments to 
economic, political and social realities and refl ected on real examples of 
resistance (Dubois 2006). People in the eighteenth century knew what 
was happening in the world around them and sought to fi nd their way 
to freedom through that knowledge. Buck-Morss concludes that Hegel 
knew ‘about real slaves revolting successfully against real masters, and he 
elaborated his dialectic of lordship and bondage deliberately within the 
contemporary context’ (Buck-Morss 2009, 50).
Hegel’s focus on intersubjectivity, on what it means to be the mas-
ter or the slave, means that the emphasis shifts away from Lockean 
questions about self-ownership, reason and consent towards a more 
developmental approach to morality in the contexts of empires and rev-
olution. Freedom is intrinsically a matter of social relations, and indeed 
‘resides only within one’s relations with others’ (Talisse 2016, 63). As 
Stefan Bird-Pollan points out, Hegel takes a developmental approach 
to morality, and the demands of reason reveal themselves gradually 
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through the process of human history as humans transform themselves 
into moral beings. As part of the same process, ‘the conception of the 
individual as the bearer of intrinsic value is something which devel-
ops historically’ (Bird-Pollan 2012, 240). This intrinsic value cannot be 
deduced from fi rst principles. Instead, people have to learn to recognise 
each other as people and treat them as ends in themselves. This process 
of recognition, of coming to see other people as humans and as ends in 
themselves, constitutes our history and our civilisation, and the process 
of civilisation makes our potential for freedom actual. Bird-Pollan draws 
attention to how we have to develop our ideas about freedom – ‘who is 
autonomous and who is not is a “fact” about the world which cultures 
as well as each subject must learn’ (Bird-Pollan 2012, 242). People fi nd 
their way to freedom through the world around them, by navigating 
the mobile borders of humanity, the signifi cance of personhood and its 
relation to moral egalitarianism.
For Hegel, intersubjectivity was achieved through the struggle 
between two individual wills, who come together as two determined 
but separate entities, each expecting to bend the other to its will. Self-
hood has to be understood as a process which involves struggle, and 
the relations between different consciousnesses are always confl ictual. 
Up until now, the world has proved to be malleable, and each has been 
able to mould it to his or her purposes. They approach one another 
expecting to use the other in the same way, as a means to their own 
end. This means that they seek to destroy the other, ‘to convert it into 
something that is useful to it’ (Bird-Pollan 2012, 244). Inevitably, the 
other fi ghts back in an attempt to maintain its own absolute dominance 
over its surroundings and so its own conception of freedom. The result 
is a struggle to the death. The other becomes a threat to the subject just 
by being there, ‘by appearing’, as Bird-Pollan puts it, ‘in (for the fi rst 
time) intersubjective space’ (Bird-Pollan 2012, 244). 
Both individuals fi nd themselves at sea in this intersubjective space, 
not yet aware that they are participating in a social system and encoun-
tering another person with intrinsic value. In the confusion of this arena, 
each combatant is determined to vanquish the other, and is prepared to 
die for the ‘principle of having the world yield before it unconditionally’ 
(Bird-Pollan 2012, 244). At the end of the struggle, the victor keeps the 
right to treat nature as a means to his own end, and so maintains an 
instrumental relation to the world, and does not become intersubjective. 
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The loser submits to the will of the stronger, and his self-consciousness 
is replaced by motives that come from the outside, from the master. He 
is no longer entitled to decide what purposes he will pursue or to con-
strain the conduct of others. This means that the outcome of the struggle 
will always be a hollow victory. It is self-defeating just to overcome and 
cancel out the other consciousness, to try to dominate it in the same way 
as you would a thing, or to incorporate it into yourself. The emerging 
self-consciousness, the one that has the potential to have intrinsic value, 
demands an independent other to overcome, but without making the 
other cease to exist (G. Lloyd 1984). 
For Bird-Pollan, the essential problem is that the master cannot truly 
enslave the slave because to do so, he would have to control not only 
the slave’s actions, but also his motivations. For that to work, the master 
would have to become the slave’s self-consciousness, and that would 
mean he had to be the slave. As we have seen in Aristotle’s analysis, this 
is the internal contradiction, the ‘problem’ of slavery, that ‘the slave can-
not at once be completely under the control of the master and also serve 
the master’s needs (as an independent being)’ (Bird-Pollan 2012, 246). 
The emergence of self-consciousness comes from being aware of the 
possibility of death, of being destroyed oneself, rather than always able 
to control the world and its things. Genevieve Lloyd argues that this link 
between self-consciousness and death makes us aware not of things, 
but of our own desire, and our awareness of our own desire makes us 
realise that the object of desire is independent of us. The object is an 
other, and its otherness must be overcome for us to sustain our cer-
tainty, our ‘grasp of self as there in the world’ (G. Lloyd 1984, 88). There 
is a possibility that both sides survive the life and death struggle, but 
one is left in a state of subjection to the other. One or other of the self-
consciousnesses is objectifi ed and has no right to purposiveness. This 
does not mean that one entity becomes an object, but that, as Sartre put 
it, ‘between the Other-as-object and Me-as-subject there is no common 
measure’ (Hutchings 2003, 62).
This outcome refl ects the argument that slavery originates in an act 
of war, the moment when one person is forced to submit to another in 
order to survive, and in so doing chooses life over liberty, and dishonour 
over death. In the just-war accounts of slavery that we have encountered 
so far, this interaction is understood to result in the ultimate defeat for 
the slave, after which they become a living tool or a beast living outside 
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the bounds of human society. The struggle produces unequal and one-
sided recognition, or the acknowledgement of domination and subjec-
tion. The slave becomes a servile consciousness in which the master 
cannot recognise himself, or see himself refl ected back. As Kimberly 
Hutchings says, ‘The participants in the life and death struggle are pre-
sented initially as heroic fi gures, but Hegel is clear that what they seek 
to prove turns to dust’ (Hutchings 2003, 75). The master fails to fi nd an 
external object in which his own, free independent consciousness can 
be mirrored, and instead fi nds himself faced with a refl ection that is 
‘distorted by the subjection which has been the condition of its attain-
ment’ (G. Lloyd 1984, 90). The life and death struggle demonstrates the 
inadequacy of any account of self-consciousness that tries to show that 
it can exist independently of other people. The developmental, histori-
cal, dialectical process of coming to be the bearer of intrinsic value can 
only take place in the context of other people, in intersubjective space. 
For Hegel, this has very particular effects on both the master and 
the slave, and his theory of the process of recognition and the develop-
ment of individuals of intrinsic value means that he does not regard the 
moment of enslavement as the end of the story, or as the extinguishing 
of personhood. To understand our self as there in the world, we need 
to inhabit intersubjective space, and this can only be achieved through 
recognition. The master’s relation to the world and to non-conscious 
things is now mediated through the slave’s labour on them. The slave 
can make his master’s wishes come true (Bird-Pollan 2012, 248), but the 
master does not have to make any effort for himself and is deprived of 
the chance to labour on things to externalise the self (G. Lloyd 1984, 90). 
The victory of the master gets him the servile consciousness of the slave, 
while the slave gets the free consciousness of the master because the 
slave, through his labour, is ‘able to transform his immediate relation-
ship to the world into self-conscious awareness of it’ (G. Lloyd 1984, 
91). For the slave, work is desire held in check, fl eetingness staved off. 
Bird-Pollan explains it like this: ‘By going up against the permanence of 
nature, the slave experiences himself as likewise permanent, that is, he 
experiences the world as resisting him. But what he creates despite this 
resistance is the authentic expression of his agency’ (Bird-Pollan 2012, 
248). The product of his labour bears the mark of his self-consciousness 
and his creativity, and of his awareness that he is separate from the world 
and can impose his will on it. For Bird-Pollan, the point is that the slave 
can understand the work he does for his master as his own work, and 
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as part of his identity. Unlike the master, he is able to externalise himself 
through his work and to refl ect on his awareness of himself and the 
world. In doing so, he comes to realise that doing as the master demands 
and making his wishes come true is a temporary identity (Bird-Pollan 
2012, 248), and also one that has to be understood intersubjectively. The 
slave can see that freedom resides only within relations with others, and, 
through his work, he can begin to understand the distinction between 
autonomy and independence. In this account, the slave does not lose all 
his inner worth, and is not regarded as at most an instrument for others.
For Bird-Pollan, the end result is the realisation that the will of the 
other has an important place in the decision-making capacity of the 
subject: ‘The point of Hegel’s parable is to show that we always have a 
choice and that the choice is always ours’ (Bird-Pollan 2012, 46). It is the 
slave who attains this self-consciousness in the life and death struggle 
because, through his enslavement, ‘the slave realizes that identities are 
changeable and that identities come from the world itself’ (Bird-Pollan 
2012, 249). This understanding contains the seeds of hope for change 
and for justice and recognition, so that, as Bird-Pollan argues, the slaves’ 
incentives for action expand, and they are able to endorse desires that 
come from outside their immediate urge to dominate things, and so 
their reasons become intersubjective (Bird-Pollan 2012, 249). By serv-
ing the master and granting his wishes, the slave recognises that he is 
acting both for the master and at the same time for himself by trying 
to ensure his survival. His agency emerges at the margins of the mas-
ter’s power (Bird-Pollan 2012, 250) and at the edges of our perception. 
Having confronted the fear of death, the slave is now aware of life ‘as 
something not exhausted by the immediate and particular vanishing 
moments of experience’ (G. Lloyd 1984, 91). At the margins of the mas-
ter’s power the slave enters into intersubjective space, and through his 
labour can stave off the fl eetingness of life and acquire an element of 
permanence. For the slave as self-conscious being, and not as an instru-
ment for others, survival involves being able to defer gratifi cation and 
to divert energy into transforming the world. Work, awareness of death 
and fear of the lord combine to effect a self-transformation, and slaves 
can begin to work their way to freedom (Hutchings 2003, 75). On the 
other hand, the position of the master is untenable because he refuses 
to recognise that he is dependent either on life or on the slave, and so 
shows himself to be incapable of learning. Without an intimation of 
mortality or the necessity for labour, the master never goes up against 
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the permanence of the world or experiences its resistance. He never 
really fi nds the edges of his power, and without the process of learning, 
he cannot understand who has autonomy and who does not, and so 
is unable to grasp fundamentally important facts about the world. The 
master fi nds that all his desires are satisfi ed by the slave, and he does 
not learn to be constrained by the world around him. He lacks both the 
experience of suffering and the possibility of hope, and so, Bird-Pollan 
argues, ‘history leaves him behind’ (Bird-Pollan 2012, 251).
The slave, on the other hand, by his social death and through living 
in fear ‘becomes acutely conscious of both life and freedom’ (Patterson 
1982, 98). We are back at Patterson’s observation that the slave is ‘always 
conceived of as someone, or the descendant of someone, who should 
have died’ (Patterson 1991b, 10). His physical life was spared in return 
for his social death and his permanent subjection to the will of another. 
In Patterson’s analysis, the idea of freedom is born in the reality of the 
slave’s (and only the slave’s) condition because for the master the strug-
gle remains all about control, and ‘the perverse pleasures of absolute free-
dom over persons’ (Patterson 1991a, 164). For the slave, freedom requires 
the consciousness that real life can only begin with the negation of his 
social death. Patterson argues that the deracinated, degraded and dis-
honoured slave was motivated to serve his master by the hope of escape 
and the promise of freedom. This allows the slave to see that freedom is 
continuously active, creative and forged through relations with others: 
‘The slave, in his social death, is already once transformed. The life he 
strives to regain cannot be the life he lost’ (Patterson 1982, 98). Through 
the history and experience of his own social death, the slave develops a 
new, transformed conception of himself as an individual, and a different 
relationship to history which cannot leave him behind. The social death 
of enslavement thus makes possible ‘a transition to richer forms of con-
sciousness’ (G. Lloyd 1984, 89).
Patterson puts the concept of recognition at the heart of his analysis 
of slavery. The inherent dishonour of slavery is, for him, connected to 
its origins in defeat and capture and its continuing basis in violence. 
His defi nition of slavery as the permanent, violent domination of natally 
alienated and generally dishonoured persons means that slavery has to 
be about individuals’ relations to each other and their habitation of inter-
subjective space (Brace 2004, 165). Patterson argues that in this space the 
master experienced a strong sense of honour, balanced by the slave’s 
experience of his loss. The slave had chosen to live rather than to die 
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unvanquished, and this defeat, in the context of always having a choice 
and that choice always being ours, renders the slave fundamentally dis-
honoured by this primal act of submission. There is, for Patterson, a ‘raw, 
human sense of debasement inherent in having no being except as an 
expression of another’s being’. In Patterson’s account, the degradation 
and debasement of the slave nurtures the master’s sense of honour and 
lightens his soul (Patterson 1982, 78). The intersubjective space he imag-
ines between master and slave is structured by honour and dishonour, 
by force and dependence, by power and powerlessness. He rejects the 
argument that the slave stands between the master and the world, and 
the idea that the master’s victory and the recognition he receives for it 
are hollow and self-defeating. For Patterson, there was no ‘existential 
impasse’ for the master because he could and did achieve recognition 
not from the slave but from other free persons, including other masters. 
In Patterson’s account the intersubjective space that matters is not occu-
pied by just one master and one slave, but by groups of people, so that 
the individual master benefi ts from sharing in the collective honour of 
masters and the generalised dishonour of slaves. 
While the master in Patterson’s vision does not get caught in the exis-
tential impasse, this does not ensure his total victory or the absolute 
destruction of the slave. Instead, for Patterson, what emerges from the 
struggle is the central importance of self-worth to the slave as ‘a per-
son afi re with the knowledge of and the need for dignity and honor’ 
(Patterson 1982, 100). The slave does not internalise the degradation to 
which he is subjected, but is transformed by his social death. Out of 
the slave’s weariness of degradation and social death comes ‘a passion-
ate zeal for dignity and freedom’ (Patterson 1982, 101) which then has 
to be recognised by others. Hegel’s core argument is that true recogni-
tion is always reciprocal recognition (Burns 2006). The struggle between 
lord and bondsman produces one-sided and self-defeating recognition 
that cannot ground an ethical consensus or underpin the shared values 
of civil society. In slave societies that rest on the power of the masters, 
deformed recognition generates a false consensus which is an indication 
of the masters’ hegemony rather than of genuine collective honour. In 
Hegel’s parable of the lord and bondsman, the wrong of slavery lies not 
just with the slavers and conquerors, but with the slaves and the con-
quered themselves (Burns 2006, 98). As we have seen in Bird-Pollan’s 
argument, we always, as masters or slaves, have a choice, and the choice 
is ours. There is always confl ict in determining social identity. 
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The struggle between lord and bondsman is in part about what it 
means to be human, to count as an individual of intrinsic value and of 
inner worth. The struggle itself involves working out how to be there in 
the world and how to negotiate what it means to live in intersubjective 
space with other subjects. It raises the diffi cult question of how to distin-
guish between subject and object in order for us to discover the self as a 
‘thinking subject’ and establish the person as a ‘unit of freedom’. As Tony 
Burns points out, man as a rational self-consciousness is a free being, 
ethically entitled to freedom (Burns 2006, 91). As a rational being, the 
individual is something determinate, able to make the claim ‘I occupy this 
space’ and actualise himself or herself by becoming someone defi nite. 
Only these concrete, defi nite individuals can be free, so that freedom in 
Hegel’s view is inseparable from a determinate social identity given to us 
by the social institutions of the society in which we happen to live, our 
civic standing. Such a social identity is an expression of freedom and of 
belonging, the basis for civil rights which ‘rouse in their possessors . . . 
the feeling of oneself as counting in civil society as a person with rights’ 
(Burns 2006, 94). This sense of defi nition and of counting is only possible 
though the recognition of other people. Self-consciousness only exists 
in being recognised through the interplay of the particular and the uni-
versal, personhood and humanity. As Burns explains, I can be sure that 
I exist as a defi nite being of intrinsic value because I can see that there 
are things about myself that are particular and to do with my determi-
nate social identity, and other features of myself that I share with other 
selves: ‘For Hegel it is only possible for me to value the differences that 
exist between myself and another human being because in at least some 
fundamentally important respects we are the same’ (Burns 2006, 94). In 
this sense, the struggle between lord and bondsman can be read as an 
intervention on the debate about the boundaries of humanity, universal-
ising and particularising at the same time.
In her analysis of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Buck-Morss points to 
the signifi cance of the slave’s self-liberation and the idea that freedom 
of the will is integral to the human personality and what it means to 
count as an intrinsically valuable being. In his discussion of property 
rights, Hegel excludes the possibility of owning other people and makes 
clear that slaves need to become free not only in thought, but also in the 
world (Buck-Morss 2009, 61). Buck-Morss, Davis, Patterson and Gilroy 
all read into the dialectic the association between modernity and slav-
ery, and Buck-Morss insists on a Hegelian understanding of ‘a dialectical 
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relationship between facts and ethics, history, and ideas’ (Buck-Morss 
2010, 177). Fischer agrees with Buck-Morss that ‘Hegel knew’, but she 
suggests that we need to ask further questions about his evasiveness 
and how we can infer ‘what it might be that he knows’ (Fischer 2004, 32). 
He knew, she says, and at the same time behaved as if he did not know. 
He fell silent at the end of the master–slave dialectic, and retreated ‘into 
silence and obscurity at the very moment when revolutionary slaves 
might have appeared on the scene’ (Fischer 2004, 32). His moment of 
clarity was a ‘mere fl icker of insight’, right on the edges of his perception 
(Fischer 2010, 168). Fischer contests Buck-Morss’s argument about the 
possibility of recovering a human history and a universal conception of 
freedom from this fl ickering silence. Instead, she says, we need to under-
stand more fully what it is that has been erased and suppressed ‘before 
any of the canonical formulations of modernity came into being’ (2004, 
33). Fischer’s point is that Hegel’s silence is ambivalent, and about fear, 
fascination and disavowal, so that he cannot tell a straightforward story 
of liberation and emancipation. It is not enough to recast the relation-
ship between Haiti and the master–slave dialectic as a story of humanity 
that takes personhood and autonomy as already accomplished. The eva-
sions, repetitions, inconsistencies and disavowals were a crucial part of 
how personhood came to be understood as a status, an attainment that 
required more than simple humanity. If we allow these evasions and 
inconsistencies to slip out of view, or try to gloss over them, then we will 
not see how diffi cult the abolitionists found it to resist the fragmentation 
of humanity, even within their own universalist frameworks. The dan-
ger then is that we will fl atten and oversimplify what gets remembered 
and how, and take the unifi ed moral self for granted as the basis for our 
political thinking about the pasts of slavery. From such a standpoint, we 
will fail to recognise the violence and repression that underpins equat-
ing modernity with humanity.
In his lectures on the Philosophy of History in 1822, Hegel cut Africa 
adrift from history and endorsed the gradual rather than the immediate 
abolition of slavery. Slavery, he argued, was an injustice, and freedom 
was the essence of humanity, but ‘for this man must be matured’. The 
gradual abolition of slavery was therefore to be preferred to its sud-
den removal (Buck-Morss 2009, 68). Buck-Morss traces a process of 
becoming more bigoted and less enlightened through Hegel’s writ-
ings on Africa. Hegel’s philosophy of history, as we have seen, was 
steeped in cultural racism and Eurocentrism, but Buck-Morss perceives 
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her project as rescuing a fragment of the possibility of universal free-
dom, a ‘moment of clarity’ in Hegel that needs not to be discarded, but 
‘redeemed and reconstituted on a different basis’ (Buck-Morss 2009, 
75). For Fischer, it is more about the discontinuities, gaps and silences, 
so that rather than assuming a continuous history, such moments fi t 
into a more complicated set of ‘confl icting emancipatory projects’ that 
constitute what she classifi es as a ‘disavowed modernity’(Fischer 2004, 
37). Saint-Domingue is better understood not as a singular revolution-
ary event, but as ‘multiple revolutionary moments’ in a history full of fi ts 
and starts and repetitions (Fischer 2004, 133).
FREDERICK DOUGLASS AND THE WORK OF RESISTANCE
In this version of history, full of starts and repetitions, we can explore 
the mobile border between personhood and humanity, and the compli-
cations of the process of humans transforming themselves into moral 
beings as it played out in nineteenth-century American slavery, and in 
particular in the life and works of Frederick Douglass. The fundamental 
similarity between humans is undone by the annihilation of the self in 
slavery, by the slave’s social subordination and lack of self-mastery. At 
the same time, something about the human being’s entitlement to be 
his or her own master, and the duty not to treat oneself as a thing, resists 
this annihilation. Leonard Cassuto makes the point that the masters 
did not succeed in turning the slaves into beasts or objects, but ‘could 
only approximate doing so’. The slaves, he argues, retained their human 
connection, becoming not things but ‘people who are being uneas-
ily forced into the category of “thing”’ (Cassuto 1996, 230). In Hegel’s 
model, ‘human objectifi cation is a dynamic and unstable process that 
does not objectify the slave for long’ (Cassuto 1996, 232). 
Frederick Douglass offers an autobiographical version of the story of 
the struggle for recognition (Kohn 2005, 498), starting from the premise 
that slave owners would not have punished disobedience so severely if 
they had not thought of their slaves as people. As Dickson had argued 
in 1789, their cruelty was an acknowledgement of slaves as moral, 
intellectual and responsible beings with the potential to set their own 
purposes and undertake their own obligations. The slaveholders’ ‘effort 
to objectify require[d] constant vigilance’, and only partially succeeded 
(Cassuto 1996, 231). Its limits were made clear by Douglass’s story of 
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intersubjectivity, resistance and violence and his struggle to count as a 
human being of intrinsic value. His written autobiography can be read 
as a ‘quest for being’, a fugitive slave narrative that tells his nineteenth-
century readers about his transformation ‘from labouring chattel into 
literate abolitionist’ (Cassuto 1996, 237).
The story of Douglass’s self-emancipation was centrally about this 
literacy, and he was taught to read by his mistress until she was forbid-
den by her husband. A slave, the master insisted, should know nothing 
but to obey his master; learning would make him unmanageable and 
unfi t to be a slave. ‘From that moment’, said Douglass, ‘I understood 
the pathway from slavery to freedom’ (Douglass [1845] 2015). Margaret 
Kohn interprets this as the ‘Kantian moment’ in Douglass’s account, 
when Enlightenment ideals of reason and persuasion brought about 
improvement in the conjunction of literacy, education and reason, 
and Douglass perceived what independence would mean (Kohn 2005, 
498). Douglass went on to say that what the master most dreaded, the 
slave most desired. It was a Hegelian moment of self-consciousness 
and of intersubjectivity, of realisation that his identity was changeable 
and of how to begin to work his way to freedom. It was also a painful 
moment as freedom appeared as an ever-present torment to Douglass, 
meaning that he regretted his own existence and wished himself dead, 
‘and but for the hope of being free, I have no doubt that I should have 
killed myself, or done something for which I should have been killed’ 
(Douglass [1845] 2015). Literacy allowed Douglass to see that he had 
been objectifi ed in the eyes of others, but not to perceive himself as 
socially dead. Through being able to read, he retained a strong sense 
of himself as a human being. Once he learnt to read, ‘he assert[ed] his 
human identity’ (Cassuto 1996, 238).
But the key to Douglass’s Hegelian life and death struggle is usually 
understood to be the confrontation with Mr Covey, which Douglass 
himself described as a turning point. Douglass went to live with Mr 
Covey in 1833 when his master ‘resolved to put me out, as he said, to 
be broken’ and sent him for a year to Edward Covey, a man with a 
reputation for breaking young slaves (a reputation that, as Douglass 
points out, was immensely valuable to Covey in getting his land culti-
vated). Douglass had been with Covey for a week when he was given a 
severe whipping ‘cutting my back, causing the blood to run, and raising 
ridges on my fl esh as large as my little fi nger’ (Douglass [1845] 2015). 
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Later, Douglass was sent to the woods to fetch fi rewood with a team of 
unbroken oxen who took fright and ran out of control, upsetting and 
shattering the cart and entangling themselves in a tree. Once Doug-
lass had got the situation back under control, the oxen bolted again 
and crushed him against a gatepost. In response, Covey had Douglass 
whipped every week for six months and worked him fully up to the 
point of endurance. For Douglass, this period represented ‘the bitterest 
dregs of slavery’:
broken in body, soul and spirit. My natural elasticity was crushed, 
my intellect languished, the disposition to read departed, the 
cheerful spark that lingered about my eye died; the dark night of 
slavery closed in upon me; and behold the man transformed into 
a brute! (Douglass [1845] 2015)
In Douglass’s narrative, this was the process that made him a slave.
In his fi nal confrontation with Covey, Douglass had been working 
in the stable, throwing hay down from the loft when Mr Covey came 
and tried to tie him up. At this moment, Douglass resolved to fi ght. He 
seized Covey hard around the throat: ‘My resistance was so entirely 
unexpected that Covey seemed all taken aback’ (Douglass [1845] 2015). 
Douglass held on and continued to fi ght back for nearly two hours. The 
outcome was not entirely clear, but Douglass ‘considered him as getting 
entirely the worst end of the bargain; for he had drawn no blood from 
me, but I had from him’. Gerard Aching argues that Covey did not lose 
the fi ght, but Douglass was never punished for his rebellion (Aching 
2012, 914), and was not whipped again in the six months he stayed with 
Covey. Douglass described this battle with Covey as the turning point 
in his career as a slave: ‘It rekindled the few expiring embers of freedom, 
and revived within me a sense of my own manhood’ (Douglass [1845] 
2015). It brought Douglass self-confi dence and determination and ‘the 
gratifi cation afforded by the triumph was a full compensation for what-
ever else might follow, even death itself’ (Douglass [1845] 2015). Doug-
lass described his deep satisfaction at using force to combat slavery, and 
talked about it as ‘a glorious resurrection, from the tomb of slavery, to 
the heaven of freedom’ (Douglass [1845] 2015). The fi ght itself seemed 
to ‘facilitate a psychological liberation, which is as powerful as physi-
cal freedom’ (Kohn 2005, 500). The confrontation was not just about 
self-defence or avoiding injury or death, but about his courage and 
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manhood. From that moment, Douglass resolved that ‘however long I 
might remain a slave in form, the day had passed forever when I could 
be a slave in fact’ (Douglass [1845] 2015). The balance of power in the 
violent encounter had shifted, changing the stakes of masculinity and 
honour, and the white man who succeeded in whipping Douglass must 
now also succeed in killing him if he wished to defeat him. There was 
no further public whipping because Mr Covey’s reputation and income 
depended on his ability to ‘break’ slaves (Aching 2012, 914). He needed 
Douglass’s labour on the farm and could not afford to indemnify 
Mr Thomas for the loss of his property, and so Covey was dependent 
on Douglass ‘whereas Douglass, who had faced death, was, in a sense, 
independent of these “particularistic” concerns’ (Kohn 2005, 505).
For Paul Gilroy, this section of Douglass’s narrative should be read as 
an alternative to Hegel, ‘a supplement if not exactly a trans-coding of his 
account of the struggle between lord and bondsman’ (Gilroy 1993, 60). 
He argues that the violent encounter between Douglass and Covey is a 
reworking and an inversion of Hegel’s dialectic. The slave emerges with a 
self-consciousness that exists for itself, and his master represents a con-
sciousness that is repressed within itself. Douglass transforms Hegel’s 
metanarrative of power ‘into a metanarrative of emancipation’ (Gilroy 
1993, 60). Gilroy sees Douglass and Covey as locked together in a Hegelian 
impasse, each able to contain the strength of the other without vanquish-
ing him (Gilroy 1993, 62). Mutual respect came out of their struggle, and 
Douglass emerged with the essential dignity of humanity at the moment 
when he reached the point of not being afraid to die (Gilroy 1993, 63). 
Physical resistance was crucial to his sense of honour, dignity and human-
ity and, as Kohn argues, the signifi cance that Douglass attaches to his 
fi ght with Covey ‘suggests that power rather than knowledge may be the 
key to personhood’ (Kohn 2005, 503). 
Douglass inverted Hegel’s narrative by preferring death over life, 
choosing death above ‘the continuing condition of inhumanity on 
which plantation slavery depends’ (Gilroy 1993, 63) and, by doing so, 
distinguishing himself from the oxen who ran away, and resisting his 
‘brutifi cation’ (Kohn 2005, 504). Douglass’s agency emerges from his 
counter-violence, his physical resistance which is, as Gilroy argues, ‘an 
interesting though distinctly masculinist resolution of slavery’s inner 
oppositions’ (Gilroy 1993, 64). It is, as Cassuto points out, violence not 
reading that sets Douglass free. It was his conscious resistance that 
created and defi ned him as a person. The fi ght with Covey provides 
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an ‘external affi rmation of his reality’ and ‘the confi rmation of a sort of 
equality in physical force validates his internal conception of himself’ 
(Kohn 2005, 504). Kohn, though, supplements this masculinist reso-
lution with an emphasis on Douglass’s experience of dread and fear 
before the fi ght, his time alone in the woods, when he confronted his 
fear of the master, which as Hegel argued, is the beginning of wis-
dom (Hegel 1976). In the end, she contends, Douglass resisted Covey 
‘because he became conscious of the contradictions between his own 
idea of freedom and its incomplete realization in the world’ (Kohn 2005, 
512). Cassuto contends that ‘Hegel’s version of work needs to be rede-
fi ned in terms of conscious, pointed resistance against the master’s 
control’ (Cassuto 1996, 241). In other words, it is not his work, his labour 
as a slave, that allows Douglass to externalise himself and refl ect on his 
own awareness of himself. In Douglass’s account, his work for Covey 
made him feel like a brute in his own eyes, while his resistance brought 
him back to manhood. 
Aching is troubled by Gilroy’s interpretation of Douglass and Hegel, 
and its implication that the master–slave dialectic ends with a life and 
death struggle that liberates the slave. Instead, he argues, we need to 
recognise Douglass’s continuing struggle with his bondage, the com-
bination of hope and fear, his actions in teaching fellow slaves to read 
in secret, the ways in which he and his fellow slaves ‘were linked and 
interlinked with each other’ (Douglass [1845] 2015) and bound together 
by cords of affection and loyalty, and by what it meant to run away when 
‘it was a doubtful liberty at most, and almost certain death if we failed’ 
(Douglass [1845] 2015). Slave narratives focus not just on autonomy 
and freedom, but also on slave communities as oases of support and 
protection in the search for freedom (Drake 1997, 97). Kimberly Drake 
points out that in Douglass’s later narrative, My Bondage, he shifts away 
from achieving individual masculine self-defi nition through physi-
cal power, and places much more emphasis on his reliance on others, 
including his fellow slave Caroline who is restored to the scene of the 
struggle and refuses to help Covey to subdue Douglass.
For Aching, the life and death struggle of the master–slave dialec-
tic ‘describes moments of compromised freedom’ (Aching 2012, 916) 
and helps us to see enslaved subjects as people who assimilate and 
grapple internally with coercion, using a range of psychic strategies 
to survive slavery (Aching 2012, 917). This fi ts with Cassuto’s argu-
ment that work cannot perform the same function for Douglass as 
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it does for Hegel because of the explicit racial ideology of American 
slavery. ‘Unlike Hegel’s bondsman’, Cassuto argues, ‘the American 
slave was held captive by a doctrine of black inferiority that encom-
passed his entire existence’ (Cassuto 1996, 241). The racial element 
of racial slavery meant that a slave was a slave regardless of his work. 
Forced labour in this context does not awaken self-consciousness 
‘because American slaveholders divorce slave inferiority from labor 
and tie it to race’ (Cassuto 1996, 249). The master–slave dialectic is 
then about the objectifi cation at the heart of slavery, and the fugitive 
slave narratives are work, ‘the work of writing resistance’ (Cassuto 
1996, 243). Douglass’s account reveals the depths of denial required 
in order to objectify a person, and it forces its reading audience to 
confront the intersubjective reality of the process of objectifying 
someone, ‘not just that the grotesque others are human, but also 
that we humans are the ones who made them out as different in 
the fi rst place’ (Cassuto 1996, 251). The doctrines of black inferiority 
were not fi xed or stable.
CONCLUSION
The process of transforming humanity into moral beings, and of dis-
tinguishing between humanity and the status of personhood, was 
never straightforward but full of disruptions, ruptures, contradictions 
and repetitions. The mobility of the border between person and thing, 
and the intermediate statuses of Hegel’s bondsman and the fugitive 
slave were inseparable from the development of ideas about epider-
malisation, colour and inferiority. Slavery was part of the forwardness 
of modernity, of stories that we think of as about progress, freedom 
and humanity. The drawing of boundaries within humanity, the sense 
of partitions that became permanent, was contested, and the line 
between human beings, subpersons and rational, moral agents was 
not easily drawn. The ‘threshold level taken to be a minimal prerequisite 
for meriting equal treatment’ (Mills 2014, 129) was diffi cult to assign, 
and fi nding its edges was an impossible task, despite Kant’s insistence 
on its solidity. The symbiosis of race and the moral-political discourse 
of Kant and Hegel and the inextricable coupling of freedom and slav-
ery worked together to undermine the possibility of taking autonomy 
for granted in the fi rst place and to disrupt the ‘happy ever after’ story 
of modern slavery that wants to hold the historical past so fi rmly in 
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place (Buck-Morss 2010, 175). The process of transforming human-
ity into moral beings and fi xing personhood as a status was linked to 
labour and to gender as registers of difference as well as to race. Slave 
inferiority was not, as Cassuto contends, simply divorced from labour 
and attached to race, and Mills’s category of subpersons was never 
decided on the basis of the race alone, as we have seen in the aboli-
tionists’ struggle with the ideas of debasement and civilisation. In the 
next chapters, we turn to thinking about labour and gender, and the 
roles they played in transforming humanity into moral beings and in 
defi ning the meanings of slavery and modernity. 
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Chapter 6
UNPARALLELED DRUDGERY AND THE 
DEPRIVATION OF FREEDOM
The transformation of humans into moral beings in the context of 
modern slavery was a process that fundamentally involved labour. The 
abolitionists and the apologists for slavery both tended to assume that 
slave and wage labour were two separate systems, although they drew 
the line between them in different places. This chapter returns to the 
themes of humanity, race and empire and explores how they were caught 
up with the emerging binary between slavery and free labour. It brings 
us back to the debates between antislavery writers and those who came 
to the defence of slavery in the late eighteenth century, before the slave 
trade was abolished. The arguments between them help to illuminate 
the ways in which constructions of race and labour were inextricable 
from one another, and how thinking about slavery as a labour system 
is inseparable from understanding freedom as a contested concept, 
forged out of experience and struggle. Part of that struggle was about 
trying to fi nd and defi ne the limits of enslavability, and its location in 
a constellation of concepts of self-possession, labour power, race and 
property. As Emma Christopher puts it, these issues were central to the 
‘prolonged fi ght over who would be eligible for freedom’ (Christopher 
2006, 6). This chapter explores how that notion of ‘freedom’ came to be 
associated with the West, with capitalism and with ‘the contractual rela-
tion between worker and employer as the natural and ordained condi-
tion of production’ (Pleasants 2008, 206). 
As we have seen, this was a struggle and a confl ict that took place 
within modernity. As O’Connell Davidson argues, it is important to 
recognise that transatlantic plantation slavery was and is ‘modern slav-
ery’. Plantation agriculture ‘resembled factories in the fi eld and, with its 
carefully structured gang labour, anticipated in many ways the assem-
bly lines and agribusiness of the future’ (D. B. Davis 2006, 6). Slave 
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economies were at the core of industrialisation and commercialisation, 
contributing to British economic growth and the development of manu-
facturing and ‘causally entwined with the emergence and consolidation 
of capitalism as the dominant worldwide social, economic and political 
system’ (Pleasants 2008, 205). Slave work, as James Walvin puts it, was 
the hinge on which the modernising world turned (Walvin 1996, 48). 
Slavery and other forms of unfree labour were a necessary element of 
capitalist societies from the start. In the past few decades there has been 
a shift in economic history’s thinking about the mode of production and 
a challenge to the idea that the commodifi cation of labour power and 
the commodifi cation of labourers can be thought of as two separate sys-
tems. Matthew Axtell, for example, argues that instead we need to think 
about a unitary structure of exploitation with slavery at its core (Axtell 
2015, 280). Walter Johnson (2016) names this ‘slave racial capitalism’ and 
positions it as a historic form of neoliberalism. This combination of slav-
ery and capitalism categorises people by race, fi xes non-white people 
in their place, assigns them particular tasks, and then uses racism to 
mystify the social inequalities it has created (Axtell 2015). By returning to 
the debates over slave labour in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, we can go back to that distinction between the commodifi ca-
tion of labour power and the commodifi cation of labourers to see what 
signifi cance it carried at the time, and use it to explore the meanings of 
freedom that emerged from the intensifi cation of slave racial capital-
ism. Orlando Patterson declared that there was nothing in the nature of 
slavery that required the slave to be a worker (Patterson 1982, 99), but 
this chapter argues, as I have done elsewhere (Brace 2004), that labour is 
inextricable from freedom and from belonging.
The previous chapters on Hegel, Haiti and empire have allowed 
us to refl ect on the meanings of blackness and of belonging in the 
late eighteenth century, and we shall return to those questions here 
through the debates between antislavery campaigners and the defend-
ers of slavery over the status of bound labour. We need to remember 
the blurriness of some of the lines of distinction, the ‘boundary trouble’ 
(O’Connell Davidson 2005) with which so many of the thinkers and 
authors considered in this book were wrestling. This chapter takes up 
Peter Peckard’s idea of the process of ‘unhumanising’ in the context 
of the debates around free and unfree labour and explores how the 
line of distinction between servants and slaves was being redrawn. It 
takes us back to questions of inferiority and debasement, and to the 
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internal fracturing of humanity just as it was being defi ned as univer-
sal. Labour as a moral and political category was caught up with ideas 
about autonomy, morality and honour that were deeply contested, and 
the mobile borders between free and unfree labour, labour and capi-
tal, persons and property were inseparable from questions about who 
belonged, and who was eligible to be incorporated into civil society.
WRETCHEDNESS AND SLAVERY
When James Henry Thornwell visited Britain from the southern United 
States in 1841, it strengthened his critique of the blatant hypocrisy of 
Europeans and Northerners who criticised the slave system while the 
waged working class died from starvation and lack of shelter. In his let-
ters home he described the narrow, crowded, damp, dark, fi lthy streets 
of Liverpool, full of paupers and beggars and ‘families poorer than the 
poorest I ever saw in America’ (Wilson 2016, 125). The British working 
classes, he pointed out, paid nearly all they could earn by hard labour 
for rent. He concluded, ‘This is wretchedness, this is poverty indeed’ 
(Wilson 2016, 125). Within his worldview, slavery was part of the social 
fabric, and such wretchedness was avoided in the Deep South because 
the Southern slaveholders upheld the civil interests of mankind, sup-
porting representative, republican government against the despotism 
of the masses. Slavery was an integral part of the preservation of prop-
erty rights and of the social order, so that Thornwell felt confi dent in 
declaring ‘We cherish the institution not from avarice, but from prin-
ciple’ (Wilson 2016, 131–2). This principle was one of responsibility and 
hierarchy. The Southern elite had a responsibility to look after the ‘poor 
of our land’, to clothe and feed those who laboured for them. God 
would punish those masters who did not treat their slaves well and 
failed to recognise that they were bound by justice and mercy to care 
for their souls. Slaves, Thornwell insisted, were a solemn trust, and 
‘while we have a right to use and direct their labor, we are bound to 
feed, clothe, and protect them’ (Wilson 2016, 134).
It is interesting that Thornwell’s description of the condition of the 
working class fi nds its echo in Engels’s famous account of the misery 
and insecurity of the East End of London which he called ‘an ever 
spreading pool of stagnant misery and desolation, of starvation when 
out of work, and degradation, physical and moral, when in work’. Indi-
viduals were starving, and ‘what security has the working-man that it 
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may not be his turn tomorrow?’ No one ensured him of employment 
or made certain that he would have the means of living: 
He knows that every breeze that blows, every whim of his 
employer, every bad turn of trade may hurl him back into the 
fi erce whirlpool from which he has temporarily saved himself, 
and in which it is hard and often impossible to keep his head 
above water. (Engels 1892, 80–1)
Engels’s work is full of descriptions of fi lth, squalor and discomfort, of 
houses that are dirty and miserable, of the ‘uninhabitableness’ of the 
industrial towns, showing ‘in how little space a human being can move’. 
Engels made the parallel with slavery: 
In the industrial epoch alone has it become possible that the 
worker scarcely freed from feudal servitude, could be used as mere 
material, a mere chattel; that he must let himself be crowded into 
a dwelling too bad for every other, which he for his hard-earned 
wages buys the right to let go utterly to ruin. This manufacture has 
achieved, which, without these workers, this poverty, this slavery 
could not have lived. (Engels 1892, 80–1)
This radical position tended to be hostile to offi cial abolitionism, in 
particular because of its association with political economy and evan-
gelicalism and the limits to its demands for reform (Epstein 2006, 263). 
Their focus on ‘the name and form of slavery’ had nothing to do with 
what the radicals regarded as the substance of slavery, which for them 
was about labour, and in particular working for twelve to fourteen hours 
a day for inadequate wages. In their view, the abolitionists were simply 
proposing to emancipate one set of slaves at the expense of another. 
Rather than tackling domestic slavery by reducing working hours, they 
‘proposed to aggravate it, by adding to its burdens, under pretence of 
removing slavery abroad’. The people of England
would doubtless give liberty to the negro, but they never proposed 
doing so at the expense of mortgaging their industry to the planter 
to the amount of £20,000,000 of money. They would, in short, make 
others free, but not at the expense of adding to their own slavery. 
(O’Brien 1833) 
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In the eighteenth century, and into the nineteenth, proslavery pro-
tagonists as well as radicals insisted on the fundamental similarities 
in the nature of the exploitation endured by slaves and wage work-
ers. They constructed a defence of slavery that was based on compas-
sion for the poor and on a critique of capitalism, and in the process 
they carefully crafted a place for themselves within the discourse of 
humanity. Defenders of slavery in the eighteenth century ‘tapped 
into some of the same moral sentiments as abolitionists’ (Rugemer 
2004, 229) by emphasising the need for reform at home, the limits to 
masters’ powers over their slaves, and the favourable working condi-
tions for slaves compared to the common labouring people of Britain 
(Othello 1790). As Nigel Pleasants points out, there is a long tradition 
in Britain of understanding antislavery protest as morally motivated, 
and the movement as driven by what he calls ‘a select band of altruis-
tic, saintly individuals’ (Pleasants 2008, 206). This particular narrative 
needs rewriting in all sorts of ways, but here it is important to point 
out that the Quakers who led the movement had often been previ-
ously involved in slaveholding and slave trading, and were thoroughly 
implicated in the economies of slave racial capitalism. Theirs was, in 
many ways, an immanent critique of ‘inhuman commerce’, which they 
needed to distinguish from other, more acceptable forms of industri-
alisation and commercialisation (Brace 2013b). Their key tactic was 
selectivity. They were, as Pleasants argues, deeply selective about 
the forms of economic oppression to which they objected, and their 
opponents were quick to point out that the abolitionists were more 
concerned with the distant suffering of slaves in the West Indies than 
they were with the squalor and poverty on the streets of London and 
other cities. Petitions against slavery from the manufacturing towns 
needed to be treated with particular care, William Innes argued, since 
‘there is not a Tradesman in Great Britain who does not directly or 
indirectly derive advantage from the African and West-India trade’. 
It was scarcely credible, he went on, that they would be prepared to 
diminish or endanger their earnings ‘from a suffering, real or imagi-
nary, across the Atlantic’ (Innes 1792, 3).
Part of the diffi culty lay in the antislavery campaigners’ need to rebut 
claims that they were seditious radicals who, in their support for the 
repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts, aimed to remove the only bar-
riers ‘we have to preserve us from the fangs of a restless and intolerant 
brood’ (Othello 1790, 33). William Dickson worried that certain readers 
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would read his letters against slavery as the product of an overheated 
imagination, and dismiss their author as a zealot and a rank republican, 
‘just as if an abhorrence of slavery implied a love of anarchy’ (Dickson 
1789, ix). Antislavery arguments needed to win acceptance from politi-
cal and social elites who were afraid of social reform and suspected the 
abolitionists of pursuing a course of conduct that risked reigniting the 
kind of revolutionary violence and bloodshed that had been seen in 
Haiti. Unlike those who defended slavery, the abolitionists could not 
afford to allow their arguments for reform to slip into a broader critique 
of trade or commerce, or to address the ‘problem of the poor’ on the 
same grounds as their opposition to slavery. Instead, they worked hard 
to contrast the tyranny of slavery, which they saw as the negation of law 
and morality, with the rationality and freedom of contract.
‘A LIFE OF INDOLENCE AND EASE’
The core of antislavery discourse was the assumption that slavery origi-
nated in commerce, and treated men like possessions, buying them and 
selling them like cattle. Like beasts, slaves were tamed ‘by the stings of 
hunger and the lash’, and their education was directed to the same end, 
‘to make them commodious instruments of labour for their possessors’ 
(Clarkson 1786, 22). For the antislavery writers, this denial of command 
over their own labour was an injury to the slaves’ self-possession, and 
a risk to their status as human fellow creatures. Lynn Festa argues that 
such ‘enumerative defi nitions of the human’ create ‘a checklist of traits’ 
and ‘then reel individual cases in and out of the class of the human 
based on the possession of these traits or the want thereof’ (Festa 2010, 
4). Peckard was aware of the dangers of an approach that produced 
an unstable, and elastic, defi nition of humanity, bringing with it the 
possibility of ‘unhumanising’ individuals, and striking them out of the 
human race. Writing in 1788, Peckard saw that the proslavery writers 
had shifted their ground within the discourse of humanity to try to 
claim that black Africans were ‘so far debased as to have lost all title to 
Humanity’ (Peckard 1788, 2). His use of the concept of ‘unhumanising’ 
others echoed the debates about the limits of humanity in Kant and 
Hegel, and the abolitionist arguments about inferiority and debase-
ment. He was clear that in arguing that the native inhabitants of Africa 
had no idea of civil government, no moral distinctions, no idea of reli-
gion, and no idea of a future, the defenders of slavery spread false and 
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humiliating opinions of their natural brethren in order to justify ‘the 
traffi ck in Human Blood’ (Peckard 1788, 3). 
This discourse of ‘debasement’ was highly contentious ground for 
the abolitionists. In delineating the effects of slavery, they wanted to 
argue that it risked undermining the basic humanity of those who were 
subjected to it, that it was of itself ‘unhumanising’. Trading in men, the 
antislavery writers argued, caused the slaves to be treated in a low and 
despicable light, and their treatment created its own effects. It depressed 
their minds, numbed their faculties, prevented their sparks of genius 
from bursting forth, until ‘it gave them the appearance of being endued 
with inferiour capacities than the rest of mankind’ (Clarkson 1786, 22). 
Once the slaves were classed with the brutes, their consequent treatment 
cramped their abilities, and then the next generations mistook appear-
ance for reality and came to believe that slaves were an inferior order of 
men, void of understanding (Clarkson 1786, 23). For the abolitionists, 
this was a gross misunderstanding. The inferiority of a particular group 
of people was not natural, but the result of inhuman treatment. Those 
who claimed a natural inferiority for the Africans (such as those we con-
sidered in Chapter 4) put far too much faith in external appearances and 
failed to perceive the underlying truth. This potentially radical position 
was undermined by the discourse of debasement which held that slav-
ery had debased slaves almost to the level of brutes, so that immediate 
emancipation would lead to anarchy, bloodshed and destruction. There 
were many distinct threads woven into the antislavery movement, but its 
evangelical and its secularising aspects shared this story of debasement. 
As Anthony Page points out, the ‘subdued abolitionism’ of the Radical 
Dissenters meant that they were willing to support gradual over imme-
diate abolition, to tolerate mitigated slavery until religious and political 
liberty had been established (Page 2011, 764). Individuals needed to be 
‘improved’ before they were eligible for freedom.
This approach to understanding slavery and its effects was closely 
bound up with thinking about slavery as a system of labour, and with 
the ideal of wage labour emerging as normative. One of the key mark-
ers of the slaves’ cramped abilities and their lack of genius was their 
supposed idleness. This meant that the struggle for them to come to be 
seen as human was tied up with their capacity for labour, and descrip-
tions of their ‘state of nature’ in Africa were not only myths of barbar-
ity and ignorance, but also myths of idleness. Part of the experience of 
being less-than (Farley 2004, 229) arose from ideas about labour and its 
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intersection with property, civil society and race. The debates around 
fi tness for freedom and dehumanisation played out not only in argu-
ments about epidermalisation and inferiority and in the Haitian revo-
lution, but in everyday practices and power relations in the fi elds and 
plantations.
In developing the discourse of debasement and explaining the injus-
tice suffered by the enslaved, the opponents of slavery drew a picture 
of Africa as a place where the ‘wretched Africans’ in their own country 
led a ‘life of indolence and ease, where the earth brings forth sponta-
neously the comforts of life, and spares frequently the toil and trou-
ble of cultivation’, so that ‘they can hardly be expected to endure the 
drudgeries of servitude’ (Clarkson 1786, 138–9). In the fertile country of 
Guinea, Peckard asserted, ‘[t]he earth yields all the year a fresh supply 
of food’ (Peckard 1788, 47). This reliance on unimproved nature, their 
mere occupation of vacant lands, meant that the Africans ‘were mostly 
in the savage state’, with their minds limited to a few objects (Clarkson 
1786, 169), unable, as we have seen, to exercise rational freedom or to 
be their own masters. This was a particular, mythical construction of the 
category of the ‘African’ and his relationship to labour, as the abolition-
ists managed and produced their own idea of Africa (B. Carey 2005, 
96). In order to construct and maintain this perfect image, antislavery 
discourse wrote African labour and commerce out of their histories. 
In the eighteenth century, one of the most important sources of slave 
labour for the British colonies was the Gold Coast of west Africa. There, 
African farmers cultivated multiple crops, yams and cassava, millet, 
sorghum and maize, and peanuts. The women tilled the soil, prepared 
and planted root crops in mounds and grew complementary crops in 
between. Their farming techniques conserved their resources and maxi-
mised returns from the land through cultivation cycles, irrigation and 
soil management (Knight 2010, 43). African agricultural workers who 
were transported and enslaved brought with them a huge amount of 
skill and knowledge about how to use ‘a combination of methods to 
produce crops on fragile soils’ (Knight 2010, 64). Far from living off the 
spontaneous productions of nature, they were productive, improving 
farmers, who were also engaged in the market, and in ‘pathways and 
“webs” of trade’ through well-established commercial networks (Knight 
2010, 18). In place of this industrious and enterprising society, antislav-
ery writings told a story about the original equality of mankind, and 
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imagined an age of dissociation and independence where people lived 
without government, laws or labour, ‘perfectly independent, perfectly 
free’ (Clarkson 1786, 76). For the antislavery writers, it was important 
to conceptualise the Africans who were captured and sold into slavery 
as innocent ‘victims of avarice’ (Clarkson 1786, 107), and to consolidate 
this picture they placed them outside the pathways and webs of trade, 
and fi gured their independence and freedom as separate from the mar-
ket and from labour. They drew the starkest contrast possible between 
their life of ease, sitting under the shade of their fi g trees, and the work 
that was expected from them on the plantations. The slaves, Clarkson 
argued, were ‘torn from their country in a state of nature’ (Clarkson 
1786, 107) and conveyed to the plantations where they were considered 
as beasts of burden. 
The proslavery writers contested this account of original freedom 
and independence by arguing that ‘slavery was ever a condition of 
human life’, ‘the genus of the state of man’ (Francklyn 1789, 204), with 
ancient and Biblical precedents, and an integral part of African com-
merce. Morocco, argued Gilbert Francklyn, sent thousands of camels 
to Guinea loaded up with salt, cowries, oil and woollen and silk manu-
factures which they exchanged ‘with the Negroes for gold dust, ivory, 
ostrich feathers, and Negro slaves’ (Francklyn 1789, 94). He acknowl-
edged the webs of trade, but placed slavery at the heart of them. At 
the same time as recognising this already existing and thriving com-
merce, the apologists for slavery needed to argue that the white slave 
traders had found the Africans living in savageness and barbarity, and 
had gradually improved and ‘reclaimed’ them through their contact 
and intercourse with them (Othello 1790, 4). On this account, Africans 
were not commercial people, although their country produced com-
modities such as gold dust, elephants’ teeth, wood and gum ‘which, 
in a commercial light, might in time become an object’ (Othello 1790, 
5). Their idleness and lack of commercial ingenuity showed itself in 
that ‘nothing but the most urgent necessity is able to incite them to 
any regular or consistent mode of labour . . . without which these arti-
cles cannot be procured in suffi cient quantities to encourage any but 
a very insignifi cant and precarious trade’ (Othello 1790, 6–7). It was 
well known, ‘Othello’ went on, that in the interior of the country, they 
‘eat one another rather than work for their food’ (Othello 1790, 7). In 
the eighteenth century, the cannibal was a prime symbol of barbarism, 
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used to establish essential difference and construct racial boundaries 
(Lindenbaum 2004, 493, 477). This slippage between subsistence and 
cannibalism reveals the potential of these imagined constructions of 
Africa to ‘unhumanise’ the other, and the central importance of labour 
for coming to be seen as human, and for transforming humans into 
moral beings. The question of the black Africans’ relationship to labour, 
the idea that they had to be forced to work, underpinned many justifi -
cations of slavery, and opened up the question of their title to human-
ity. In constructing Africans as mostly in the savage state and as living a 
life of indolence and ease, the abolitionists conceded important ground 
to those whom they accused of spreading false and humiliating opin-
ions of their natural brethren. 
THE SUFFERING OF THE CARGO
Once they had been torn from their ‘state of nature’ and uprooted 
from their closest connections, the people who had been captured as 
slaves were subjected to the transportation to the colonies. For the 
abolitionists, their uprooting and their brutal treatment on board ship 
was about tearing the Africans away from freedom, not just about 
acquiring rights to their labour. In the minds of their captors, this was 
a crucial stage in the development of the slaves’ relationship to their 
labour power, turning them from wild animals to domestic brutes and 
integrating them as commodities and labourers into the system of 
slave racial capitalism. The voyage, as Emma Christopher argues, was 
central to the process of changing ‘the form of the “merchandise” as it 
crossed the seas’ (Christopher 2006, 165). Once they reached port, the 
sailors prepared the slaves for market by blackening their grey hairs, 
polishing their skin, shaving them closely to make them look younger, 
and feeding them up a bit to make them look healthy. The captives 
were transformed into slaves, cargo into merchandise, so that once 
the slaves were taken off the ships they were ‘unhumanised’. They 
were exposed to sale and picked out by the purchaser ‘without any 
consideration whether the wife is separated from her husband, or the 
mother from her son’ (Clarkson 1786, 132).
The kidnapped Africans left the ships and arrived on the planta-
tions as, in Patterson’s terms, socially dead, natally alienated and per-
manently dishonoured slaves (Patterson 1982). The slaves who worked 
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in the fi elds, the vast majority of the slaves on the sugar plantations, 
were, according to the abolitionists, generally treated more like beasts 
of burden than human creatures. Slave labour undermined the dis-
tinction between humans and non-human animals by subjecting the 
slaves to ‘uncivilised’ labour. They cultivated the land with no assistance 
from cattle, and suffered every hardship associated with exhausting 
work, inadequate food, poor lodging and being treated with a degree 
of severity ‘which border[ed] on inhumanity’ (Dickson 1789, 6). Slaves 
tilled the ground, carried out the dung and ‘must go through all the 
drudgery of husbandry, which cattle perform in every civilised coun-
try under heaven, except the West Indian Islands’ (Dickson 1789, 12). 
Food and clothes were given to the slave to enable him to continue his 
daily labour, ‘so that it must be considered in much the same light, as 
the foddering of a horse, or the expence of fattening cattle for slaughter; 
because the food is not given for any other consideration, than for the 
profi t of the owner’ (Sharp 1769, 150). Amy Dru Stanley points to the 
importance of time in distinguishing between slavery and wage labour 
(Stanley 1998, 96), and the abolitionists carefully described the slaves’ 
working hours. They started work at fi ve in the morning, either cultivat-
ing the fi elds or collecting the grass for the cattle, blade by blade. They 
worked without a break until nine at night (Clarkson 1786, 14). There 
was very little time for rest, and besides the ordinary labour of the day 
they were kept in mills that were never shut down, so that their sleep 
was reduced to about three and a half hours a night (Clarkson 1786, 
142). Theirs was a life of ‘unparalleled drudgery’, intense and inces-
sant (Clarkson 1786, 143). Cultivation was all manual, and the slaves 
dug rows of holes for the cane, up to sixty or even a hundred in a day, 
with each hole bordered by a ridge to help retain moisture and manure. 
This was recognised by contemporaries as ‘severe labour’, hard physical 
work, carried out by the strongest slaves under the driver’s whip. For 
William Dickson, ‘this circumstance alone may serve to convince the 
public of the state of debasement to which the negroes are reduced’ 
(Dickson 1789, 24). It epitomised the slaves’ status as commodious 
instruments of labour, their debasement and their brutishness, their 
detachment from the honourable, industrious elements of labour, and 
so the ways in which they had been ‘unhumanised’ by enslavement.
The labour they were forced to perform was not creative or improv-
ing. Abolitionists described how the nature of the slaves’ servitude 
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meant that their minds were in a continual state of depression, and 
they lived without any expectations in life or any hope of riches, power, 
honour or fame. The severity of their servitude meant that
we cannot be surprised if a sullen gloomy stupidity should be the 
leading mark of their character; or if they should appear inferiour 
to those, who do not only enjoy the invaluable blessings of free-
dom, but have every prospect before their eyes, that can allure 
them to exert their faculties. (Clarkson 1786, 166–7) 
For Clarkson, the slaves’ minds as well as their bodies had been broken 
by slavery. They were not encouraged to innovate or to save their labour 
and any attempt to do so would have been read as laziness and a desire 
to save their own labour at their master’s expense (Dickson 1789, 25). 
As a result, Dickson declared, slaves were very seldom inventive and 
failed to seek property. The abolitionists argued that being compelled to 
work without pay made the slaves stubborn; their genius and inclina-
tion were not consulted, and ‘they have no interest in their own labour, 
therefore the [sic] are careless of its success; no person consults their ease, 
therefore they consult it themselves, and are lazy’ (Dickson 1789, 56–7).
Having left the fi g trees of their Lockean state of nature behind, they 
were taken to be incapable of exercising their property in the person 
through an interest in their own labour. For the defenders of slavery, 
the slaves lacked self-possession, but the slave ‘has the advantage of the 
servant, in having, in his own person, a better security against excessive 
cruelty than the restraint of the most rigid laws, and that is, his master’s 
interest’ (Othello 1790, 15). Drawing on the constructions of slave own-
ing as corrupt and aristocratic, Dickson asked the question ‘If a regard 
to interest prevent not the gamester, the drunkard or the sensualist 
from ruining their fortunes, why is it expected to work such wonders in 
defence of the slave?’ (Dickson 1789, 37). From both perspectives, slaves 
had no interest in their own labour power, and no possibility of being 
eligible for freedom. Once they were fi gured as lacking even an interest 
in themselves, they could more easily be struck out of the human race. 
It was a mark of their extreme dependence that their security relied on 
another person’s interest in them, rather than resting on their interest in 
their own labour, underpinned by a property in their own person. Slaves 
were held in slavery, and as James Cropper put it in 1823 (Gladstone 
1824, 94), ‘in the language of the an old abolitionist, I will only say, if a 
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man had stolen my horse, it would be no satisfaction to me if he proved 
that he fed him well and worked him easily; I want the restoration of my 
horse, and the Slave of his own person’.
PERPETUAL DRUDGERY AND HABITUAL INDUSTRY
This lack of an interest in their own labour not only meant that slaves 
were stigmatised as lazy, but that they were understood to be unci-
vilised by the work they were forced to do. Exhausting, hard, repetitive 
labour reinforced their apparent inferiority. The abolitionists described 
how slaves were beaten and tortured, badly clothed, and miserably 
fed. Women worked in the fi elds until late in pregnancy, and Dickson 
told his readers how during his time as secretary to the Governor of 
Barbados he was particularly astonished to see ‘drivers curse both them 
and their squalling brats, when they were suckling them’ (Dickson 1789, 
12). Children were employed picking vines and insects for the chick-
ens, then later joined little gangs for weeding and collecting grass until 
they were ready to join the great gang, ‘a transition which compleats 
the hardship and misery of a fi eld negro’ (Dickson 1789, 12). Labour 
demands were particularly heavy in the four to six months of the sugar 
harvest, and each slave worked around seventy-two hours a week dur-
ing crop time. The proslavery writers responded to these accounts of 
overwork by insisting that God had cast humans in various and dif-
ferent moulds, that the estates in Jamaica were well-regulated, and 
the work of the slaves was ‘perfectly moderate, proportioned to their 
strengths and abilities to perform it’ (Othello 1790, 16). Gilbert Franck-
lyn, a proslavery polemicist who owned estates in Antigua and Tobago, 
suggested that the slave’s ‘severest task is not equal to the daily labour 
of an husbandman in England’ (Francklyn 1789, 230). 
While contesting this picture of comfortable and humane employ-
ment, the antislavery campaigners were aware that not all slaves per-
formed debasing, back-breaking fi eld work, and that some people who 
were not slaves carried out ‘uncivilised’ and unreasonable labour. This 
meant that the antislavery writers had to confront some of the com-
plexities of what it meant for individuals to have an interest in their 
own labour. William Dickson, writing about conditions under slavery in 
Barbados, emphasised the hierarchies operating within slavery. Some 
slaves worked as porters, boatmen and fi shermen in the coastal towns, 
and he claimed that drivers, watchmen and other mechanics and 
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domestics lived in comparative ease and plenty. There were also skilled 
slaves who ‘worked out’, fi nding employment for themselves and giv-
ing their owners a weekly return out of their earnings. The custom of 
slaves receiving payments for their labour was quite widespread in the 
Americas, especially for skilled and industrial labour. Many slaves on 
the sugar estates in Louisiana, for example, received cash payments for 
woodcutting and harvest work as regular bonuses, and others received 
rewards for good conduct or loyalty (Bolland 1995). Slave hiring acted 
as an alternative to manumission in diffi cult economic and politi-
cal circumstances and helped to keep the slave system viable. At the 
same time, it was a strain on social relations because the agreement 
between master, slave and hirer was ‘intrinsically and idiosyncratically 
triangular’, dividing ownership and control into separate spheres ‘with 
awkward temporal boundaries’ (Martin 2004, 2–3). Those who hired 
others’ slaves regarded themselves as temporarily entitled to the full 
prerogatives of mastery, including force and punishment, and this could 
sometimes work against the owners’ long-term property interests in 
their slaves and their future labour and earnings. Jonathan D. Martin 
sees this as opening up opportunities for confl ict, distrust and com-
petition between managers and hirers, giving slaves some leverage for 
subversion and negotiation. Managers and slaves were ‘continuously 
enmeshed in exchanging goods for services’ (Turner 1995, 5). This meant 
that some slaves were able to sell their labour power, and actively nego-
tiate their own hire, and so could be understood to be exercising an 
interest in their own labour. They participated in decisions about where 
they would be hired out, and sometimes enquired into the character of 
their potential temporary master, exercising some infl uence over the 
course of their lives. The success of hiring arrangements rested to some 
extent on the slaves’ co-operation and willing participation. Their own-
ers’ plans could be defeated by slaves who ran away, or burnt down the 
hirer’s kitchen or threatened to fl ee, and hirers resented any attempts 
to restrict their mastery. Martin argues that, to an extent, slave hiring 
attenuated the absolute domination on which slavery rested (Martin 
2004, 5) and disrupted relations of total dependence. Slave masters 
showed themselves to be prepared to enter contracts, and so as ready to 
‘give something away, including some incidents of their mastery’ (Axtell 
2015, 288). Slaves who were self-hired artisans and industrial workers 
worked alongside white workers in iron forges and furnaces, and they 
were relatively privileged as long as there was a shortage of their skills. 
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As we have seen, Dickson made clear that as carpenters, locksmiths, 
musicians, silversmiths and watchmakers, ‘the negroes show no want 
of genius’ (Dickson 1789, 73). 
Some of these black skilled workers were regarded as having a dif-
ferent relationship to their labour, and to some extent escaped the 
pervasive and damaging stereotype of the lazy slave. Enslaved swim-
mers, for example, who cleared rivers of the debris that could ensnare 
fi shing nets, and dived down to set explosives, were in the ambiguous 
position of ‘privileged exploitation’ (Dawson 2006, 1348). They earned 
some respite from work in the fi elds, some material rewards and mon-
etary bonuses, worked largely free of direct white supervision, and were 
permitted to drink alcohol. The swimmers and divers exercised skills 
learned in Africa and so were diffi cult to replace, and slave owners 
found themselves in ‘a continually negotiated relationship’ with their 
slaves, having to concede some autonomy to the divers, and recognise 
their ‘sterling manhood’ as well as their discretion, skill and ambition 
(Dawson 2006, 1352–3). Hiring as a practice revealed the ways in which 
slaves were both labour and capital, people and property, and the ten-
sions generated by those dualities (Martin 2004, 17). This continual 
negotiation of dependence and independence, security and personal 
liberty, masculinity and reward, meant that slaves were claiming some 
title over their own bodies and labour time, and slave labour was being 
treated as ‘a bundle of property rights that could be redistributed as 
liquid capital assets’ (Axtell 2015, 289). As Axtell argues, this opened up 
the possibility of slave self-purchases, and of freed people moving their 
survival strategies and their willingness to work into the open market, 
seeking their own property, using the tools of capitalism to undermine 
slave racial capitalism.
The negotiated relationships and enmeshed exchanges between 
slaves, employers and the market continued in slave provisioning 
grounds which generated surpluses and plugged the slaves into the 
cash economy. Slaves were allotted parcels of land where they could 
grow tree crops, vegetables, herbs and root crops, and take any surplus 
produce to the local markets. ‘Negroes’, according to Francklyn, came to 
market every Sunday and brought with them ‘all kinds of roots, greens, 
herbs, and fruits, capons, fowls, pigs, pork, goats, fi sh, grass, wood, &c. 
for sale’ (Francklyn 1789, 197). ‘Othello’ was quick to point out that in 
1787, three quarters of all the circulating silver coin in Jamaica was cal-
culated to be in possession of the slaves (Othello 1790, 17). The slave 
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plots were a way for the owners to supply wages in kind, and to offl oad 
onto the slaves ‘responsibility for fuelling the labour used on the estates’ 
(Turner 1995, 3), subjecting them to the vagaries of drought, hurricane, 
and variable land quality, and demonstrating the limits of the master’s 
interest in their security. They were required to work on their own land 
on Sunday, so that they had no day of rest. Their plots were cultivated 
using slash and burn techniques that produced high yields for a few 
years, but required intensive weeding. The work on the plots was hard, 
involving cutting down heavy timber, clearing the land, and travelling 
long distances to market (Sheridan 1995, 58). Theft, pilfering and loose 
livestock caused constant problems for the slaves on their provisioning 
grounds, and much of the ‘surplus’ they managed to accumulate went 
on buying pickled and salt fi sh to try to supplement a diet that was 
defi cient in protein and fat.
For the defenders of slavery, the provision grounds offered the slaves 
as much land as they were willing to work, and a reasonable amount 
of time for the purpose. Their vision of the slave allotments matches 
Peckard’s picture of the African sitting under the shade of his vine and 
fi g tree in a state of pure nature. Francklyn described how the slave 
lived ‘in full enjoyment of his house, his family, his live stock, and his 
cultivated spot of ground, in safety’ (Francklyn 1789, 229). The produce, 
the proslavery writers insisted, was suffi cient for their own consump-
tion, to sell, and to feed their stock. The slaves were permitted to raise 
swine, goats, poultry and all manner of livestock ‘from which those who 
are industriously inclined lay by considerable sums of money’ (Othello 
1790, 17). In this context, the defenders of slavery assumed that the 
slaves were exercising an interest in their own labour, building up their 
own networks of trade, and dealing with each other in ‘a commercial 
light’. They were able to produce their own food crops, largely unsuper-
vised, and they organised their own subsistence production and inter-
nal marketing system. In Jamaica, slaves were allowed some time off for 
cultivation under the Consolidated Act of Jamaica 1792 and the Slave 
Act of 1816, which allocated twenty-six days in the year to cultivation, 
and decreed that no slave should be compelled to perform estate labour 
on a Sunday. Slaves paid each other wages, and by 1832, twenty-seven 
per cent of Jamaica’s total agricultural product came from the slaves’ 
provision grounds and was the product of wage labour. By selling food 
they had grown in the market, slaves became sellers engaged in mar-
ket transactions, making both agreements between adults and claims 
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to property in their moveable goods. People of colour were trading on 
their own account, taking an entrepreneurial approach to freedom and 
entering ‘a hostile world as racially marked others with something to 
buy or sell’ (Axtell 2015, 293). Slaves in Jamaica and elsewhere were 
‘bursting the bonds of the coerced labour economy’ by participating in 
the capitalist economy, rather than merely serving it from the outside 
(Turner 1995, 46). 
This economic participation meant that it was not always straight-
forward for the abolitionist accounts to distinguish between slavery and 
freedom where some slaves were paid for part of their forced labour, 
and some free labourers were subject to coercion and discrimination 
(Bolland 1995, 143). Provision grounds, trade networks and the differ-
ent forms of wages paid for labour ‘all contributed to generating status 
differentials between the slaves’, with some able to exercise a degree of 
control over their own labour power and through their own industri-
ousness claim the basis of self-possession. Others, the ‘poorer sort of 
Negroes’, were fi gured as having only what was given to them, remain-
ing in the savage state, without the ‘habitual industry’ that could have 
made them comparatively rich (Mullin 1995, 75–8). In their debates 
about the slaves’ and masters’ interest in the labour of the enslaved, 
the defenders of slavery and the abolitionists reconfi gured the division 
between the skilled and the unskilled. They hinged it on the possibility 
of the individual being able to exercise an interest in their own labour, 
and on having that interest recognised. As Axtell argues, the practices 
of slave hiring and of the provision grounds shifted the ground away 
from seeing slaves as absolute units of production towards understand-
ing them ‘as divisible bundles of marketable interests’, some of which 
unpicked the tight stitching of the master’s underlying property in his 
slave (Axtell 2015, 287). Slaves who could market their own goods 
might also be capable of selling their own labour time, and of using the 
rules of private property to their own advantage. For some, participat-
ing in the market could ‘become a strategy of empowerment, a way to 
gain resources and rebuild ties to a larger social world’ (Axtell 2015, 
294). At the same time, as Martin reminds us, hired slaves were always 
slaves, and the fl exibility that hiring gave to masters allowed them to 
convert their human property into cash crops while they ‘lived comfort-
ably off the annuities provided by the slaves they rented out’ (Martin 
2004, 192). The internal tensions between mastery and property gener-
ated the space for some stories of escape, but the slaveholders’ ‘vulgar 
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plea of private property in a Slave’ (Sharp 1769, 40), both as labour and as 
capital, continued to hold sway. 
THE IDEA OF LABOUR
This mixture of labour and capital, person and property was not quite 
enough to distinguish a slave from a servant. The lands in Barbados 
were originally cleared and cultivated by white indentured servants. The 
labourers signed a formal legal contract, but the alternative to inden-
tured labour was often punishment for vagrancy or vagabondage, and a 
kidnapping system was well organised (Miles 1987, 77). Servants were 
required to produce a pass in order to be allowed to leave the planta-
tion, and they had to obtain their master’s consent to marry. They could 
not vote, trade or make cash savings, and they were subject to corporal 
punishment. These elements of control were part of a wider strategy by 
the planters ‘to demonstrate that the servant was not a free person under 
contractual obligations, but primarily a capital investment with prop-
erty characteristics’ (Beckles 1996, 576). In 1780, many of them were still 
retained on the estates ‘where they obtain a very scanty subsistence by 
cultivating, with their own hands, little odd skirts of land which they hold 
as tenants’ (Dickson 1789, 40). They worked the ground without using 
slave labour, and poor white women walked for miles loaded with their 
produce to towns where they exchanged it for European goods. The 
rest of the poor whites subsisted by fi shing, mechanic employments 
(aligned with physical labour), and keeping retail shops, some of which 
bought stolen goods from the slaves ‘whom they encourage to plunder 
their owners, of every thing that is portable’ (Dickson 1789, 41). Some 
of them, according to Dickson, depended on robbing the slaves for their 
subsistence. There was in Barbados ‘a redundancy of white men’ and 
their wages as servants on the plantations or as clerks in the towns 
were pitifully low. Their diets were coarse, and their livings were pre-
carious. ‘Hence’, Dickson argued, ‘some of the book-keepers, distillers 
and drivers become worthless and abandoned; and in truth, as unwor-
thy of trust as the negroes themselves’ (Dickson 1789, 42). Such trust 
was a prerequisite for self-government, rational labour and incorpora-
tion into the social contract. Private property and market transactions 
might have held out some hope to the enslaved people able to trade on 
their own account, but for the white working poor their participation 
in ‘masterless capitalism’ (Axtell 2015, 293) and freelance hustling only 
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served to confi rm their worthlessness and redundancy. Even those who 
were shielded by whiteness had a worth that could be abandoned, an 
essential precariousness that could take them outside the parameters 
of trust and humanity when they lost an interest in their own labour. 
They had lost their inner worth and made themselves unworthy of the 
possession of the person entrusted to them by virtue of their racialisa-
tion. Slaves who hired themselves out and poor white workers could 
all be ‘unhumanised’ by idleness, but the fl uidity of these categories is 
undercut by Dickson’s clear assumption that the ‘negroes’ were inher-
ently unworthy of trust, whatever their relationship to their own labour 
or to the market and however much cash they had in their pockets. 
In the arguments between the abolitionists and those who defended 
slavery, the question of unfree labour was complicated. Being forced to 
labour was not in itself enough to constitute slavery. For Clarkson, 
thus then may that slavery, in which only the idea of labour is 
included, be perfectly equitable, and the delinquent will always 
receive his punishment as a man; whereas in that, which addi-
tionally includes the idea of property, . . . the delinquent must 
previously change his nature, and become a brute. (Clarkson 
1786, 106) 
It was possible for those who were forced to work to maintain an interest 
in their labour, and not to be unhumanised. Slavery as hard labour could 
be a punishment that allowed individuals to keep their self-possession 
if not intact, then at least reclaimable. Clarkson distinguished between 
a proper slave ‘whose actions are not at his own disposal’ because his 
liberty had been bought and appropriated, and the slave condemned 
to the oar, to the fortifi cations or to other public works whose ‘liberty 
is not appropriated’ (Clarkson 1786, 248). These very Lockean terms of 
disposal and appropriation refl ected the abolitionists’ insistence that 
human liberty was beyond the possibility of either sale or purchase, and 
that men could bear nothing worse than the loss of liberty. It followed 
that ‘as nature made every man’s body and mind his own; it is evident 
that no man can justly be consigned to slavery, without his own consent’ 
(Clarkson 1786, 48–9). The crux came when ‘masters claim a right to the 
perpetual service of a man, without being able to produce an authentic 
written contract; for, without a voluntary contract, there cannot be ANY 
RIGHT’ (Sharp 1769, 138). 
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Both slaves and servants could be required to provide perpetual ser-
vice, and the proslavery writers made much of the parallels between a 
slave and an indentured servant who, they argued, ‘is as much a slave to 
his master as the negro in the West-Indies is to his; and not infrequently 
more unmercifully treated in every other respect’ (Othello 1790, 15). 
They pointed out that no man who was compelled by necessity to 
labour for his daily bread, or who ‘for a scanty subsistence fi nds himself 
forced to submit to the will and caprice of another, can be said to be free’ 
(Francklyn 1789, 13). Every man was deprived of his freedom to some 
degree, and ‘[e]very deprivation of freedom is a species of servitude or 
slavery’ (Francklyn 1789, 14). After that, the question of where to draw 
the line between slavery and freedom was, for those in favour of slavery, 
merely a question of opinion and custom. The only material difference 
between slaves and the poor of other countries ‘is that they possess some-
what less of personal liberty, and have the degrading title of slaves’. Real 
happiness, Innes insisted, was not affected by ‘such trifl ing distinctions’. 
Slaves were compelled to submit to the commands of a master, ‘but the 
iron hand of necessity is equally compulsory on the poor of every country’ 
(Innes 1792, 12–13). There was little in West India slavery but the name, he 
went on, and this ‘to the African is nothing; for he is born in slavery, and 
at the disposal of a merciless and barbarous tyrant, secure of neither life 
nor property’ (Innes 1792, 13). Freedom, in the proslavery discourse, was 
sometimes less desirable than slavery, and unevenly distributed between 
Africans and Europeans, and between rich and poor, rather than being 
at the core of a fundamentally shared humanity. In their focus on com-
pulsion, they drew on the opposition between those for whom slavery 
‘would represent a demeaning, traumatic loss and those for whom it was 
supposed to be natural’ (Nyquist 2013, 27). Against the antislavery insis-
tence on individual autonomy and inner worth, these proslavery thinkers 
used the idea of freedom from arbitrary power to position slavery as part 
of a continuum of subjection to force. This move blurred the line between 
involuntary and voluntary slavery and contested the abolitionist argu-
ment that freedom is only ever given up by force (Nyquist 2013, 351). 
In the mid-eighteenth century, anyone who served another for wages 
was legally a servant, and could be punished by imprisonment if they left 
before the end of their fi xed term. Servants were paid wages and served 
by the year, but were subject to strict legal controls. Employers were able 
to call on the criminal courts to enforce oral agreements. The ‘compulsory 
labour’ clause required those without visible means of support to work 
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for whoever required their services. Apprentices were expected to live in 
the master’s household and were not paid wages for their work. Masters 
were legally obliged to train their apprentices in the techniques of their 
craft, and in return an apprentice was legally obliged to obey his master, 
and was not entitled to absent himself from service. As Steinfeld argues, 
servants and apprentices were understood to have ‘turned themselves 
over to their masters completely, had placed themselves in their masters’ 
hands – both as to control over their movements and persons and as to 
responsibility for their well-being’ (Steinfeld 1991, 40). Steinfeld charac-
terises this as the partial juridical merger of the servant into the master. 
The servant’s area of personal determination was severely restricted by 
his employment relation, and he was subject to the jurisdiction of his 
master (Steinfeld 1991, 59). English servants had to secure their mas-
ter’s permission to hire themselves out at harvest, for example, and they 
were forced to hand over a proportion of their outside earnings to their 
master. The hirer of the labourer had the right to control, use and enjoy 
the property of the person he hired for a specifi ed time or purpose 
(Steinfeld 1991, 80). The servant leased himself out to his master. In 
the process, the servants, like their masters’ wives, became subcontrac-
tors in the social contract, without full autonomy, because ‘none of them 
bore full legal responsibility for him or herself’ (Steinfeld 1991, 56). They 
inhabited the problem-space of the mobile border between subperson-
hood and humanity. 
This was diffi cult ground for the abolitionists when it came to the 
question of perpetual service, and the distinction between slavery and 
servitude. After all, as Wilberforce put it, their aim was to see ‘the harsh-
ness of their present bondage being transformed into the mildness 
of patriarchal servitude’ (Debate 1792, 10). The antislavery campaign-
ers agreed that there was nothing in the nature of the sheer exhaust-
ing labour, even when exacted through physical coercion, that made a 
slave a slave. Masters had a right to perpetual service where they could 
produce a written, authentic, voluntary contract (Sharp 1769, 138), and 
trace the duty back to its source. When the proslavery lobby tried to 
argue that the condition of the poor in England was the same as that 
of the slaves in the West Indies, the abolitionists responded by arguing 
that they were failing to make a crucial distinction: ‘they can plainly 
mean by the word slave, nothing more than what is commonly meant 
by the word drudge, or a person who toils hard, and lives on a poor diet’ 
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(Dickson 1789, 50). For abolitionists, the distinction between slavery 
and drudgery hinged on consent. 
The abolitionists distinguished between servant and slave on the 
basis of individual control over labour power. Sailors on the slave ships, 
peasants and indentured servants all lived lives that were close to slav-
ery in toiling hard, living on poor diets and being subject to violence. 
When these groups of people resisted, they fought for wages, and 
for recognition of their self-possession in the form of a contract that 
implied they could be trusted. The British peasant, Dickson concluded, 
did not suffer half the miseries of slavery because he could choose and 
change his employer, and had the opportunity to rest on a Sunday. 
Unlike the slave, he had some respite from working in bad weather 
and on long winter evenings, and his family could not be deliberately 
separated from him. Richard Hillier argued that the people of England 
were inured to labour and did not consider it a hardship, but they were 
accustomed to having an interest in it, and receiving a reward for it. 
Hillier contrasted this hard labour to what he called the ‘nakedness of 
slavery’ (Hillier 1791, 8) and to the usurpation and tyranny of the slave-
holders. It was not the labour of slavery that disturbed the abolition-
ists, but the lack of a written, voluntary contract between the parties, 
making their relationship indistinguishable from subjection to arbitrary 
power. In the abolitionists’ selective worldview, which stressed the ini-
tial essential injury of being bought and sold over the ongoing nature 
of the exploitation, debt bondage was acceptable. Free-born citizens 
who ‘from the various contingencies of fortune, had become so poor as 
to have recourse for their support to the service of the rich’ could fi nd 
themselves in a situation Clarkson defi ned as voluntary slavery. Where 
there was an express contract between the parties, the servant could 
demand his discharge if he was ill-used. He was treated ‘with more 
humanity than those, whom we usually distinguish in our language 
by the appellation of Slaves’ (Clarkson 1786, 4). He had the prospect 
of liberty, an eligibility for freedom, and a possibility of a future, which 
‘must have been a continual source of the most pleasing refl ections, 
and have greatly sweetened the draught, even of the most bitter slavery’ 
(Clarkson 1786, 20). Being poor and working hard were not enough to 
make someone a slave. 
British miners, Hillier asserted, would not thank anyone for calling 
them underground slaves or for comparing them to Africans. Like the 
sailors defi ning themselves against their slave cargo, the differences 
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between wage workers and slaves were central to abolitionists’ under-
standings of identity. Hillier recommended an experiment:
The ladies in the West Indies have a happy dexterity in slipping 
off their shoes, and beating the heels of them about the heads of 
their negroes. Now, with a very little practice upon your bed post 
or dressing table, you will make a tolerable profi ciency in the art. 
If ever afterwards you have an opportunity of visiting Newcastle 
or Kingswood, put your experiment in practice upon the head of 
the fi rst collier you meet, and depend upon it, you will soon arrive 
at an absolute certainty about the comparative happiness of a 
free miner, and a slave. (Hillier 1791, 8) 
For the antislavery writers, it was the legal limit on the use of the 
force that distinguished the slave from the servant, the miner, the 
peasant or the sailor. The life of the peasant was not structured by 
force in the same way as the slave’s, because ‘the peasant may defend 
his person against any aggressor; at the negro’s peril does he lift his 
hand against the meanest white man, who may chuse, in the absence 
of whites, to attack him’ (Dickson 1789, 53). This layer of outsider-
ness, of lacking protection, was also about patriarchy. The persons 
and chastity and of the peasant’s wife and daughter were effectively 
guarded from violence, while
Before the negro’s face, whenever his owner or manager thinks fi t, 
his wife and daughter may be exposed naked and scourged by the 
ruthless hand of a driver: and will it be affi rmed that their chastity 
is never violated with absolute impunity? (Dickson 1789, 53) 
For a woman, becoming a wife who was bound to her husband as a 
dependant negated her slave status. Her husband became her trusted 
protector within the limits of the law rather than an arbitrary monarch 
who ruled with passion and caprice. For both husband and wife, this 
was the opposite of abandonment. Freedom for the ‘negro’s wife’ meant 
coverture, while her husband was assured a property not only in him-
self but also in his wife, underpinned by freedom of contract (Stanley 
1998, 59). His interest extended from his own labour to his wife’s. The 
peasant was a drudge who worked hard and lived on a poor diet, but 
through his interest in his labour he was offered some protection by the 
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social contract: ‘In two signifi cant words, the peasant is a FREE-MAN; 
the negro is a SLAVE’ (Dickson 1789, 53). 
For the proslavery writers, these words were much less signifi cant. 
Being in a position where they must work or starve meant that the 
freedom of the poor was no more than nominal, an ‘empty name’ that 
would not feed, clothe or comfort them. It might, Francklyn conceded, 
increase the misery of a poor Englishman if he did not consider himself 
free, but a Negro ‘who never had an idea of such a state of freedom’ may 
be as happy as any other poor man (Francklyn 1789, 229). For these 
thinkers, it was poverty that created lack of freedom, and it was depen-
dence that was racialised and associated with slavery. The defenders 
of slavery emphasised the ways in which the European poor labourer 
could not consider himself absolutely free, or equally protected by the 
law. He could be sent to the house of correction, whipped and sen-
tenced to hard labour for a month for poaching. He was not allowed 
to leave the parish he was settled in, and he was ‘compellable to work’ 
(Francklyn 1789, 201). The labourer was not entitled to hunt, shoot or 
fi sh without being ‘subject to be kept to hard labour in the workhouse, 
or be whipped till his body be bloody’ (Francklyn 1789, 201). It was his 
poverty, his place in the social hierarchy that compromised his freedom 
and his interest in his labour, and the diffi culty of subsisting that meant 
he was held in a state of servitude and bondage. If slavery was univer-
sal, the genus of the state of man, the different kinds of servitude were 
‘distinct species’, and equally impossible to eradicate. 
The defenders of slavery stressed the moderation of the slave own-
ers and the limits to their power over their slaves, and emphasised 
the suffering of the poor closer to home. They challenged the moral 
legitimacy of the abolitionists’ ‘specious pretence of tender anxiety in 
the cause of humanity’ (Francklyn 1789, 2), and argued that there was 
no need to ‘seek abroad’ for it ‘as long as we can use our own human-
ity with propriety amongst ourselves’ (Othello 1790, 39). The ways in 
which individuals sought to transform themselves into moral beings 
were contested. The proper use of our humanity was to express a tender 
regard for our fellow creatures by helping the sick and infi rm, the poor 
and the aged. Their suffering, Francklyn argued, had been disregarded 
by all sorts of people who ‘have been incited to interest themselves in 
the visionary distresses of the Negroes in Africa’ (Francklyn 1789, 18) 
instead of focusing on ‘the swarms of beggars, vagrants, thieves, and 
real objects of charity’ (Othello 1790, 38) on their own streets. This 
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proslavery discourse saw no great advantage in being free to sell your 
labour power, in suffering from the pain and misery of the ‘extremity of 
cold’ of Northern Europe (Francklyn 1789, 230), ending up as part of the 
divided and marginalised ‘motley crew’ of anonymous, landless, poor 
and mobile workers described by Linebaugh and Rediker (Rediker and 
Linebaugh 2002) and subject to the vagaries of ‘the creative destruction 
of masterless democratic capitalism’ (Axtell 2015, 293). The distinctions 
that both the apologists for slavery and the abolitionists made between 
the ‘poorer sort of Negroes’ and those who were habituated to industry 
or ‘industriously inclined’ were crucial in defi ning who was eligible for 
freedom. In abolitionist discourse, the possibilities of being worthless, 
abandoned and debased were in some ways brought frighteningly close 
by being made open to everyone, refl ecting the ‘democratic’ elements of 
masterless capitalism, and made contingent on bad fortune.
CONCLUSION
The hardening racial categories that underpinned the social con-
tract made clear that the peasant was a free man and the ‘negro’ was 
a slave. In the abolitionist imaginary, racial others were not fi gured 
as naturally incapable of ingenuity or of improvement, or as perma-
nently condemned to the condition of nature, but they were fi gured 
as lacking in industry and an interest in their own labour (Goldberg 
2002, 45). Their lack of industry in turn meant that they lacked the 
prerequisites to make them eligible for freedom, and for belonging to 
the state. Slaves, Dickson argued, could not bear any great and sud-
den alteration of their condition. As we have seen, to have any hope 
of belonging, ‘[t]hey must be made sensible of their value and dig-
nity as men and, must be converted to Christianity, before they can be 
expected to act properly as freemen’. Otherwise, idleness, drunkenness 
and violence would arise from ‘brutish fi eld negroes’ being suddenly 
raised to affl uence and converted to freedom (Dickson 1789, 91). Even 
for the abolitionists, the slaves were fi gured as lacking an interest in 
themselves, the self-possession that grounded proper, limited, mascu-
line and Christian freedom. Such self-proprietorship was incompatible 
with the ‘brutishness’ that they could not escape from once they had 
been constructed as ‘negroes’. Slaves had no security, and so no real 
property in their labour or control over their labour power. Even the 
industriously inclined could only aspire to a precarious grasp on their 
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labour, a privileged exploitation that did not translate into freedom, 
or into a government that would afford security to their acquisitions 
(Clarkson 1786, 60). As a result, an ‘end to slavery often ushered in not 
freedom, but bondage in its various, adaptable guises’ (Walvin 1996, 
179), and it is this adaptability that has made slavery so diffi cult to 
defi ne and to disentangle from other forms of exploitation. 
The abolitionists’ arguments about freedom, rationality and shared 
humanity could not help them to escape the malleability of bondage, as 
it resurfaced in questions about the command over labour, trustworthi-
ness, the appearance of inferior capacities, and the division between the 
industrious and the idle. They continued to be haunted by the spectre 
of the mob. Free wage earners who were treated as if they were mere 
brutes, worthless and abandoned white men, debased slaves who 
worked like cattle and ‘wretched Africans’ who shed the blood of oth-
ers subdued their abolitionism and tempered their notions of freedom. 
Their ideas about labour were inextricable from what it meant to be a 
man, to make your mind and body your own, and to engage with the 
world as someone who could defend your person against an aggressor 
and make contracts with others on the basis of trust. For the abolition-
ists, the ‘nakedness of slavery’ lay in the arbitrary power of the planters, 
the moment of unfreedom when self-proprietorship was snatched away 
from a person. The limits of their opposition to forced labour, their insis-
tence that the social contract could distinguish clearly between the free 
man and the slave and their own distinctions between the ‘poorer sort 
of Negroes’ and the ‘industriously inclined’ meant that their antislavery 
strategies focused on rescuing those who had improved themselves, 
and not on imagining the continuing inequalities of what it meant to be 
either a ‘negro’ or a drudge, or a voluntary slave. 
The antislavery writings of the late eighteenth century make clear 
that the idea of rational labour is inseparable from the state, and free-
dom is inextricable from self-government. In their attempts to differen-
tiate between free and unfree labour, the ideas of contract and consent 
have to bear an almost unbearable weight. Not being a slave is about 
not being bought, transferred and sold. Non-slavery looks like a bare 
and formal freedom, a contract that brings only a partial incorpora-
tion into civil society and the state, a domination that is patriarchal 
but not arbitrary, labour that is hard and exhausting but not perpetual. 
The social relations of power remained virtually the same. The status of 
slaves would continue to inform their relationship to the state because 
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their various freedoms and their attempts to make their own lives more 
tolerable were all subject to the constant threat of violation. It was based 
on rights ‘which were readily denied, infringed or transgressed’ (Walvin 
1996, 156). Slaves could only ever aspire or expect to be ‘freelance hus-
tlers’, migrant labourers, not fully incorporated into civil society or the 
state. Labour, with its connections to autonomy, morality and honour, 
created its own registers of difference that were riveted into the more 
solid, racially infl ected bodies identifi ed by Wheeler (2000). These hier-
archies of labour that defi ned belonging and membership were also 
deeply gendered, and the next chapter goes on to explore how women’s 
subjection fi ts into the mobile borderlands between subpersonhood, 
humanity and property.
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Chapter 7
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN: 
LOOPHOLES OF RETREAT?
This chapter focuses on gender and slavery, and in particular on the 
rhetoric of thinking about wives as slaves in both the pre- and post-
abolition contexts, and in the different and parallel conversations 
about empire that went on through the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. In the process of transforming humanity into moral beings, 
gender as a register of difference played out in complex ways that trou-
bled the concept of personhood as a status and redrew some of the 
boundaries of enslavability. The place of women within the discourses 
of debasement and inferiority was part of both the universality and 
the fragmenting of humanity, pulled in both directions by ideas about 
nature, progress and civilisation. The borders between free and unfree 
labour, labour and capital, persons and property were even more unde-
cided, and more heavily policed, for women. The distinction between 
honourable labour and drudgery, and questions of autonomy, morality 
and honour were highly gendered and mediated through marriage as 
well as wage contracts. The ‘vision of useful men and protected wives’ 
meant that wage and marriage agreements mutually reinforced one 
another (Cope 2004, 10) and enforced a particular and gendered con-
ception of freedom. This chapter explores some of the silences and 
occlusions that surrounded women’s experience of sexual subjection 
under slavery, their agency and power under conditions of ‘oppres-
sive freedom’, and the spaces they inhabited and experienced as loop-
holes of retreat and as stifl ing prisons. The complications of home, the 
‘collapsed geography’ of the plantation household, and the contested 
meanings of the private/public divide require us to think about the 
power relations within the household, between women and men, but 
also between women and women living in constant contact with one 
another (Glymph 2008). 
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MARRIAGE AND SLAVERY
John and Mary Hylas were slaves who were brought over to England 
in 1754, and were married with the consent of their respective master 
and mistress. In 1766, Mary was sent away to Barbados without her 
husband’s consent, and John Hylas sued her master, John Newton 
(UCL, 2017a), for damages, claiming that he had kidnapped Mary 
and resold her into slavery in Barbados. The court found in Hylas’s 
favour, and the defendant was bound to bring Mary back and restore 
her to her husband within six months, and was charged with one 
shilling damages (Paugh 2014, 630, Anon 1820). Mary Hylas was 
both enslaved and a feme covert, belonging to both her master and 
her husband. Cases involving married women were inherently prob-
lematic, and different from cases such as that of James Somerset in 
1772 where Lord Mansfi eld ruled that a slave landing in England 
‘falls under the protection of the laws, and so far becomes a freeman, 
though his master’s right to his service may possibly continue’ (Anon 
1820, 207). The Somerset case was a legal action against wrongful 
enslavement, and Lord Mansfi eld granted his habeas corpus petition. 
This ruling denied the right of Somerset’s master, Charles Stewart, 
a Virginian planter, to exercise the rights of a slaveholder over his 
servant (Blackburn 2013, 134). Mansfi eld affi rmed that being a slave 
elsewhere was not enough to mean that Somerset could be forcibly 
removed from England (Harris 2007, 447). Slave status was founded 
on positive law, and Mansfi eld’s ruling confi rmed that slavery ‘was 
an institution constrained by law’ (Harris 2007, 442). The case was 
widely interpreted as meaning that slavery was illegal in England and 
that slaves entering free territory were free, but slavery in the colonies 
was left intact and its legality was affi rmed. The reception and the 
legacies of the Somerset case were complex, but they tended to focus 
on Somerset’s autonomy and legal personhood asserted in the face 
of arbitrary power, and on the distinction between servant and slave 
that could be identifi ed by contract. These questions were more com-
plicated in the case of Mary Hylas and her ‘freedom suit’, which was 
brought by her husband, and which contained her freedom inside 
his. The Somerset ruling seemed to confi rm the boundaries of the 
zones of freedom and unfreedom, but in Hylas’s case the borders 
of contract were more mobile, and much closer to home. In arguing 
against Mary’s forcible seizure by her slave owner and for her return 
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to John Hylas, Granville Sharp ‘relied heavily on the assertion that 
man and wife should be regarded as a single, indivisible and utterly 
harmonious legal entity’ (Paugh 2014, 633). 
For enslaved women without the protection of a husband and the 
legal status of a wife, freedom and the status of personhood were more 
precarious, but less circumscribed. Mary Prince was a West Indian house-
hold slave originally from Bermuda who came with her owner to England 
in 1828, and her autobiographical History was published in London and 
Edinburgh in 1831, chronicling her enslavement to a series of abusive 
masters in the West Indies and her captivity in England (Wong 2001, 60). 
In England, Prince left her master John Wood and he returned to Antigua 
without her. From there he refused to manumit or sell her, so that she 
remained a slave elsewhere. In England, following the Somerset ruling, 
she was relatively free, but she could not return to Antigua as a free British 
subject. Returning to the Caribbean would have meant reverting to her 
slave status (Wong 2001, 60). The British courts did not have the power to 
force Wood to manumit her or to ensure her safe passage, because slavery 
was still legal in the plantation zone. Prince was trapped in the imperial 
space between freedom and slavery, but her owner kept claiming that 
Prince had chosen to leave his household and remain in England, ‘turn-
ing her agency into the very instrument of his continuing power over her’ 
(Wong 2001, 60). She was still his property, and his right to her service 
continued while slavery was an institution rooted in the law. 
Mary Prince emerges from her own History, heavily mediated by 
her editor Thomas Pringle and the amanuensis Elizabeth Strickland, 
both members of the Anti-Slavery Society, as a survivor, who was 
entrepreneurial, resourceful and resistant. As Wong points out, Prince 
was enslaved as chattel and the object of another’s property, and this 
‘radically complicates what can be rightly identifi ed as “agency”’, but 
does not remove the possibility of it altogether (Wong 2001, 61). Prince 
described how she took in washing and sold coffee, yams and other 
provisions to the captains of ships, sometimes buying a cheap hog on 
board a ship and selling it for double the money on shore. ‘I did not 
sit idling during the absence of my owners’, the History records, ‘for I 
wanted, by all honest means, to earn money to buy my freedom’ (Prince 
1831, 23). Prince’s vision of freedom was, like Somerset’s, about the 
difference between slave and servant. She wanted to be able to change 
her employer by giving notice and being hired by another one, and 
she demanded proper treatment and proper wages, in line with English 
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servants (Kaplan 2006, 202). Even in slavery, she negotiated her own 
sale to Mr Wood: ‘it was my own fault that I came under him, I was 
anxious to go’ (Prince 1831, 20), and she asked other masters to buy 
her. She went to Mr Burchell and asked him to buy her with money she 
had saved, in the hope of purchasing her freedom. Mr Wood refused to 
sell her (Prince 1831, 21), or to allow her to purchase her freedom: ‘if I 
wished to be free, I was free in England, and I might go and try what 
freedom would do for me, and be d_d’ (Prince 1831, 27). 
Mr and Mrs Wood constantly threatened to send her back to Antigua, 
or to turn her out of doors and let her provide for herself. Eventually, 
she took them at their word, ‘though I thought it very hard, after I had 
lived with them for thirteen years, and worked for them like a horse, to 
be driven out in this way, like a beggar’ (Prince 1831, 28). Mr and Mrs 
Wood rose up in a passion, opened the door and ordered Prince to leave 
in response to Prince’s protests about doing the laundry in hot water that 
exacerbated her rheumatism. ‘But I was a stranger, and did not know one 
door in the street from another, and was unwilling to go away’ (Prince 
1831, 27). This moment of being turned out of doors exemplifi es the com-
plications of what can be identifi ed as agency in the context of slavery. 
Wong emphasises Prince’s sense of dislocation and isolation in London, 
her dependent status as a foreigner and a stranger, and reads the Woods’ 
action as a violent act ‘that permanently severs her from Antigua and the 
possibility of a return home’ (Wong 2001, 62). It can be made to look like 
a turning point and a moment of resistance, but Prince was forced to 
‘remain within the oppressive terms of existence dictated by the Woods’ 
(Wong 2001, 63). 
In being thrown out of doors, Prince lost her home in England, and 
could not go back to Antigua without being re-enslaved. She could not 
be forcibly returned, but if she went back voluntarily she would become 
a slave again. Her freedom required ‘the loss of home’ (Wong 2001, 64). 
Prince was given the illusion of choice by the Woods’ violent action, 
but for her to exercise free will was impossible. She was driven out by 
her owners, and then countered this threat by ‘embracing the desperate 
freedom on being “turned out of doors”’ and publicising her story ‘in the 
face of her continuing dislocation and dispossession in England’ (Wong 
2001, 69–70). ‘Prince’s painful sense of dependency’, Wong argues, was 
‘fueled by her anxiety over the gendered signifi cance of her homeless-
ness and heightened by the possible appearance of vagrancy, poverty, 
and indecency’ (Wong 2001, 67). Without a husband to constrain and 
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restrain her freedom, and systematically denied the ability to return 
to her home, her freedom made her immediately suspect. Her agency 
in earning money and negotiating her own status was not enough to 
protect her against being considered a ‘vagabond whose mobility [was] 
criminalized’ (Wong 2001, 69). 
Gillian Whitlock is interested in how Prince found ‘room for manoeu-
vre in the text’ (Whitlock 2000, 20), where the diffi culty was that she 
could only speak by presenting herself as virtuous and domesticated, 
but she had to describe experiences that made virtue and domesticity 
impossible for her. Whitlock points to the gap between experience and 
telling the truth in Prince’s History, and in particular to the problem of 
speaking the truth about sexual abuse and control. The challenge for 
the black female abolitionist ‘was to be an agent without appearing to 
be one’, ‘to tell and not tell’, to bring home the degradation, brutality 
and violence of slavery without compromising her innocence and pro-
priety (Whitlock 2000, 21). Jenny Sharpe argues that in order to meet 
(or anticipate) the ‘antislavery requirement’ of the free and enlightened 
ex-slave, Prince had to exhibit the moral agency of a free individual 
(Sharpe 1996), and in particular of a respectable woman. She had to 
claim the gendered status of personhood and autonomy before they 
were available to her, and that meant trying to counter any appearance 
of vagrancy, poverty or indecency. She had to show her audience that 
she was not a freelance hustler, even though (or perhaps because) her 
enterprise and her earning were the source of her agency and power. 
There is clearly the possibility that Prince engaged in sexual relations 
with Wood to persuade him to bring her to England, and that could 
help to explain why he refused to manumit her once she was there, but 
both her engagement in transactional sex and her rape by her mas-
ter were written out of the story. Sharpe focuses on Prince’s efforts to 
earn enough money to purchase her freedom, and suggests that it is 
likely that she made an arrangement with Captain Abbot to serve as 
his housekeeper and concubine in exchange for her purchase price of 
$300. He lent her some cash to help her buy her freedom, ‘but when I 
could not get free he got it back again’ (Prince 1831, 23). The History 
was written to imply that the money was a loan, and it worked hard not 
to condone ‘such negotiations as a legitimate means to manumission’ 
(Sharpe 1996) in order to sustain its status as an abolitionist narrative. 
When her relationship with Abbot came to light in the text, Prince was 
required to recognise herself as a ‘great sinner’ which, as Sharpe argues, 
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‘codes the sexual availability of slave women as their moral weakness’ 
(Sharpe 1996). 
As a slave woman, Prince existed outside the structures of domes-
ticity but was expected to uphold its ideals (Sharpe 1996). She mar-
ried Daniel James, a free black man, who became a fellow member of 
the Moravian Church. The History is careful to point out that he was 
industrious and comfortably off, but they could not be married in the 
English Church because no free man could marry a slave woman 
(Prince 1831, 25). Mrs Wood was angered by the marriage and stirred 
up her husband to fl og Prince with a horsewhip. She was concerned, 
Prince concluded, that Prince would spend her time doing her hus-
band’s washing instead of hers. Prince wrote, ‘I had not much happi-
ness in my marriage, owing to my being a slave’ (Prince 1831, 25). Her 
marital status offered her no protection. She was abused by Mrs Wood 
for being married – ‘She did not lick me herself, but she got her hus-
band to do it for her, whilst she fretted the fl esh off my bones’ (Prince 
1831, 25) – but she always refused to sell her. Rauwerda argues that, in 
the end, ‘Prince has no agency with which to secure her manumission, 
possibly even as a result of her sexual relations’ (Rauwerda 2001, 402). 
Wood did not release her. Sharpe uses Prince’s History and her court 
testimony to question ‘the use of a model of self-autonomy for explain-
ing power relations under slavery’ (Sharpe 1996). 
Mary Prince’s story was ‘explosive’ because it brought slavery home, 
and gendered it as female. Prince, through the text, exhibited the 
innate longing for freedom that defi ned liberal personhood and was 
more often ascribed to male slaves (Kaplan 2006, 204).When Mrs Wood 
asked her angrily who had put freedom into her head, she replied, ‘To 
be free is very sweet’ (Prince 1831, 26). She had her own moment of 
fi ghting back after her old master, Mr Dowell, stripped himself naked 
and ordered her to wash him in a tub of water: ‘This was worse to me 
than all the licks. Sometimes when he called me to wash him I would 
not come, my eyes were so full of shame.’ He struck her severely when 
she dropped some plates and knives, and ‘at last I defended myself, for 
I thought it was high time to do so’. She told him she would not live 
with him because he was spiteful and ‘too indecent; with no shame for 
his servants, no shame for his own fl esh’. She ran away to a neighbour’s 
and stayed away all night, but then went home again, ‘not knowing 
what else to do’ (Prince 1831, 20). Throughout her History, Prince was 
presented ‘as someone demanding a better life, perhaps even in Britain, 
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not salvation through death’ (Kaplan 2006, 205). She emerges from the 
text as a woman who was present at her own making, negotiating and 
reworking the constraints on her agency, and then politicising those 
constraints in the History. Her access to freedom, to wages, marriage 
and a home was formed and given meaning by the culture and politics 
of slavery and of abolitionism in which it was embedded (Featherstone 
and Griffi n 2016). Prince’s story is a reminder of how diffi cult it is to 
shoehorn enslaved women into the likeness of autonomous, enlight-
ened individuals, and of how easy it is to render invisible the complica-
tions of just getting by (Thomas 2016). For the abolitionists who wanted 
to tell her story, as well as for her owners, Prince was, as Kaplan points 
out, an implicit threat to the social order because of the nature of the 
freedom she wanted to claim and the means she was prepared to use to 
obtain it. Kaplan reads Prince as ‘doomed to oscillate between perfect 
victim and transgressive agent’ (Kaplan 2006, 208). 
Slaves were not subject to common law, and so were not protected 
against rape. An enslaved husband who killed the man who raped his 
wife was not allowed to call her as a witness. Her status as a wife was 
negated, her rape was displaced as adultery, and any defence of provo-
cation was disallowed. The ‘normativity of rape’ established an inextri-
cable link between racial formation and sexual subjection (Hartman 
1997, 85). As Hartman argues, sexuality was deployed very differently 
in different contexts. For white women it was about kinship, the pro-
prietorial relation of the patriarch to his wife, the making of legitimate 
heirs and the transmission of property. It was in this context that a white 
wife was subjected to the arbitrary power of her husband. For enslaved 
black women, their masters’ sexuality was deployed for ‘the reproduc-
tion of property, the relations of mastery and subjection, and the regu-
larity of sexual violence’ (Hartman 1997, 84). Rape was a non-existent 
injury for the female slave because ‘the lascivious enslaved woman was 
a guilty accomplice and seducer’ (Hartman 1997, 87). African American 
women lacked inviolability, and ‘were judged and blamed for their own 
predicament’ (Hunter 2016, 152). This was inextricable from their status 
as commodifi ed human beings. White men ‘identifi ed rapes and slave 
sales as conjoined and essential parts of their very selves’ (Baptist 2004, 
167). As Baptist argues, the fi ctions of commodifi cation were powerful 
enough to ensure that some people were treated as objects and men 
bought light-skinned fancy maids in order to rape them. Slave women 
were vulnerable to sexual assault because they could be sold, and 
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they were desirable to purchase in part because they could be raped. 
The market gave value both to their ‘sexual desirability and enforced 
availability’ (Baptist 2004, 189). The message that African women were 
commodities, often raped by white men, ‘added a taste of secondhand 
sexual power without restraint, a glimpse of the pure consumption of 
human beings, to the unconscious and conscious minds of many con-
sumers’ (Baptist 2004, 190).
If Baptist is right about this deep entanglement of economic and sex-
ual desire then it makes sense of the complications of home, marriage 
and free labour for black women both living in and escaping slavery. The 
context of commodifi cation and the power of the slave owners to sepa-
rate families are crucial for understanding slave women’s experience, 
and the ways in which their agency and their power were gendered 
and racialised. It is no wonder that Harriet Jacobs (1861), for example, 
took what Lovell has characterised as a salutary view of wage labour, 
where labour ‘is seen as an organic expression of the self and the primary 
and necessary means of establishing a conception of selfhood’ (Lovell 
1996, 1). Like Mary Prince, her sense of self was grounded in the perfor-
mance of economically valued work, and in the negotiation of contracts 
that showed that she could act as an agent in the market economy. In 
common with many nineteenth-century thinkers, Jacobs saw contract 
rights as a form of freedom, and self-ownership as ‘the right to sell one’s 
labor, marry freely, and engage in market exchanges in terms of equality, 
not as a subjugated dependent’ (Cope 2004, 5). Her status as a worker 
underpinned her ability to ‘perform her duty as a mother and a woman 
within a sentimental framework’, and was also directly paralleled by her 
ability to resist Dr Flint’s attempts to take her purity and to give it to 
Mr Sands. In doing so, ‘she takes the power to remove this purity away 
from Flint and gives it to herself’ (Larson 2006, 749). In having a deliber-
ate affair with Mr Sands, she created a kind of contract with him based 
on exchange rather than subjection. As Lovell argues in his discussion 
of Linda Brent, the protagonist of Jacobs’ Incidents in the Life of a Slave 
Girl, this partial and contingent giving of herself constituted her self-
ownership: ‘Only by surrendering a portion of her self-possession does 
[she] create a claim to herself as an agent who can act in accordance 
with her will’ (Lovell 1996, 5). It was a conception of freedom that forced 
her to violate ‘the most basic tenet of womanhood (virtue) to fulfi l the 
basic requirement of contract freedom (volition)’ (Cope 2004, 12). As an 
enslaved black woman she could not have both, and this exercise of her 
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freedom disqualifi ed her from the bourgeois model of self-ownership 
that was premised on moral self-regulation (Cope 2004, 15). Her free-
dom was constantly compromised by her fugitive status and her race, 
and by economic injustice so that her escape from slavery was a jour-
ney into capitalism, ‘but not the capitalism she envisioned’ (Cope 2004, 
18). It could not meet her demands for a better life, or offer her protec-
tion either for her virtue or for her industriousness. It could not give her 
a home or an escape from the oppressive terms of her existence. The 
dream of her life could not be realised.
Jacobs’s story and her self-presentation were taken up and interpreted 
by the white women of her audience in very particular ways. As Nudel-
man argues, Jacobs endorsed sexual purity as a shared value, but also 
portrayed her affair with Sands as ‘an instance of her autonomy’, which 
meant ‘defi ning her relationship with her audience as adversarial rather 
than cooperative’ (Nudelman 1992, 939). Incidents in the Life of a Slave 
Girl was written between 1853 and 1858 when the sexual subjugation 
of slave women had been widely publicised in the antislavery literature 
and used to emphasise the pain and suffering, and so the humanity, of 
the slave woman. In the process, the abolitionists created ‘the canonized 
fi gure of the suffering slave’ (Nudelman 1992, 941). This female body 
in pain was central to the process of transforming humans into moral 
beings. For the slave woman it brought home ‘the utter availability of her 
humanity’, her lack of inviolability and her commodifi cation (Nudelman 
1992, 941), but the same fi gure was mobilised to ‘prompt the political 
agency of white middle-class northern women’ (Nudelman 1992, 942). 
The binary of passive female slave/empowered white female liberator 
became a key trope of antislavery activism, underpinning a sentimental 
exchange in which both were humanised and moralised, universalised 
and differentiated. They reinforced and recreated each other through the 
suffering of the female slave, which authorised her victim status and her 
readers’ sympathetic and virtuous response, suggesting a reciprocal suf-
fering. White women were construed as sympathetic, as able to identify 
with the suffering of others through their readings of sentimental texts 
that required both an emotional response and moral action. Tracts pro-
duced by the antislavery societies called upon their women readers to 
imagine themselves in the place of the black female slave and to picture 
their own mothers on the treadmill, their innocent daughters sweeping 
the streets, their own children left to die. Enormous stress was placed 
on the experience of identifi cation with others, on ‘shared tears’ and the 
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‘congruence of feeling’ between women (Sussman 2000, 150, 152), until 
the other’s pain is only acknowledged by substituting the white body 
for the black body, and empathy becomes repressive and the identifi ca-
tion an act of violence (Hartman 1997, 20). As Nudelman argues, Jacobs 
insisted that her white readers had never known what it was to be a slave, 
and she employed suffering ‘to assert the irreducible difference between 
white women and slave women’, the contrast in their experience rather 
than their shared tears, by articulating her own suffering and insisting 
on speaking as a narrator and a subject in her own story (Nudelman 
1992, 957). In doing so she showed that she understood what Saidiya 
Hartman calls ‘the precariousness of empathy and the uncertain line 
between witness and spectator’ (Hartman 1997, 4). 
In the campaigns against slavery, there was a strong focus on domes-
ticity and the importance of maintaining separate spheres (Sussman 
2000, 7; Stanley 1998). Much of the emotional power of the antislavery 
discourse came from their focus on ‘the circumstances of the female 
body’: ‘Within the antislavery repertoire of bodily metaphors, the pre-
dominant one was the scourged body of the bondswoman, an image 
that symbolized the slave’s utter debasement’ (Stanley 1998, 25). She 
was ‘the paradigmatic chattel’ (Stanley 1998, 27), and as such a com-
plicated contrast to the white, middle class English women negotiat-
ing coverture and their own status as subcontractors and only partial 
self-owners, engaged in their own struggle with despotic dominion. As 
Clare Midgley argues, ‘the creation of an image of the modern Western 
woman depended from the beginning on the creation of a contrasting 
image of the victimised non-Western woman’ (Midgley 2000, 113). As 
Sussman points out, white British women were able to compare them-
selves to slaves in ways that men could not because it was ‘safe’ for them 
to imagine themselves as interchangeable. They would never be placed 
in the same position as the female slave because they were guaranteed 
male protection (Sussman 2000, 146). Their ‘bounded bodily integrity of 
whiteness’ was ‘secured by the abjection of others’ (Hartman 1997, 123). 
In the antislavery debates in Britain, and later in the United States, the 
sovereignty of husbands was understood to be a fundamental dimen-
sion of freedom. Once the female slave became a free woman, and her 
husband a free man, she would be entitled to his protection. For the 
freedwoman, emancipation would mean coverture, experienced as slav-
ery’s opposite (Stanley 1998, 29). The antislavery campaigns were about 
helping slave women to attain what their privileged sisters already had, 
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the real but inferior power of the subcontractor. It was a power that was 
understood to come from morality, not from politics, and it was bal-
anced by the inevitable and utter powerlessness of the slave.
MARRIAGE AS SLAVERY
Campaigners for women’s rights in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies worked to complicate the binary between power and powerless-
ness, often obscuring their own relative privilege, bodily integrity and 
social protection in the process. The parallels between marriage and 
slavery were made by white feminists to draw attention to their legal 
erasure as persons, the denial of their property in the person under cov-
erture and the ways in which their citizenship was shot through with 
elements of domination. In arguments which drew on Hegel’s mas-
ter–slave dialectic and on the ongoing conversation about empire, they 
argued that women were subsidising men’s citizenship, and that the 
institution of marriage was valued above the independence of the wife 
as an individual. Thinking about marriage and slavery together called 
into question the relation of protection to obedience and the issue of 
the control over the body, as well as a whole set of diffi culties about the 
contested meanings of dependence and freedom. At the heart of these 
arguments was the issue of contract, and its relation to the exercise of 
arbitrary power. Carole Pateman suggests that rather than reading mar-
riage as a quasi-feudal institution, as a left-over from more patriarchal 
times, we need to understand that modern marriage is contractual, and 
that contract is ‘the specifi cally modern means of creating relationships 
of subordination’ (Pateman 1988, 118). Until the late nineteenth century 
the legal and civil position of a wife ‘resembled that of a slave’ because of 
her civil death, her lack of independent legal existence (Pateman 1988, 
119). The law, Pateman says, rested on the assumption that ‘a wife was 
(like) property’, and her husband could sue another man for damages 
if his wife committed adultery (Pateman 1988, 122). She highlights the 
slave owner’s right of sexual access to his female slaves, and to his wife. 
She draws attention to the laws enforcing conjugal rights which held 
that the husband could not be guilty of raping his wife because the wife 
had given herself up to her husband through their ‘mutual matrimonial 
contract’, and could not retract from it. At the end of the nineteenth 
century, wives could be jailed for refusing conjugal rights and husbands 
were legally allowed to lock their wives into their homes to obtain their 
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rights. As Pateman puts it, the marriage contract ‘is a contract of specifi c 
performance’ (Pateman 1988, 123). 
Wives in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries lived in 
the problem-space between slavery and citizenship. Their legal existence 
was suspended under coverture, under which husband and wife were 
considered to be but ‘one person’, so that ‘the very being and existence of 
the woman is suspended during coverture, or entirely merged and incor-
porated in that of the husband’. Through the marriage contract, ‘women’s 
subjection is secured in civil society’ (Pateman 1988, 181) and they were 
subjected for life to their husbands and expected to provide perpetual 
service, bringing them close to the status of slaves (Pateman 1988, 145). 
At the same time, the space wives inhabited was not the space of slavery, 
but the more ambiguous gap between contract and subjection. In the 
end, Pateman rejects the confl ation of wives with slaves because a free 
and equal citizen could not be an actual slave, although she could con-
tract to be a civil slave (Pateman 1988, 124). 
The idea that white wives were subjected to slavery emerged from 
a complex and multi-layered conversation about domination, subor-
dination, improvement, degradation and freedom. The critique of the 
exercise of arbitrary power in Wollstonecraft was about the ways in 
which tyranny would undermine morality and attempt to crush rea-
son. Women were slaves because they could not be citizens, because 
they were not ethically incorporated into the polis, and because they 
only imperfectly possessed themselves. For Wollstonecraft, women 
were created to be ‘the toy of man, his rattle’ (Wollstonecraft [1790] 
1995, 104), made for his purposes and amusement rather than their 
own. Like the slaves as living tools in Aristotle’s account, women 
in Wollstonecraft’s narrative ‘appear to be suspended by destiny’ 
between heaven and earth, not quite reduced to livestock, but not 
enlightened by reason or given the opportunity to struggle against the 
world, unfold their faculties or acquire the dignity of conscious virtue. 
Without a clear set of morals and principles, women became passive 
and indolent, and bore the marks of inferiority (Wollstonecraft [1790] 
1995, 105). Their sparks of genius had been prevented from bursting 
forth and their minds were depressed, meaning that, like slaves, they 
failed to exert themselves and were unable to transform themselves 
into moral beings. Without enlightened growth and useful work, both 
the powerful and the powerless were caught in a damaging and tyran-
nical relationship. 
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Wollstonecraft’s language was about the supremacy of reason, of 
thinking and acting for ourselves as rational beings capable of auton-
omy. Like Kant, Wollstonecraft’s focus was on independence and rightful 
interaction between individuals who all had the quality of being their 
own master. She too demanded vigilant government over the self. Like 
Locke, Wollstonecraft’s argument was that we cannot hand over abso-
lute power to others because we do not have it over ourselves. Women 
were rendered weak and luxurious by wealth, and ‘made slaves to their 
persons, and must render them alluring that man may lend them his rea-
son to guide their tottering steps aright’ (Wollstonecraft [1790] 1995, 235). 
They could choose between this kind of submission and governing their 
tyrants by ‘sinister tricks’ (Wollstonecraft [1790] 1995, 235). To be virtuous 
and useful, a woman needed the protection of civil laws: ‘she must not be 
dependent on her husband’s bounty for her subsistence during his life or 
support after his death – for how can a being be generous who has noth-
ing of his own? Or virtuous, who is not free?’ (Wollstonecraft [1790] 1995, 
236). Honest, independent women needed a civil existence in the state. 
Collective self-governance required dignity (Ober 2012) and the status 
of citizenship. Instead, women were domesticated through ignorance 
and dependence, and prepared in childhood ‘for the slavery of marriage’ 
(Wollstonecraft [1790] 1995, 248). 
As a result of what Alan Coffee terms ‘the stranglehold of depen-
dence’ (Coffee 2013, 121), the caprice of tyrants won out over the rational 
rule of law. This encouraged a culture of hidden, covert and corrupting 
power, both in public and in private, for both men and women. ‘When, 
therefore, I call women slaves,’ said Wollstonecraft, ‘I mean in a politi-
cal and civil sense; for, indirectly, they obtain too much power, and are 
debased by their exertions to obtain illicit sway’ (Wollstonecraft [1790] 
1995, 262). Her picture of women as ‘literally speaking slaves to their 
bodies’, was about women’s loss of rational autonomy that undermined 
the possibility of rational fellowship with men. Women were slaves in 
the political and civil sense because they could not be citizens, because 
they were not ethically incorporated into the polis, and because their 
grasp of autonomy could only ever be precarious (Hartman 1997, 117). 
They were slaves not only because the power exercised over them was 
arbitrary, but also because the only power they were able to exercise over 
others was arbitrary (Coffee 2013, 123). Wollstonecraft’s argument was 
that improvement must be mutual, ‘or the injustice which one half of the 
human race are obliged to submit to, retorting on their oppressors, the 
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virtue of man will be worm-eaten by the insect whom he keeps under 
his feet’ (Wollstonecraft [1790] 1995, 272). 
Wollstonecraft’s analysis focused on the dangers of tyranny and 
domination, and their distorting effects on rational freedom and jus-
tice. Her arguments fi t into the wider discourse of antityranny, where 
enslavement sought to dishonour and disenfranchise citizens who were 
meant to be free (Nyquist 2013, 1). She used slavery as a polyvalent 
metaphor, but her concern was to challenge the disenfranchisement of 
women, which she framed as political slavery that relied on women’s 
vulnerability to force and their dependence on individuals’ arbitrary 
power. Part of this discourse of antityranny, as Mary Nyquist argues, 
involved positioning selected non-European societies as existing with-
out publicly ordered social or political relations (Nyquist 2013, 16–17). 
By the eighteenth century the discourse had shifted to thinking about 
slavery as ‘an ocean away’, and to a new kind of liberal imperialism that 
contrasted the ‘pure air’ of England to much more oppressive and claus-
trophobic social and political relations in the East. Despotism was ‘that 
destructive blast which desolates Turkey, and renders the men, as well 
as the soil, unfruitful’ (Wollstonecraft [1790] 1995, 116). The damaging 
effects of the exercise of arbitrary power were felt everywhere (but par-
ticularly in Turkey) because it denied the possibility of improvement. 
The displacement of despotism and patriarchal oppression onto Turkey 
is part of what Joyce Zonana has identifi ed as ‘feminist orientalist dis-
course’ which fi gured the objectionable aspects of life in the West as 
Eastern (Zonana 1993, 593). Wollstonecraft uncritically associated the 
East with despotism and tyranny, imagining ‘gendered despotism’ as 
a defi ning feature of Eastern life and as a corruption of Western values 
(Zonana 1993, 600). In her account, women in the East ‘languish[ed] 
like exotics’ (Wollstonecraft [1790] 1995, 107), lived in harems where 
they were indolent, confi ned, under-educated and over-sexualised, and 
they were treated as if they were not a part of the human species. Woll-
stonecraft’s emphasis on the sexual enslavement of women in the East 
added the ‘erotics of suffering’ to antislavery discourse (Howard 2004), 
giving the exercise of arbitrary power a sexual dimension. 
The ‘East’ was a site of ‘imperial irresponsibility’ where Islam 
imposed an inferior status on women who were thought to have no 
souls (Howard 2004, 69). This ‘problematic intersection of liberal and 
imperial ideas’ (Botting and Kronewitter 2012, 468) continued in the 
writings of William Thompson and John Stuart Mill as they built on 
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Wollstonecraft’s ideas about women’s social and political enslave-
ment under coverture. They all used anti-Muslim stereotypes to make 
arguments for women’s rights in ways ‘that treat Muslim culture 
as contrary to the progressive feminist values of Western Europe’ 
(Botting and Kronewitter 2012, 472). The contrast with ‘the East’ rather 
than with Africa or America allowed the authors to highlight the bar-
barism of patriarchal marriage in primitive and Orientalist terms and 
to draw attention to the odalisque as the representative of ‘the basest 
yet most exotic form of female subordination’ (Botting and Kronewit-
ter 2012, 472). Eastern despotism and its associations with the harem 
and the seraglio were used to emphasise the themes of confi nement, 
imprisonment, brutality and sexual control. At the same time, the focus 
on polygamy and the otherness of Eastern subordination provided 
‘a reassuring substrate to their own oppression, assuring them of 
their relative privilege as English women in a civilized society’ (Paugh 
2014, 640).
The language of despotism and political tyranny was transposed 
into the social and brought home, so that the household became a 
space of terror, of fear and blood, and in particular of imprisonment. 
Power was reconceived in a privatised form, heightening the dangers 
of personal enslavement (McKeon 2005, 133). Tyrants, Wollstonecraft 
argued, in phrasing which captured the claustrophobia and dan-
ger of the home, ‘force all women, by denying them civil and politi-
cal rights, to remain immured in their families groping in the dark’ 
(Wollstonecraft [1790] 1995, 69). Women were ‘shut up like eastern 
princes’ (Wollstonecraft [1790] 1995, 119), confi ned to their cages. 
William Thompson, too, placed a great deal of emphasis on wives 
being deprived of the right of locomotion, and the ways in which 
they were held captive in the house: ‘In his house he imprisons her or 
opens the doors at his option; an indulgent master is all she can look 
for.’ She did not have the right to go in or out any more than a kitten 
(Thompson 1825, 85). As Pateman has pointed out, husbands had the 
legal right to constrain their wives to remain inside the home. The 
wife chained to a brutal tyrant also found that her children belonged 
by law to him. If she tried to leave her husband, she could take 
nothing with her, not even her children. He could compel her to 
return, either by law or by physical force. A woman, John Stuart Mill 
argued, ‘is denied any lot in life but that of being the personal body-
servant of a despot’. Everything depended on the chance of fi nding 
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a husband who ‘may be disposed to make a favourite of her instead 
of merely a drudge’, and the law gave her only one chance to fi nd a 
good master (Mill [1859] 1997, 149). Wollstonecraft, Thompson and 
Mill all used language that drew attention to the intense intimacy 
of men’s domination over women, and to women’s immobilisation 
within the home. In their writings we can read slavery and freedom 
as the founding narratives of the liberal subject, and see how they are 
inextricable both from each other and from the narratives of race and 
gender.
William Thompson’s argument was that society was organised to 
the advantage of men in the pursuit of happiness, who paralysed and 
oppressed their feebler competitors, making women their slaves. Wom-
en’s compensation was marriage, under which ‘women are reduced to 
domestic slavery, without will of their own, or power of locomotion, 
otherwise than as permitted by their respective masters’ (Thompson 
1825, xi). Women were neglected in the distribution of rights, ‘excluded 
in the true Eastern style’, without consideration. James Mill in his utili-
tarian tract ‘Article on Government’ built his system of liberty on the 
political, civil, social and domestic slavery of women, and in doing so 
he ‘capriciously divides the human race into two moral masses, the one 
of which is to be saturated with liberty and enjoyment, the other with 
slavery, privation, and insult’ (Thompson 1825, 20). This conception of 
dividing the world into these two halves brought the zones of freedom 
and unfreedom, and the confl ict between the old and the new, together 
under one roof, and privileged gender as the key register of difference 
between humans struggling to transform themselves into moral beings. 
The current system left women ‘the most isolated and unprotected of 
human beings’, shut out from political rights (Thompson 1825, 36), and 
from property. 
In Thompson’s view this made the marriage contract a slave con-
tract, requiring a man to enter into a relationship based on the denial 
of a woman’s moral status as a person. The husband, like the slave-
holder, put himself in a position where he exercised all the rights over 
his wife that she currently exercised over herself, putting her inher-
ent dignity and her moral worth entirely under his command. This 
created a moral relationship between husband and wife that involved 
total control by the husband, even if he never exercised it, and complete 
renunciation of her rights on the part of the wife (Fabre 2006). It was, 
Thompson declared, like the slave contracts of the West Indies, ‘the law 
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of the stronger imposed on the weaker’ (Thompson 1825, 56). He lik-
ened the contract of marriage to a slave code, no more consulting the 
interests of women ‘than the interests of bullocks are consulted in the 
police regulations that precede and follow their slaughter’ (Thompson 
1825, 56–7). Men were the owners, masters and rulers of everything 
while women were ‘the moveable property, and ever-obedient servant’ 
(Thompson 1825, 57). As wives, women’s civil rights disappeared and 
they fell back into the state of children or idiots, ‘the passive property of 
their owners; protected by the law in some few respects only, like other 
slaves, from the excessive abuse of despotic power’ (Thompson 1825, 
59). The despotism of man over woman was maintained by personal 
force and established by the law. Women’s dependence may have been 
voluntary for a moment before the contract, but was then ‘unrelentingly 
forced during the whole remainder of life’ (Thompson 1825, 62). She was 
a victim of her owner, ‘renouncing the voluntary direction of her own 
actions in favour of the man who has admitted her to the high honor 
of becoming his involuntary breeding machine and household slave’ 
(Thompson 1825, 63).
Thompson was explicit about the whiteness of the wives-as-slaves 
he was talking about. Black slaves, he said, were not insulted with 
the requirement to swear obedience. The ‘gratuitous degradation of 
swearing to be slaves, of kissing the rod of domestic despotism, and 
of devoting themselves to its worship’ was reserved for white women 
(Thompson 1825, 65–6). For him, it was this distortion of freedom 
that lay at the heart of their oppression, clearly aligning his argument 
with the antityranny approach. White women were not supposed to 
be enslavable, and his argument fi gured them as perfect victims rather 
than as transgressive agents. The ‘gratuitous degradation’ of swearing to 
be slaves was imposed upon them, and he sidestepped the complica-
tions of what can rightly be defi ned as agency. He termed marriage a 
‘white-slave code’, investing one human being with all the attributes 
of despotism compounded by the ‘cruel mockery’ of insisting on the 
semblance of voluntary obedience, ‘of devotedness to her degradation’. 
The marriage-slave code rested on the same myth as the paternalism 
of chattel slavery, the idea that the interest of wives was necessarily 
involved in that of their husbands. The wife was, for Thompson, ‘the 
literal unequivocal slave of the man who may be styled her husband’ 
(Thompson 1825, 66). Her actions and her earnings were not under her 
own control, but under the arbitrary control of someone else, putting 
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her inherent dignity and moral worth entirely under his command. This 
lack of self-government was, for Thompson, the essence of slavery. For 
Thompson, ‘To be a woman is to be an inferior animal; an inferiority 
by no talents, by no virtues to be surmounted; indelible like the skin 
of the Black’ (Thompson 1825, 164). Men looked at women as belong-
ing to an inferior and degraded class of beings, not entitled to equal 
consideration. Thompson was offering a critique of a gender hierarchy 
that denied women’s capacity for self-legislation and hardened the 
boundaries of human difference by connecting them to a more rigid 
anatomical model, and so to the idea of natural inferiority. Gender as a 
register of difference was undergoing the same process as racialisation 
in becoming indelible and hereditable, condensed into two great moral 
masses facing each other across an abyss. 
Thompson recognised the risk that the doctrine of inferiority would 
undermine women’s basic humanity, and relegate them to the status 
of subpersonhood. Like the antislavery writers, he understood that 
freedom was contingent on membership of civil society. Women, in 
Thompson’s view, had been reduced to the level of automatons, ‘the 
passive tools of the pleasures and passions of men’, their actions regu-
lated ‘by the arbitrary will of masters’ (Thompson 1825, 193). The sys-
tem, Thompson argued, had created deep-rooted habits. Some women 
‘have been all their lives benumbed by the withering infl uence of an 
insolent domination’ which inculcated submission to arbitrary will as 
a moral duty and ‘encompass[ed] the slave with a superstitious hor-
ror of its own freedom’ (Thompson 1825, 187). Through enforcing 
the marriage contract, men had surrendered the delights of equality, 
esteem and friendship and chosen instead to keep their slaves in ‘blind 
unenquiring obedience’, holding the whole ‘motley fabric . . . together 
by fear and blood’ (Thompson 1825, ix–x). In this sense, Thompson’s 
approach was intersubjective, and inextricable from the choices made 
by European men. He used slavery as a root metaphor for explaining 
the subjugation of white women and the arbitrary power of white men 
over them. His understanding of slavery was deeply individualised, 
connected to notions of dishonour and the denial of autonomy. In his 
view, slavery was the ultimate form of arbitrary power and a griev-
ous loss of freedom. Women subjected to marriage had lost their inner 
worth and become chattels, the instruments of others. This refl ects a 
specifi c understanding of the social relations of slavery and liberty, 
designed to apply to white women who were woven into the fabric of 
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civil society as wives and perfect victims, in a position of relative privi-
lege inside the structures of domesticity. 
It was a highly racialised understanding of gender and slavery. 
Thompson declared that enslaved black women were able to exer-
cise more agency and power, to fi nd more room for manoeuvre, than 
white women subjected to direct force by their husbands. They were 
not obliged to vow obedience to all the despotic commands of their 
enslaved husbands, and somehow they emerged from his account as 
having more freedom than the wives he described. He gave value to 
their transgressive agency and their position outside the structures of 
domesticity without accounting for the risks and dangers that it carried. 
They were pictured as being able to form acquaintances, friendships 
and attachments, and to mould their own actions according to their 
own views of interest, propriety and justice, ‘liable to the same physical, 
legal, and arbitrary restraints with her male companion in slavery and 
no more’ (Thompson 1825, 83). Slavery was an institution founded on 
and constrained by law and their shared legal status made the enslaved 
man and his companion equal in degradation and misery. The wife of 
a slave, on this view, was not subjected to unrelenting force, or con-
strained by the immoral vow of obedience. For Thompson, the state 
of the ‘civilized wife’ was worse than that of the female slave in the 
West Indies, and yet it was the white woman’s situation which was 
termed a state of equality and identity of interests with those of her 
husband (Thompson 1825, 86). White wives were cut off from the com-
mon protection of the laws by having no property, they were made to 
swear obedience to domestic slavery, and they were constantly (rather 
than occasionally) subject to the lust and caprice of an ever-present 
tyrant. This coding of ‘real’ slavery as domestic, highly personalised and 
particularly degrading for white women was part of the wider pro-
cess of partitioning and drawing internal distinctions within human-
ity. It suggested a particular binary between slavery and independence. 
White women were constrained by the arbitrary and unjust power of 
their husbands and by the institution of marriage, but it is clear that 
once these disabilities were removed, white women would cross the 
boundary into civil society and claim the status of personhood, leaving 
enslaved black women to fi ght their own battles for a better life. 
For John Stuart Mill, the adoption of the system of inequality 
between the sexes was never the result of rational deliberation, but had 
its origins in a woman fi nding herself in bondage to men ‘owing to the 
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value attached to her by men, combined with her inferiority in muscular 
strength’. A mere physical fact was converted into legal right. Progress 
was gradual until male slavery was abolished, and female slavery was 
‘gradually changed into a milder form of dependence’. It was this form 
of dependence that Mill characterised as ‘the primitive state of slav-
ery lasting on’, surviving modifi cations from justice and humanity, but 
never losing the ‘taint of its brutal origin’ (Mill [1859] 1997, 123). Mill’s 
argument was that the inequality of rights between men and women 
had no other source than the law of the strongest. People fl attered 
themselves that the rule of mere force had ended and that advanced 
civilisations could not rest on the principle of ‘might is right’. Those 
who allowed themselves to be seduced by this narrative of progress and 
humanity needed to understand that the social relations that subordi-
nated women to men had survived the rise of equality and justice, and 
were ‘not felt to jar with modern civilisation, any more than domestic 
slavery among the Greeks jarred with their notion of themselves as a 
free people’ (Mill [1859] 1997, 125). Marriage, like slavery, existed within 
the forwardness of modernity, and universality and rationality were 
used to sustain an order of gender difference that was inherited from 
the premodern era. Mill argued that the conditions of modern social 
life deformed and dehumanised both men and women as husbands 
and wives. He employed the rhetoric of slavery and abolition in order 
to suggest that the failings of marriage as an institution were historical 
rather than natural, and so could be subject to change. In doing so, he 
relied on a particular narrative of history which worked hard to relegate 
slavery to an unenlightened and benighted past, with no place in the 
new world of the modern. The rhetoric of modernity was about isolating 
the social subordination of women as ‘a single relic of an old world of 
thought and practice exploded in everything else’ (Mill [1859] 1997, 137). 
Like Wollstonecraft’s insect underfoot or the worm in the bud, this for 
Mill was a serious question for ‘the progressive movement which is the 
boast of the modern world’ (Mill [1859] 1997, 137).
The law of servitude in marriage was ‘a monstrous contradiction 
to all the principles of the modern world, and to all the experience 
through which those principles have been slowly and painfully worked 
out’ (Mill [1859] 1997, 195–6). After the campaigns for the abolition of 
slavery, ‘Marriage is the only actual bondage known to our law. There 
remain no legal slaves, except the mistress of every house’ (Mill [1859] 
1997, 196). Mill was drawing on slavery as the ‘root metaphor’ to draw 
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attention to the power relations at the heart of marriage, and to men’s 
exercise of absolute, arbitrary power over their wives. This most uni-
versal and pervading of all human relations ought to be regulated by 
justice rather than injustice. He anticipated the objection that the rule 
of men over women was not a rule of force, but was accepted volun-
tarily by women who gave their consent to marriage and made no 
complaint about their treatment (Mill [1859] 1997, 131). Mill pointed 
out fi rst that many individual women did not accept their situation and 
had recorded their protests. The problem was that all social and natural 
causes combined against women’s collective resistance. Their masters 
required something of them beyond actual service: ‘Men do not want 
solely the obedience of women, they want their sentiments’ (Mill [1859] 
1997, 132). They wanted a willing slave, a favourite, demanding more 
than simple obedience out of fear. Women were not educated, expected 
or required to strive for self-government, agency or self-control, but 
for submission and yielding to the will of others. Women were taught 
that it was in their natures to live for others, to abnegate themselves 
and not to exercise their autonomy. The law of marriage was a law of 
despotism, and to maintain their despotic rule, men had not allowed 
women to learn to read and write, or to acquire any skills not required 
for a domestic servant. 
The accepted narrative of progress was that marriage had been 
gradually losing its despotic edge, and civilisation and Christianity had 
ensured that women’s rights were restored. Mill contested this consol-
ing narrative by arguing that ‘the wife is the actual bondservant of her 
husband: no less so, as far as legal obligation goes, than slaves com-
monly so called. She vows lifelong obedience to him at the altar, and 
is held to it all her life by law’ (Mill [1859] 1997, 147). She could not act 
except with his permission, and all her property became his as husband 
and wife became one person in law. ‘I am far from pretending’, Mill 
declared, ‘that wives in general are not better treated than slaves; but no 
slave is a slave to the same lengths, and in so full a sense of the word, as 
a wife is’ (Mill [1859] 1997, 148). Her master could torture her and make 
her loathe him, and still ‘he can claim from her and enforce the lowest 
degradation of a human being, that of being made the instrument of 
an animal function contrary to her own inclinations’ (Mill [1859] 1997, 
148). Mill contrasted this loss of bodily integrity through vulnerability 
to rape to the situation of enslaved women, who, according to Mill, 
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performed fi xed tasks for their masters and then withdrew into their 
own family lives. Like Thompson, Mill left out black women’s sexual 
subjection to white men, and so ignored the racialised dimensions of 
the men’s power.
Instead, Mill’s vision of the power relations within marriage and of 
the exercise of men’s dominion over women was mediated through 
class, which became a marker for savagery, brutality and irrationality. 
Violence towards women did not carry much danger of legal penalty, 
and Mill suggested that the ‘lowest classes’ ‘indulge[d] the utmost habit-
ual excesses of bodily violence towards the unhappy wife’ who could not 
resist or escape from their brutality. Her excessive dependence ‘inspires 
their mean and savage natures’ not with a sense of honour and protec-
tion, but with the idea that ‘the law has delivered her to them as their 
thing, to be used at their pleasure’ (Mill [1859] 1997, 151). Mill was talk-
ing about a vast number of men ‘who are little higher than brutes’, and 
then about ‘ferocious savages, with occasional touches of humanity’, all 
of whom were entrusted with absolute power over women (Mill [1859] 
1997, 152). It was not possible to tell what such men’s conduct would 
be in ‘the unrestraint of home’ (Mill [1859] 1997, 153). Like Locke, Mill 
regarded the poor as unrestrained and debauched, an inferior order of 
men, and in this rhetoric we can see the real dangers Mary Prince was 
facing in being turned out of doors and treated like a beggar. As Roz-
bicki argues about Locke, Mill’s thoughts on the ‘lowest classes’ should 
remind us that we need to think about slavery and liberty not as ideas 
but as specifi c social relations, and be alert to the deeply hierarchical 
understanding of society that underpinned Mill’s liberal imperialism 
and his arguments for women’s equality. Liberty ‘continued to be largely 
understood as class privilege, applicable in full only to a group entitled 
to it by property, reason and virtue’, even as that group was expanded 
to include middle-class white women (Rozbicki 2001, 39). Mill readily 
admitted that under the present law, the great majority of the higher 
classes lived in the spirit of a just law of equality. On the other hand, 
in the ‘most naturally brutal and morally uneducated part of the lower 
classes’, a man felt a sort of disrespect and contempt towards his own 
wife that he did not feel towards any other woman, born out of her legal 
slavery and her physical subjection to his will (Mill [1859] 1997, 162). 
In the complicated intersections of race, class and gender inside the 
home, working class white men emerged as mean and savage, and so 
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as morally incompetent virtual outsiders with no place either inside the 
structures of domesticity or within civil society.
What happened to the enslaved black women who were blotted out 
of this story of slavery as despotism and tyranny, and excluded from the 
progressive movement that was the boast of the modern world? Kaplan 
argues that the radicalism and the feminism of the 1780s dissipated in 
the nineteenth century, until virtuous European femininity with its mili-
tant domesticity and insistence on respectability crowded out and made 
impossible ‘a radical autonomy of mind and behaviour, whose danger-
ous bottom line is the will and capacity to rebel’ (Kaplan 2006, 200). 
The emphasis shifted from Wollstonecraft’s focus on women’s tyranny, 
the possibility of agency and transgression in their ‘sinister tricks’, and 
her vision of subjects formed in complicated relations to others under 
oppressive terms of existence, to Thompson and Mill’s more perfect and 
powerless victims. The capacity for autonomy and rebellion was dis-
placed onto the fi gure of the black woman. Women of mixed race were 
regarded as even more dangerous as the visible evidence of European 
men’s transgressive behaviour, ‘so that their intrusion in to the metro-
politan space [was] an unwelcome reminder of the inevitable perme-
ability of social and moral borders between empire and “home”’ (Kaplan 
2006, 200). Their very existence undermined the silences and disavow-
als so carefully constructed by thinkers such as Thompson and Mill 
around the sexual subjection of enslaved black women. They refused to 
acknowledge the ‘glimpse of pure consumption’ and instead reinforced 
the idea of moral boundaries created by women’s self-regulation inside 
domestic space. 
THE UNRESTRAINT OF HOME
This construction of white middle-class women as domestic, respect-
able and subjected to unrelenting force had particular resonances in 
the plantation household in the Deep South in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Just before the American Civil War, the plantation mistress Mary 
Boykin Chestnut wrote, echoing Mill, that there was no slave like a 
wife, and all married women, all children and girls who lived in their 
fathers’ houses were slaves (Foster 2007). Foster discusses the popular 
images of the plantation mistress as the ‘mother-to-all’, instructing her 
slaves and actively managing the household. Plantation wives were 
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presented simultaneously as closet abolitionists and as innocent vic-
tims, ‘helplessly caught up in the torrent of history’ (Foster 2007, 205). 
Foster argues that we need to think about the gendered memorialisa-
tion of slavery, and in particular the ongoing ‘characterization of white 
women as survivors of slavery’. He considers the collective wounds 
and guilt over slavery to be ‘too fresh to allow, willingly, a confrontation 
with the spectre of white female “savagery”’ (Foster 2007, 317). This 
means that we tend to ignore the degree to which ‘southern women 
generally seem to have worked as feverishly as their men to sustain and 
enhance their places in their small worlds’ (Foster 2007, 318). Thavolia 
Glymph’s work is about the plantation household as a workplace and 
as a fi eld of power relations, and she explores what happens when we 
consider the public character of the private household (Glymph 2008). 
She begins by pulling apart the depiction of planter women as ‘a silent 
abolitionist constituency’ who were the potential allies of slaves, and of 
slave women in particular. They tended to be presented as hardwork-
ing women who were handicapped by paternalism and patriarchy, and 
for some historians they ‘were women who found in their own subjec-
tion the basis for an alliance with slave women’ (Glymph 2008, 4). As 
Glymph adds in her next sentence, ‘slaves rarely thought this’. Histo-
rians of southern women, she argues, often gave priority to patriarchy 
and imagined freedom for slave women as ‘the right to patriarchy and 
its kindred domestic norms’, granting them the possibility of returning 
home, of fi nding their core identity as wives and mothers (Glymph 
2008, 4). Glymph’s central argument is that we need to remember 
that white women wielded the power of slave ownership, of life and 
death, and that their violence was ‘integral to the making of slavery’ 
(Glymph 2008, 5). As Foster says, the vision of the delicate southern 
belle was reworked by historians to be become the hard-working, 
self-sacrifi cing southern plantation mistress with responsibility for an 
extended household of family and slaves, suffering under the weight 
of patriarchal authority and somehow managing to be ‘both violent 
and good’ and endow the system with humanity (Glymph 2008, 23). 
In this process, which lies behind the characterisation of white women 
as the survivors of slavery, mistresses ‘remain essentially unsullied by 
the violence, indecency and racism endemic to slaveholding societies’ 
(Glymph 2008, 24). Their silence has been read as abolitionist sympa-
thy, while their power was mistaken for powerlessness.
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The plantation household was the site for the construction of south-
ern white womanhood, set against the construction of the black women 
within the household as vessels of disorder and fi lth, lying, thieving, 
impudent, unmanageable and ignorant. White women’s labour was 
presented by proslavery ideology as ‘the central operative mechanism 
of the plantation household’, bringing order and cleanliness to ‘a world 
stained by black women’s mere presence’ (Glymph 2008, 66). In this con-
text, white women were left feeling outwitted and angry as their slaves 
worked slowly, ran away and refused to do as they were told, rejecting 
the idea that their mistresses’ interests were their own, even as they had 
to live together in close proximity and warring intimacy (Glymph 2008, 
68–9). Female slaves who worked slowly and used impudent language 
‘impeached the ideology of white female supremacy’ and, in Glymph’s 
analysis, carved out small spaces of autonomy for themselves, and 
began to build an oppositional culture and a new meaning for freedom 
that came out of everyday struggle and resistance (Glymph 2008, 91). 
The resistance and agency of slave women was, Glymph argues, buried 
in the gendered language of domesticity as insubordination rather than 
rebellion, and in the collapsed geography of the household, the small-
ness of the spaces in great houses and slave cabins, they were engaging 
in the ongoing debate about what it meant to be free or enslaved, male 
or female, black or white. 
The general confi nement of women to ‘the more collapsed geog-
raphy of the household’ made their acts of violence seem less pur-
poseful and effectual, and more savage, as Foster points out (Glymph 
2008, 28). Their violence was explained as petulance, capriciousness, 
hysteria and ill humour, explanations that profoundly underestimated 
white women’s agency and the ‘practical reality of routine domina-
tion’ (Glymph 2008, 31). Glymph uses fi rst-person testimony from 
plantation households to argue that in place of the sense of planta-
tion mistresses being trapped by the system, we need to understand 
the women of the household as living in ‘a kind of warring intimacy’, 
marked by the everyday violence of dragging, biting, kicking and shak-
ing and by shocking acts of cruelty, such as that described by Lucinda 
Hall Shaw in her account of the fatal beating and hasty burial of a 
slave woman and her living baby, birthed as a result of the mother’s 
whipping (Glymph 2008, 40). Glymph argues that rather than regard-
ing such incidents as exceptional cases, slaves saw them as part of a 
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habitual pattern of inherent violence and terror. Power ‘could wear a 
white female face’, and sustaining the system of slavery required the 
exercise of force, as the plantation mistresses themselves recognised 
(Glymph 2008, 62, 64). It is signifi cant that Mary Prince was fl ogged 
at the instigation of her mistress, calling into question the character of 
the English, and her status as a slave: ‘In the History we fi nd monstrous 
white women and a slave woman who has all the attributes of English 
middle-class domestic gentility’ (Whitlock 2000, 25). 
In thinking about the common ground between feminism and post-
colonialism, Whitlock attributes to postcolonial criticism ‘a particularly 
strong sense of the intimacies of identity formation, how subjects are 
formed and reformed in relation to others, with unpredictable inter-
sections, connections and leakage between’ (Whitlock 2000, 34). It is 
impossible to separate out the perfect victims from the transgressive 
agents, or to understand the meanings of freedom and slavery in isola-
tion from the specifi c social relations in which they are entangled. The 
oppressive terms of existence were different for plantation mistresses, 
abolitionist activists, fugitive slaves and freed women. They were forced 
to negotiate power and powerlessness, agency and victimhood and the 
‘unrestraint of home’ in different ways, and with very different conse-
quences. Thinking about enslaved women as wives, and white wives as 
slaves, allows us to understand the claustrophobia of the structures of 
domesticity and the catastrophic boundary loss of being thrown out of 
doors. It brings out the gendered and racialised complications of what 
can be defi ned as agency, and shows us how those complications were 
connected to property, possession and exchange. The constructions 
and presentations of white women as closet abolitionists and perfect 
victims continue to play out in current debates about traffi cking and 
modern slavery, bolstered by defi nitions of slavery that focus on private, 
intimate violence and on subjection to force. Civilised wives, or their 
respectable equivalents, still emerge as innocent victims as opposed 
to transgressive agents, and the effect is still to ignore the dangers of 
vagrancy, poverty and indecency for women racialised as black who 
continue to be judged and blamed for their own predicament. These 
blind spots and disavowals are part of the disjunctive history of slavery 
and freedom, its fi ts and starts and ruptures. The process of transform-
ing humanity into moral beings was always an uneven process, shot 
through with registers of difference, but also always undertaken in close 
5606_Brace.indd   167 12/01/18   6:04 PM
168 The Politics of Slavery
contact and in intersubjective space. The politics of ‘new slavery’, which 
we examine next in the contexts of incarceration and of traffi cking, 
continue to be infused by the wishful thinking and consoling narra-
tive of freedom and progress that places slavery as a legal institution 
fi rmly in a benighted past and refuses to engage with the afterlives of 
its warring intimacy, the fear and blood, the normativity of rape and the 
abjection of others. 
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Chapter 8
INCARCERATION AND RUPTURE: 
THE PAST IN THE PRESENT
This chapter focuses on the prison industrial complex in the United 
States to ask again about what gets remembered and how, to take us 
back to the question of what happens to a manumitted slave, and to 
revisit the fi gure of the slave as an uncanny object in the blind spot of 
modernity. Do the patterns and practices of mass incarceration sug-
gest that the exercise of despotic power is regarded as legitimate if its 
objects are considered to have put themselves outside civil society? Are 
the processes of transforming humanity into moral beings reversible, so 
that prisoners can de-create themselves through civil and social death? 
One of the key problems with the discourse of modern slavery and its 
insistence on the rupture between past and present and the ‘newness’ 
of the slavery lurking in the shadows and in our nail bars is the way 
that it brings slavery into the present. For its core message of abolition 
to work, ‘old’ slavery has to be comfortably assigned to the past, where it 
was abolished by the high-minded, incorruptible and conscientious few 
who came to realise how fundamentally wrong it was, and the actions 
of like-minded consumers and activists who worked tirelessly to shine 
a light on the immoral activities of the slave traders and holders and to 
expose the inhumanity of their commerce. When slavery is brought into 
the present out of this story, it is often as part of a grand redemptive 
narrative, from the history of slavery to the future of abolition through a 
present in which today’s slavery is invisible, a ‘hidden crime’, and slaves 
themselves are ‘locked away’ in obscurity. As Joel Quirk has pointed out, 
the literature on contemporary slavery tends either to ignore the history 
of slavery or to posit ‘a sharp divide between past and present’. Con-
temporary issues such as child sexual exploitation, traffi cking and ser-
vile marriage are framed as distinctively modern problems associated 
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in particular with globalisation and the disposability of labour (Quirk 
2006, 566). This approach raises a whole set of questions about what 
slavery really means, and also about how to connect the past to the 
present. 
Closely related to the idea of a sharp divide between past and present 
in modern slavery discourse is the underlying claim that race no longer 
matters in modern slavery. Poverty, on this account, and not racialised 
identity, makes people vulnerable to being enslaved. Race, Kevin Bales 
asserts, ‘means little’ in the new slavery: ‘The criteria of enslavement 
today do not concern color, tribe, or religion; they focus on weakness, 
gullibility, and deprivation’ (Bales 2012a, 11). In the introduction to his 
bestseller Disposable People, Bales places himself within the narrative of 
slavery lost and found. ‘Of course’, he says, ‘many people think there is 
no such thing as slavery anymore, and I was one of those people just a 
few years ago.’ In describing what it means to be ‘one of those people’, 
he then turns to an anecdote from his own past, to describe an encoun-
ter with segregation when he was four years old in a cafeteria in the 
American South:
As we started down the serving line I saw another family stand-
ing behind a chain, waiting as others moved through with their 
trays. With the certainty of a four-year old, I knew that they had 
arrived fi rst and should be ahead of us. The fairness of fi rst come, 
fi rst served had been drummed into me. So I unhooked the chain 
and said, ‘You were here fi rst, you should go ahead’. The father of 
this African American family looked down at me with his eyes 
full for feeling, just as my own father came up and put his hand 
on my shoulder. Suddenly the atmosphere was thick with unspo-
ken emotion. Tension mixed with bittersweet approval as both 
fathers grappled with the innocent ignorance of a child who had 
never heard of segregation. No one spoke until fi nally the black 
father said, ‘That’s OK, we’re waiting for someone; go ahead’ 
(Bales 2012a, 6)
For Bales, this is a story about fairness and equal treatment, and about 
how ‘sometimes it takes a child’s simplicity to cut through the weight 
of custom’ (Bales 2012a, 7). It fi ts into his story of being glad to see such 
blatant segregation coming to an end, while at the same time realising 
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that emancipation was a process and not an event, and that it was a pro-
cess that carried a ‘residue’ in bad housing, health inequalities, educa-
tion and the legal system. He defi nes these problems which he associates 
with race and racism as the ‘vestiges of slavery’, and then goes on to dis-
tinguish these vestiges from what he describes as ‘real slavery’, brought 
to light for him not in the segregated queue for the cafeteria, but in 
Anti-Slavery International leafl ets distributed in 1980s London (Bales 
2012a, 7). He does not describe the content of these leafl ets, so the reader 
is left to fi ll in the gaps between the vestiges of slavery and real slavery, 
but he does tell us that slavery is an obscenity, ‘more closely related to 
the concentration camp than to questions of bad working conditions’, 
and that there is ‘nothing to debate about slavery: it must stop’ (Bales 
2012a, 7–8). The black family are left standing in the queue, presumably 
with their eyes still full of feeling and still silent, since there is nothing to 
debate, while they contemplate Bales’s precocious humanity and their 
own not-actual slavery.
In his discussion of race and slavery, Bales puts ethnic and racial dif-
ferences fi rmly in the past, where he says they were used to explain and 
excuse slavery and to make the slaves into others through ‘tremendous 
investment in some very irrational ideas’, and a set of contortions to 
explain white supremacy, and to justify their economic decisions (Bales 
2012a, 10). By contrast, for Bales, today’s slavery is all about the money, 
and modern slaveholders are ‘freed of ideas that restrict the status of 
slaves to others’, and they can keep their costs down by enslaving people 
from their own country (Bales 2012a, 11). While he recognises ethnic and 
religious differences between slaves and slaveholders in Pakistan, India 
and Thailand, Bales concludes that their caste and religion ‘simply refl ects 
their vulnerability to enslavement; it doesn’t cause it’ (Bales 2012a, 11). 
The key differences that he identifi es are not racial but economic, and the 
common denominator is poverty, not colour. ‘If all left-handed people 
in the world became destitute tomorrow,’ he says,’ there would soon be 
slaveholders taking advantage of them’ (Bales 2012a, 11). 
Tryon Woods offers a devastating critique of this kind of left-handed 
argument, arguing that anti-traffi cking and modern slavery discourse 
more broadly is ‘mired in an ahistoricism symptomatic of our anti-black 
world’ in which slavery is ‘evoked to cloak the movement with political 
saliency and emotional urgency, while obscuring the ongoing calcu-
lus of racial slavery’s afterlife’ (T. P. Woods 2013, 122). For Woods, Bales 
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is summarising the mainstream perspective of white civil society and 
its understanding that slavery ended in 1865 and the loose ends were 
tied up by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Within this narrative of legislative 
progress, remaining inequities, Woods argues, then attach themselves 
to ‘the innate inadequacies of those left behind’ and become the prod-
uct of irrational bigotry. Any empirical evidence to the contrary is then 
‘unpersuasive in the face of white desire to be human, or in today’s par-
lance, to “transcend race” and be “post-racial”’ (T. P. Woods 2013, 130). 
This analysis does not quite refl ect Bales’s claim to see the vestiges of 
slavery in current racialised inequalities, but it does capture his story of 
the cafeteria queue, from which he emerges as ‘post-racial’ before any 
of those around him. His focus on skin colour and nation, and on the 
apparent randomness of poverty, vulnerability and economic inequality 
are attempts to disavow ‘the facts of the ongoing relations of racial slav-
ery’ (T. P. Woods 2013, 131). Racial slavery is invoked by Bales as part of a 
shared past, a bittersweet struggle for both fathers as they stood in line. 
It emerges as something that the white family, his parents ‘who were 
not radicals’ and he, can transcend. They can leave the cafeteria behind 
with their notions of fairness intact and move on to tackle the ‘real’ slav-
ery that happens elsewhere, particularly in the Indian subcontinent and 
the Far East (Bales 2012a, 22).
In taking the ‘racial’ out of racial slavery, and in invoking black suf-
fering to make non-racial political demands, modern slavery discourse 
shows itself to be unconcerned with the black struggle or with actually 
existing black communities. In Woods’s view, the rhetoric of modern day 
slavery ignores the historically specifi c context of the anti-black world 
in which the slave is paradigmatically black (T. P. Woods 2013, 126). The 
impulse to ignore and disavow the racial element of ‘old’ slavery is, for 
Woods and others, specifi cally about denying the afterlife of racial slavery, 
and the sense that ‘blacks gained entry to the body of the nation-state 
as expiators of the past, as if slavery and its legacy were solely their cross 
to bear’ (Hartman 1997, 133). For Hartman, this process of emancipation 
after 1865 ‘produced national innocence yet enhanced the degradation 
of the past for those still haunted by its vestiges because they became 
the locus of blame and the site of aberrance’ (Hartman 1997, 133). In this 
account, slavery shaped the experience and interpretation of freedom, 
and antislavery and reform discourse paved the way for brutal forms 
of modern power. The idea of a sharp divide between past and pres-
ent, and the insistence that this is not about working conditions, ignores 
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the complicated connections between slavery and free labour, vagrancy, 
idleness, respectability and mobility. The race line that Bales describes 
in the cafeteria has very different resonances for Hartman’s approach. 
In her account, it would be an example of how segregation enabled the 
perpetuation of slavery because ‘the contours of the social were shaped 
by slavery and its vestiges and an indifference to black misery’, until the 
spectre of black misery failed to arouse compassion and the slave was 
wholly overlooked (Hartman 1997, 169). The black family cannot walk 
away from the queue. For her, the endurance of voluntary servitude and 
the reinscription of racial subjection should draw our attention not to 
the rupture between past and present, or to the distinction between 
the vestiges of slavery and real slavery, but to ‘the continuities of slav-
ery and freedom as modes of domination, exploitation, and subjection’ 
(Hartman 1997, 172).
The question then becomes one of how to understand these conti-
nuities of slavery and freedom, and how to grapple with the afterlives of 
slavery as domination, exploitation and subjection. For those who do not 
want to disavow the racial in racial slavery, this is a course that brings its 
own challenges and pitfalls where the alternative to Bales’s ‘post-racial’ 
story is to invest in the suffering and injury of black misery so that the 
identity to be preserved is that of the powerless victim (Balfour 2005). 
Balfour is talking specifi cally about reparations, which are not the key 
concern of this chapter, but her conclusions apply to thinking about 
mass incarceration as well. Both involve ‘a call to grapple with the ways 
the past is lived’ (Balfour 2005, 802), compelling public witness to inju-
ries that both endure and are constantly re-infl icted. Balfour engages 
with Wendy Brown’s work on injury to explore how ‘reckoning with 
the afterlife of even ancient crimes is both necessary and dangerous’ 
(Balfour 2005, 802) and to show how the politics of reparation can dis-
rupt both unthinking progressive narratives and the business-as-usual 
politics that go with them. Taking the reparations movement seriously, 
she argues, requires ‘attending to the question of whose interests can and 
cannot stand for the common good’, and so a reorientation of vantage 
point (Balfour 2005, 804). This reorientation means moving away from 
progressive narratives and a ‘child’s simplicity’ that cuts through the 
weight of custom. Without asking why it is left up to the black father to 
make segregation socially comfortable for the white family, we cannot 
hope to grapple with slavery’s ‘complex haunting of the American pres-
ent’ (Balfour 2005, 805).
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In the debates around mass incarceration and the prison industrial 
complex in the US, this idea of a ‘complex haunting’ carries consider-
able power. The racial politics of incarceration bring to the fore the 
question of whose interests can ground the common good, the rein-
scription of racial subjection, and what it means to claim what Avery 
Gordon calls ‘the right to complex personhood’ (Gordon 2008, 5). In 
thinking about these questions in the context of haunting, Gordon 
argues that we can investigate ‘how that which appears absent can 
indeed be a seething presence’ and ‘learn to make contact with what 
is without doubt often painful, diffi cult and unsettling’ (Gordon 2008, 
17, 23). At the core of this discourse of haunting is this notion of con-
tact and encounter and of having a particular connection with loss. It 
also brings with it the sense, articulated by Toni Morrison, that we can 
bump into a ‘rememory’ that belongs to somebody else, so that the past 
can be over, but still there waiting for you. In this sense, the ghost has 
a living force that feels like the return of a familiar stranger (Gordon 
2008, 169, 179). For Morrison, the complex haunting is not about a 
return to the past, but about a reckoning with the present and its pos-
sibilities. She is calling for accountability, for the recognition that ‘it is 
our responsibility to recognize just where we are in this story, even if 
we do not want to be there’ (Gordon 2008, 188). A refusal to encounter 
the ghosts means acting as if we can erase or transcend the power rela-
tions in which we lived then and live now, as if we can just step into a 
post-racial world, freed from ideas that might force us to think about 
the making of status. Instead, by allowing ourselves to encounter ‘the 
elusive concreteness of ghostly matter’, we can pay attention to the 
moments ‘when the over and done with comes alive’, the points ‘when 
your own or another’s shadow shines brightly’ (Gordon 2008, 197). 
The contacts and encounters between the pasts and presents of slav-
ery are not about being able to draw straight lines from one to the 
other, or about being able to draw a line between them, but about 
these moments in the shadows, between the visible and the invisible. 
It is in this shadowy space that we return to the distinctions between 
personhood, subpersonhood and humanity.
Part of this means thinking again about race, gender and exclusion, 
and about how freedom, labour and belonging intersect in the ‘waver-
ing present’ (Gordon 2008, 183) to construct the status of black pris-
oners in the afterlife of slavery. In contrast to the notions of vestige 
and forgetting that are implicit in the dominant discourse of modern 
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slavery, we need to forefront the ‘obligation to remember what our fel-
low citizens cannot reasonably be expected to forget’ (McCarthy 2002, 
629). Thomas McCarthy reminds his readers of DuBois’s point that a 
segregated society required a segregated historical memory, which was 
created through a ‘searing of the memory’ by white supremacist his-
toriography that obliterated the black experience and the meaning of 
emancipation. In Bales’s account of his own segregated memory, he 
places himself in what McCarthy identifi es as the American main-
stream thinking about slavery, which places it in the past, relates to it 
as a Southern phenomenon and does not think of it as central to the 
American story. It becomes instead a regional aberration and a histori-
cal accident (McCarthy 2002, 634). Against this mainstream, McCarthy 
calls attention to the continuing volatility of race relations, where ‘talk 
about racial injustice in the past is typically experienced by both blacks 
and whites, as being also about the present, and reacted to accordingly’. 
The passions and interests of the present, he argues, are integral to the 
politics of the memory of racial injustice, ‘a past that is still present, that 
refuses to pass away’ (McCarthy 2002, 635). 
McCarthy argues not for drawing a direct causal line between the 
unjust and unremedied past and current injustices, but for a more com-
plex narrative, ‘one in which the repeated refusal to acknowledge past 
wrongs and the continued failure to remedy them are themselves fresh 
wrongs that compound the original one’ (McCarthy 2004, 760). He 
acknowledges the risk of reinforcing essentialism through a sense of 
victimisation, but insists that ‘it makes little political sense to maintain 
that a group identity forged during centuries of brutal oppression could 
or should be dissolved while injuries still persist’ (McCarthy 2004, 768), 
or to try to deny what those persistent injuries are and who they belong 
to. In McCarthy’s account, race consciousness can enhance a group’s 
sense of effective agency and transformative power even as hierarchies 
of power and privilege are maintained and a history of disrespect and 
domination continues to structure the meanings of complex person-
hood and of the public good. This is fundamentally different from the 
rupture between past and present proposed by Bales and the rhetoric of 
new slavery, and it casts a very different light on how current injustices 
and inequalities should be understood and resisted. Within this more 
complex web of power relations and rememories, it is possible to get to 
grips with the afterlife of slavery without divorcing it from its racial past 
or disavowing what it means to be vulnerable.
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THE PRISON IN HISTORY, THE PRISON AS HISTORY
In her ground-breaking work Are Prisons Obsolete?, Angela Davis talks 
about how we take prisons for granted, so that it is diffi cult to imag-
ine life without them. In taking them for granted, she says, people are 
reluctant to face the realities of what goes on inside them and tend to 
think about imprisonment as a fate reserved for others, and in par-
ticular others who are not the objects of benevolence or the victims of 
avarice but who deserve their criminal status. Prisons become a simul-
taneous presence and absence, part of the structures of knowing and 
not-knowing, and of the strategic ignorance identifi ed by Charles Mills. 
For Davis, prisons fi ll a ghostly space in the shadows ‘as an abstract site 
into which undesirables are deposited, relieving us of the responsibil-
ity of thinking about the real issues affl icting those communities from 
which prisoners are drawn in such disproportionate numbers’. Davis 
is explicit in arguing that this acceptance of prison parallels the wide-
spread belief in the permanence of slavery in the past, and that ‘prison 
reveals congealed forms of antiblack racism that operate in clandestine 
ways’ (A. Y. Davis 2003) and attach themselves to the racialised histories 
of Latinos, Native Americans and Asian Americans. 
For the scholars and activists who are opposed to hyperincarcera-
tion and the prison industrial complex, there are clear parallels between 
slavery and mass incarceration and they trace its history through con-
vict leasing, white supremacy, violence and civil death with a particular 
focus on the Black Codes. Moments of emancipation and reconstruc-
tion bump up against the anti-black world and the unremedied past 
so that after 1865 the Black Codes in the southern states imposed a 
system of curfews and fi nes and vagrancy laws that prohibited African 
Americans from voting, restricted their travel, denied them equal edu-
cational opportunities and subjected them to a racist legal system and 
to extra-legal lynching (Weatherspoon 2007, 603), reinforcing their sta-
tus as subpersons and outsiders to civil society. Angela Davis argues 
that the ideologies governing slavery and punishment were profoundly 
linked in early US history through the connections between hard labour 
and penal labour and the central role of race in constructing presump-
tions of criminality. The Black Codes proscribed a range of actions such 
as vagrancy, absence from work, breach of job contracts, possession 
of fi rearms and insulting gestures or acts that were criminalised only 
when the person charged was black. The Mississippi Black Codes, for 
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example, declared any black person who had run away, got drunk, been 
wanton, handled money carelessly or neglected their job or family to be 
a vagrant, a crime that was then punishable by incarceration and forced 
labour (A. Y. Davis 2003). Frederick Douglass commented in 1883 that 
reasonable doubt seldom had any force or effect when a black man was 
accused of a crime, and that ‘color is a far better protection to the white 
criminal, than anything else’ (Douglass 1883).
Critical race scholars trace a path through convict leasing to the 
chain gangs and peonage camps to prison plantations, from the mid-
dle passage to the plantation to the chain gang and back again. Childs 
characterises his work as a ‘history of the present’, drawing on Angela 
Davis’s claim that pre-1865 slavery was itself a form of incarceration 
and insisting that what is called modern mass incarceration has been 
‘centuries in the making’ (Karlin 2016). Prison abolitionists recognise 
the overt brutality of convict leasing and the ways in which the model 
of punishment was based on the slavery model of the South, but they 
also point to the importance of alternative systems of social control in 
the North, and the nominally colour-blind criminalisation and incar-
ceration of black people in the North since the 1890s. Their aim is to 
critique a long historiographical tradition of Southern exceptionalism, 
and to argue that racial privilege, the protection offered by whiteness, 
is as important as racial discrimination in understanding the regimes 
of punishment in the US, and in particular what it means to be defi ned 
as a ‘deserving criminal’ (Muhammad 2011, 81). In doing so, they dis-
rupt the mainstream narrative by arguing that slavery cannot be cor-
ralled either into the past or into the South and insisting instead on 
the importance of thinking through slavery, freedom and narratives of 
modernity together. 
For these critical race scholars, the vestiges of slavery have persisted 
in the prison system in mandatory minimum sentences, harsh penalties 
for non-violent drug offences and the continued construction of prisons 
regardless of crime rates. Kim Gilmore points to the importance of rec-
ognising the role of freed blacks and slaves in nineteenth-century US 
abolitionism, and the ways in which their resistance and refusal chal-
lenged the labour and social systems being built on the foundations of 
racial slavery (K. Gilmore 2000, 197). She argues that ‘mass imprison-
ment was employed as a means of coercing resistant freed slaves into 
becoming wage laborers’, and that the role of the state was critical ‘in 
mediating the brutal terms of negotiation between capitalism and the 
5606_Brace.indd   177 12/01/18   6:04 PM
178 The Politics of Slavery
spectrum of unfree labor’ (K. Gilmore 2000, 198). The capitalists used 
the state to recruit and discipline a convict labour force, and were able 
to use the penal system as a powerful sanction against rural blacks. 
The system, and the racism of the system, was used to achieve indus-
trialisation in the South and take a step forward into modernity (A. Y. 
Davis 2003). For Gilmore, prison labour is the bridge between slavery 
and paid work, and the punishment system mirrored the slave order, 
bringing the slave system back to life. The ghosts she sees in the system 
are of the slaves’ dreams of freedom during Reconstruction, and their 
resistive politics, cut short by vigilante justice, racialised violence and 
the state’s role in criminalising ex-slaves. For her, ‘The point of retracing 
this history is not to argue that prisons have been a direct outgrowth 
of slavery, but to interrogate the persistent connections between rac-
ism and the global economy’ (K. Gilmore 2000, 195). Childs argues that 
we need to read today’s ‘legally perpetrated and socially accepted ter-
ror system of penal neoslavery as a continuance rather than a break 
from America’s centuries-long history of chattelized imprisonment and 
white supremacist genocide’ (Childs 2015).
This approach to the afterlife of slavery that uses the concept of 
‘neoslavery’ and argues for the existence of a carceral model that can be 
traced from the middle passage to the plantation and the chain gang 
tells a very different story from that of the modern slavery narrative. For 
Childs, the progressive path of penal modernity has remained tightly 
bound up with chattel slavery in what he calls a permanent Middle Pas-
sage (Childs 2015). He uses Morrison’s concept of rememory to explore 
how the black subaltern is caught by and in a history where the past ‘is 
felt as an “open wound” that keeps reopening with every breath’ (Childs 
2015). There is no possibility of walking away, of being ‘one of those 
people’ who think there is no such thing as slavery anymore, and no 
need to go searching elsewhere for the ‘real slavery’ that others cannot 
see. He is talking instead about a complex history of terror, disposses-
sion and rupture that underpins what he terms ‘the predicament of lib-
eral de jure freedom’ for black people in the US. Like Gilmore, he draws 
attention to what happened to free and fugitive black people during 
the Reconstruction era, and argues that they represent a ‘haunting pro-
logue’ of the collective experience of black people after the arrival of de 
jure freedom (Childs 2015). 
While this approach to history draws clear connecting lines between 
past, present and future and focuses on the continuities rather than the 
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breaks in the black experience of oppression and injustice, it is not about 
seeking out new slaves or about drawing bright lines between acute forms 
of suffering and exploitation and slavery itself. Michelle Alexander in her 
book The New Jim Crow points to the familiar stigma and shame, the sys-
tem of control, political disenfranchisement, legalised discrimination and 
the production of racial meanings that defi ne the current prison system. 
The exclusion of felons from juries, she argues, ‘has put black defendants 
in a familiar place – in a courtroom in shackles, facing an all-white jury’. 
Segregating prisoners from mainstream society and taking their status for 
granted means that prisoners return to ghetto communities in ‘a closed 
circuit of perpetual marginality’ (Alexander 2010a, 189, 191). At the same 
time, she recognises the limits of the analogy between slavery and incar-
ceration and acknowledges the way things have changed and different 
narratives have taken hold as racial vigilante violence has reduced, seg-
regationist thinking has been rejected, and public discourse has shifted 
from racial hostility to racial indifference (Alexander 2010a, 198). This is a 
messier and uneven picture, and black people emerge within it not only 
as victims, but also as sometimes complicit in their support for ‘get tough’ 
systems of imprisonment, while white people are in some cases directly 
harmed by the caste system. The pattern that Alexander sees behind 
these tangled threads moves through slavery as exploitation, Jim Crow 
as subordination, and mass incarceration as marginalisation (Alexander 
2010a, 207), but she does not make a claim for interchangeability or direct 
analogy. It is more about interrogating the persistent connections and 
their meanings, recognising where the past is still present and acknowl-
edging when the shadows shine brightly.
THE PRISON ITSELF
The Californian prison population grew by nearly 500 per cent between 
1982 and 2000. Of 160,000 prisoners, two thirds were African Americans 
and Latinos. Twenty-fi ve per cent of them were non-citizens, and eighty 
per cent were represented by state-appointed lawyers for the indigent. 
Convicts are overwhelmingly the working or workless poor (R. Gilmore 
2007, 7). Ruth Gilmore draws attention to the relationship of prison to 
dispossession. As a consequence of certain actions, some people lose all 
freedom. Historically, the poor would have been classifi ed as vagrants 
and subjected to curfew, but not necessarily locked up ‘because their 
unfreedom was guaranteed by other means’ (R. Gilmore 2007, 12). Her 
5606_Brace.indd   179 12/01/18   6:04 PM
180 The Politics of Slavery
argument is that prisons exist in order to produce social stability as ‘soci-
eties decide they should lock people out by locking them in’ and offer 
justifi cations for imprisonment such as retribution, deterrence, reha-
bilitation and what she terms ‘incapacitation’ (R. Gilmore 2007, 13). For 
Gilmore, the underlying explanation for prisons is that capital must be 
able to get rid of workers whose labour power is no longer desirable, 
and at the same time have access to new or ‘previously idled labor’ as 
the need arises. Workers without work ‘must wait, migrate, or languish 
until – if ever – new opportunities to sell their labor power emerge’ 
(R. Gilmore 2007, 71). In her analysis, the new state built itself in part by 
building prisons, and the key to understanding the growth of prisons is 
the goal of incapacitation and the production of prisoners. Prisons are a 
means of achieving dehumanisation and producing racial categories. It 
is this rather than the unpaid labour performed in prison that connects 
imprisonment to ‘new slavery’ for Gilmore. As it does for Davis, Alexander 
and Childs, the link between slavery and incarceration comes from 
exclusion and dispossession, and from a particular kind of rightlessness. 
This is not just about profi t, but about the creation and maintenance of 
a perpetual enemy who must always be fought but can never be con-
quered. The connections between slavery and prison are ‘more about the 
construction and consolidation of a certain kind of enemy status’ than 
they are about the people who have been criminalised (Loyd 2012, 49). 
Both groups are treated as if they share common features that are closely 
related to Patterson’s constituent elements of slavery of alienation, vio-
lent domination, coercive force and general dishonour until they are 
identifi able as ‘the prison race’ (Loyd 2012, 50).
It is worth exploring further what being put into this category of 
previously idled labour and incapacitated means for conceptions of 
personhood and subpersonhood. Joan Dayan proposes a ‘continuum 
between being declared dead in law, being made a slave, and being 
judged a criminal’ and her analysis rewrites the crossing between the 
state of nature and civil society not as a single act, but as a repeated 
ritual. She uses William Blackstone’s Commentaries on Law to explain 
how natural liberty is ‘the savage essence that must be ferreted out, 
as a stain’ (J. Dayan 2001, 6–7). This killing off of natural liberty is a 
ritual that has to be staged over and over again, so that nature can be 
disguised and reproduced in law, and the stability of civilisation can 
be affi rmed. In the process of this ritual, the law puts the criminal out 
of its protection and takes no further care of him. As Locke says about 
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the person who breaks the law of nature, the criminal breaks the tie 
that is meant to secure him from injury and violence and puts himself 
outside the social contract, making himself into an outcast who may 
be killed like a lion or a tiger. For Blackstone, ‘he is then called attaint, 
attinctus, stained or blackened’ (J. Dayan 2001, 7). Dayan argues that 
slavery in the colonies required ‘the justifi cation of the inner depravity 
of those enslaved’, so that blackness was equated with slavery, but at 
the same time the presumption of servitude and the stain of natural 
liberty was also inseparable from ‘alternative experiments in unfree-
dom’ such as the subjugation of the Irish, indentured servitude and 
the vagrancy acts that ‘had already provided a template for domina-
tion’ (J. Dayan 2001, 9). 
Dayan moves from this discussion of legal slavery to talk about the 
confi nement of prisoners becoming an alternative to slavery, what she 
calls ‘another kind of receptacle for imperfect creatures whose civil dis-
ease justifi ed containment’ (J. Dayan 2001, 15). For her, this narrative 
offers a powerful counter-argument to the currents of Southern excep-
tionalism. The penitentiary in the North, she argues, ‘turned humans 
into the living dead’, especially through the mechanisms of solitary 
confi nement and symbolic execution. A criminal punished with civil 
death became the slave of the state, ‘so that once incarcerated, the pris-
oner endured the substance and visible form of disability, as if imagi-
natively recolored, bound, and owned’ by the state in place of the slave 
owner (J. Dayan 2001, 15–16). The invention of criminality and the 
imposition of civil death reversed the process of transforming humans 
into moral beings. This idea of being the slave of the state is about the 
‘escape clause’ of the Thirteenth Amendment which abolished slavery 
and involuntary servitude except as punishment for a crime, and for 
many of those who advocate for prison abolition and others who write 
about the reinvention of slavery as incarceration, this idea of civil death 
is central to their argument, and connects the treatment of legal slaves 
in the nineteenth century to the treatment of prisoners in the twenti-
eth and twenty-fi rst centuries. Rather than taking the modern slavery 
approach of distinguishing ‘old’ slavery from ‘real’ slavery and striving 
to come up with new defi nitions of what it means to be a slave, these 
ideas return in many ways to Orlando Patterson’s constituent elements 
of slavery, and in particular to the idea of social and civil death. This 
has a profound effect on the focus of their analysis in its recognition of 
injury and subjection, its concern to explore the making of status and 
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exclusion, and the gradual annihilation of the person through solitary 
confi nement which ‘permits the suffering of the soul before the death of 
the body’ (J. Dayan 2001, 20). Dayan has an anonymised quotation from 
a prisoner she interviewed in Arizona State Prison in 1996 which sum-
marises this sense of living death: ‘If they only touch you when you’re 
at the end of a chain, then they can’t see you as anything but a dog. I’ve 
lost my skin. I can’t feel my mind’ (J. Dayan 2001, 20–1).
These theorists of incarceration focus on what goes on inside the 
prison, and especially in the restricted settings of special security units 
and supermaximum security prisons where inmates are spending lon-
ger and longer locked in solitary confi nement, often alone in their cells 
for twenty-three hours a day. What was used rarely as a disciplinary tool 
has been redefi ned as normal for those held under special or secure 
management, and the ‘conditions of confi nement are manipulated in 
order to confi rm depravity’. Dayan enumerates the savage effects of 
solitary confi nement that takes the prisoners beyond human endurance 
and creates an arena for mutilation, with the inmates turning paper 
clips into darts and sharpening pencils into pincers in order to harm 
themselves. Like Gilmore, she sees this as an expression of disposses-
sion and legal incapacitation, part of a process through which the cap-
tives endure unbearable conditions that make them feel responsible for 
disfi guring themselves, and for unravelling as unifi ed moral selves. The 
inmates who mutilate themselves have enacted what Dayan calls the 
‘law’s process of decreation’ on their own bodies, ‘making visible what 
the law masks’ (J. Dayan 2001, 28). This notion of de-creation and of 
the living, disfi gured dead very closely recalls Hartman’s description 
of the slaves being overlooked because their misery failed to arouse 
the emotion of compassion. With individual criminals, we reach the 
limits of benevolence and come crashing up against questions of their 
agency at the margins of the state’s power. As Childs argues, the temp-
tation is to ignore the structural injuries, what he calls the ‘larger social 
recidivism’, in favour of branding individual black persons as criminals 
(Karlin 2016). The story of national innocence is written to leave prison-
ers behind, to reinscribe them as deserving of their fate, and to defi ne 
them as not-slaves because their captors are the state, and not sinister 
modern ‘slaveholders’ waiting to enslave them for being destitute or 
left-handed. Like the slave, these prisoners have chosen to submit and 
live, and in this primal act of submission they are, in Patterson’s terms, 
degraded, and their resistance overcome. They are dishonoured within 
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an intersubjective space that is structured by the state, and not by the 
master’s domination of the slave. 
Dayan focuses on the conditions of solitary confi nement in US pris-
ons, and in particular on the indefi nite confi nement of gang members 
on the basis of their status as gang members, where evidence against 
them bears no logical relation to the specifi c deprivations they are 
forced to undergo. Instead of going through due process, alleged gang 
members are locked down in special treatment units and labelled as 
‘security threat groups’. She gives accounts of individuals being held 
in virtual isolation because of their status as purported members of 
these groups, where their only way out of solitary confi nement is to 
debrief and denounce. This is not a possible route out for those who 
were not gang members in the fi rst place, and those individuals who 
do debrief are targeted for death by gang members and sent to protec-
tive custody in another restricted segregated facility: ‘Anyone suspected 
of gang affi liation, whether he debriefs or not, is thus condemned to 
what amounts to solitary confi nement for the rest of his life’ (Dayan 
2008, 500). Dayan points out that the harsh logic of supermax detention 
relies on arbitrary deprivations based on status, and this combination of 
confi nement and secrecy is what Blackstone called a dangerous engine 
of arbitrary government that undermines the principle of habeas corpus 
(Dayan 2008, 501). The ‘residuum of liberty’ that attaches to the prisoner 
as a legal person is no longer as important as maintaining order (Dayan 
2008, 493). As we saw in the discussion of Locke, slavery and punish-
ment have always been closely linked, and the fi gure of the criminal 
shows us the history of slavery as it coalesces around the selectivity of 
natural rights and the concept of enslavability.
INCARCERATION AND RACIAL CASTE
In 2010, Michelle Alexander points out, more African Americans were 
under correctional control (in prison, jail and on probation or parole) 
than were enslaved in 1850. Members of this growing undercaste are 
permanently relegated to second-class status, denied the right to vote, 
excluded from juries, and legally discriminated against in employment, 
housing, access to education and public benefi ts (Alexander 2010b, 75). 
In her analysis, slavery has to be understood as a legal status, endorsed 
by the state. It cannot be the same thing as being illegally subject to 
the domination of another. There has been a shift in status from slave 
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to felon, but ‘Once a person is labeled a felon, he or she is ushered 
into a parallel universe in which discrimination, stigma, and exclusion 
are perfectly legal, and privileges of citizenship such as voting and jury 
service are off-limits’ (Alexander 2010a, 92). It is the legality of prison-
ers’ dispossession and incapacitation that is signifi cant, both in and out 
of prison. They are locked away, but not in a place where race ‘means 
little’. In ways which recall just-war justifi cations of slavery and the idea 
of slavery as punishment, ‘In the drug war, the enemy is racially defi ned’ 
(Alexander 2010a, 96). As Grotius argued, men can become slaves ‘by a 
human Fact’, though agreement, crime or conquest, and criminals for-
feited their own lives by some act that deserves death (Grotius [1625] 
2005, 75). Slavery and the state of war, as we have seen, are mutually 
constitutive, and the criminalised captive is constructed as the aggres-
sor who introduces a state of war.
People who are branded as felons are given a badge of inferiority 
and are caught in a cycle that sends them in and out of prison and back 
again and leaves them subject to constant surveillance by the police. 
Young black men are treated as criminals in multiple settings, in the 
street, at school, community centres and at home, until the entire com-
munity is seen by them as ‘collaborating to form a system that degraded 
and dishonored them at an everyday level’ (Rios 2006, 44). Rather like 
the indigenous peoples whose treatment was discussed in the chapter 
on Locke, they are mewed up within their own contracted territories, 
and their relationship to reason and liberty is treated as uncertain and 
incomplete. They end up not being integrated into the mainstream 
society and economy, but being constantly stopped and searched 
by the police and returned to prison for minor infractions. They are 
treated as the embodiment of risk and monitored and controlled by 
the state through probation offi cers. From his fi eldwork, Victor Rios 
describes young men who experienced the ‘overwhelming presence’ of 
their probation offi cers as the forceful intervention of the state in their 
lives through supervision and sanctions. The youth of colour he met he 
describes as hypercriminalised because ‘they encounter criminalization 
in all the settings they navigate’ in a system of interconnected institu-
tions that attempt to brand, control and contain them (Rios 2006, 52). 
As a social group, Alexander argues, criminals are ‘deemed a charac-
terless and purposeless people, deserving of our collective scorn and 
contempt’ (Alexander 2010a, 138). In the US, convicted felons are not 
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allowed to enlist in the military, possess a fi rearm or obtain federal 
security clearance. Citizens lose the right to vote and non-citizens are 
immediately deportable. The word ‘felon’ has become a label of stig-
matisation, a way to signify otherness and to fi lter access to housing, 
employment and education (King 2006, 8). The prohibition on voting, 
Ryan King argues, is essentially a character test on the franchise, a 
restriction based on worthiness to vote that renders some people alien 
in their own country by telling them that their voices are unwelcome 
in the national discourse, that their interests cannot stand for the pub-
lic good (King 2006, 13–15). They are incorporated into the legal and 
political system as felons and criminals in ways that defi ne their status 
because they have ceased to belong in their own right to any legitimate 
social order. They live in something close to what Locke describes as 
the ‘state of slavery’, within which their lives, liberties and estates are 
forfeited and their rights are readily denied, infringed or transgressed. 
Disenfranchisement is not grounded on a legal solid principle or in 
considerations of the greater social good. It plays instead, King argues, 
to the politics of retribution and fear. They are shut out of civil society 
and denied the possibility and the privilege of political resistance. This, 
again, is about the creation of status and about where ‘slavery’ fi ts into 
the basic structure of politics, either as ‘neoslavery’ or as ‘new slavery’. 
The anti-prison reckoning with the afterlife of slavery is in this sense 
both necessary and dangerous. It requires a reorientation of vantage 
point and a focus on the power relations that we live in now, to recog-
nise where we are in this story, to struggle with that politics of retribu-
tion and fear rather than to insist on a post-racial world.
THE PRISON AND THE BORDER
The construction of prisoners as a characterless and purposeless peo-
ple, Loïc Wacquant argues, depends on ‘a vast discursive constellation 
of terms and theses that come from America on crime, violence, justice, 
inequality, and responsibility’ and have been insinuated into European 
public debate as part of what he calls ‘the redefi nition of the mission 
of the state’ (Wacquant 1999, 320). As the state withdraws from the 
economic arena and reduces its social role, it builds more prisons and 
incarcerates more people. Wacquant terms this ‘the new penal com-
mon sense’ that aims to apply market principles to social problems and 
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in the process criminalises poverty and normalises precarious wage 
labour (Wacquant 1999, 321). This new common sense mirrors quite 
closely Hutcheson’s justifi cations of the enslavement of the British poor 
as vagabonds and vagrants, using slavery as the proper punishment 
for those who ruined themselves and made themselves a public bur-
den. Wacquant points in particular to policies of zero tolerance in public 
spaces, which often involve the management of ‘troublesome poverty’. 
The rhetoric of the war on crime and of recapturing public space is, 
he says, ‘a rhetoric that assimilates (real or imaginary) criminals, the 
homeless, panhandlers, and other marginal persons to foreign invaders’ 
(Wacquant 1999, 327). This idea that criminals and vagabonds are for-
eign invaders is effective for forging a consensus around the idea that 
the undeserving poor ought to be brought back under control by the 
state, using curfews and other social sanctions as well as reimprison-
ment. His sense is that the few are once again enslavable for the good 
of the whole, and liberty has to be understood as a class privilege linked 
to property, reason and virtue. 
By insisting that ‘slavery should not be confused with anything else’ 
(Bales 2012a, 259) and that slavery is not to do with working conditions, 
Bales and other antislavery activists take a highly selective approach to 
identifying the ‘new slaves’, and offer very little analysis of the back-
ground conditions that led to the creation of the vulnerability that they 
talk about as the basis for enslavability. As Julia O’Connell Davidson 
argues, this selectivity is in part explained by their attachment to a lib-
eral narrative of advancement, which is in turn linked to these activ-
ists’ vision of the state as a neutral arbiter. As she points out, slavery 
depended on legal, social and physical restrictions on slave movement 
imposed by the state. In today’s world, people also fi nd their mobil-
ity circumscribed not just by incarceration, but also by immigration 
laws and border enforcement. Such immigration regimes, O’Connell 
Davidson argues, often create vulnerability to exploitation and abuse 
by private individuals, empowering individuals to exercise violence 
over others at what Sassen characterises as ‘the systemic edges’ (Sassen 
2016). We need to pay attention to the state-led production of political 
vulnerability and criminalisation that strips people of political standing 
and of meaningful recognition (Sheth 2016, 92). The new abolitionism, 
as O’Connell Davidson points out, does not challenge the right claimed 
by states to control and restrict freedom of movement (O’Connell 
Davidson 2015). 
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Restrictions on the right to locomotion can be read as connecting 
old slavery to neoslavery and the past to the present in very different 
ways from those proposed by the new abolitionists. Dylan Rodriguez, 
for example, argues that we need to understand prison as a form of 
violence perpetrated by the state, and recognise the capacity of the state 
to reform and shift its techniques of bodily coercion (Rodriguez 2008, 
2–4). For Rodriguez, border militarisation, anti-terrorism and anti-
gang policing are all expressions of global US imperialism, and the US 
prison is part of ‘a regime of domination and strategic violence’, which 
is global in its reach (Rodriguez 2008, 6) and encompasses not just the 
golden gulags of California but immigration detention prisons as well. 
In arguing for this model of a ‘regime’, Rodriguez is making the point 
that these are not self-contained institutions, but together form a pro-
totype of organised punishment and social, civil and biological death 
through what he calls ‘the kinship of captivity’ (Rodriguez 2008, 7). The 
complex haunting of the present by the past, the elusive concreteness 
of the politics of slavery, is there in the state’s capacity for violence that 
refuses to pass away.
This analysis of carceral violence builds on the arguments about 
mass incarceration in the US to think about prison itself as a border, 
and prison and border regimes as ‘the culmination of many histories 
of struggle over colonialism, the nation-state, and what it means to 
be human’ (Loyd, Mitchelson and Burridge 2012, 2). Contemporary 
penal and migration policies are tied together through a shared pro-
cess of criminalisation. Citizenship, incapacitation and punishment 
work together ‘to legally consign entire groups of people to precarious 
futures and premature deaths’ (Loyd, Mitchelson and Burridge 2012, 
4). The connection between the rise of the nation state and the rise 
of the prison is located, Loyd, Mitchelson and Burridge argue, in the 
contradiction between mobility and immobility, and in laws that ‘legiti-
mate the forcible confi nement and isolation of some groups of people’. 
These laws, they go on, ‘also draw lines of power between groups of 
people who will be (or expect to be) entitled to be a part of the pub-
lic, share in the social wealth, and contribute to shaping the common 
good for present and future generations’(Loyd, Mitchelson and Bur-
ridge 2012, 7). Those who are not incorporated into this vision of the 
public good and complex personhood are fundamentally insecure, with 
a special kind of outsiderness as enemies, foreigners and strangers, but 
also as lazy, irresponsible and irrational. The social being of a prisoner 
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and a migrant, like that of a slave, can be altered at any point by the 
will of another when they are understood to have crossed the waving 
line between the state of nature and civil society, or the mobile border 
between person and subperson. 
Angela Davis argues that the globalisation of the prison industrial 
complex is entangled with immigration detention centres and facilities 
in which prisoners of war are incarcerated, the prisons in Guantanamo 
and Abu Ghraib and the normalisation of torture. It is, she claims, ‘really 
easy to traffi c between the various systems’ (Kautzer and Mendieta 
2004, 342). Guantanamo and Camp X-ray were enabled by the rapid 
development of new technologies within domestic prisons, and new 
military techniques in turn inform what happens inside supermax facil-
ities. Angela Davis argues that the sensory deprivation, solitary confi ne-
ment and lack of human contact in prison reinforces the ‘everydayness 
of torture’ elsewhere, making it possible to treat it as unexceptional and 
creating a situation where ‘the minimum implies the supermaximum’ 
(Kautzer and Mendieta 2004, 345). For Anne McClintock, we can trace 
circuits of imperial violence that are connected with ‘the vast, internal 
shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes – the “modern slave ships on 
the middle passage to nowhere”’ (McClintock 2009). The majority of 
the men held at Guantanamo were arbitrarily detained, and of the 700 
held there very few could yield any information at all. Most were not 
picked up by the US military but by the Northern Alliance, the Pakistani 
military intelligence who handed them over for bounties of between 
fi ve and ten thousand dollars (McClintock 2009, 65). 
McClintock describes the new regime of torture to which they were 
subject as one in which the self was broken down through radical sen-
sory deprivation, disorientation and extreme stress. She draws attention 
to the bright visibility of the outside spaces in Guantanamo, and to the 
invisibility of their suffering that left no traces on the body. Torture was 
administered ‘without visible trace or touch’, leaving them ‘reduced to 
zombies, unpeopled bodies, dead men walking, bodies as imperial prop-
erty’ (McClintock 2009, 65). McClintock uses the language and imagery 
of the middle passage and of social death to conjure a vision that is at 
once hypermodern and saturated in the past, an open imperial wound, 
as the men are declared to belong to the US Marine Corps, to be the 
mere property of the state. The state goes to great lengths to prevent the 
prisoners from committing suicide, as if taking their own lives would 
be a unilateral declaration of war, an attempt to rob the empire of its 
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legitimacy. The empire produces the enemy through spectacle and dis-
play, by keeping these bodies under hypersurveillance in see-through 
cages and cells made of mesh, but ‘[a]t the same time, these men are 
made juridically spectral, conjured into legal ghosts’ (McClintock 2009, 
67). Their shadows are shining so brightly that it is possible to see right 
through them. Lights of different colours shine on the same spot, and 
the light refl ecting from that spot is ‘an additive mixture’ because it is 
the sum of all the light (Science Snacks 2017). Guantanamo represents 
another example of being made dead in law, taken outside of protec-
tion and tainted. In their orange suits that signify danger and security 
threats to Western viewers, the prisoners are imaginatively recoloured, 
as bound and owned by the state. The creation of the prisoners’ status 
derives from America’s colonial legal history and the ‘law’s ability to 
invent persons who yet remain in a negative relation to law’ (Dayan 
2008, 486), to bring the slave into existence. Dayan points to ‘the per-
petual re-creation of the rightless entity’, from slave codes to prison 
cases to torture memos that create new classes of condemned people 
who have lost the right to have rights. Terrorist suspects are not told 
who their accusers are or how they came to make their accusations. 
They cannot confront the witnesses against them, and hearsay evidence 
is allowed to stand. The label ‘illegal enemy combatant’ puts them out-
side claims to legality and inside ‘a space of incapacitation’ (Dayan 2008, 
489) where no law exists for them. They become, Dayan argues, ‘ghost 
detainees’ in Iraq, Afghanistan, Diego Garcia and other CIA secret 
prisons, who ‘inhabit a spectral world that has no political boundaries’ 
(Dayan 2008, 489). 
CONCLUSION
The discourse of new abolitionism treats ‘new slavery’ as a hidden 
crime, as something that can be found only by looking behind the 
legal masks to fi nd people in chains (Bales 2012a, 6). The ‘disposable 
people’ they fi gure as enslaved are not conjured as the enemy, but as 
helpless victims. In the process, the new abolitionists refuse to engage 
with the politics of retribution and fear, and to grapple with the dan-
gers of the past. Their understanding of ‘slavery’ as illegal means that 
their approach cannot engage with the production of status or with 
the politics of slavery. The focus on individual violence by slavehold-
ers, and on the idea of ‘total control’ means that the discourse allows 
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them to glimpse ‘the horror of a life captured and destroyed to feed the 
greed of a slaveholder’ (Bales 2012a, 246), but not to understand the 
more complex contexts and spectral hauntings that are connected to 
history, the state and imperialism. The approach of theorists who focus 
on the afterlives of slavery in modern prisons is not about identifying 
alternative modern slaves, but, as O’Connell Davidson points out, the 
US penal system involves forcible detention, the theft of entire lives and 
important elements of anti-blackness (O’Connell Davidson 2015, 100). 
The new abolitionists make a choice not to include the prison indus-
trial complex in their discourse of modern slavery, and for Tryon Woods 
(2013) that choice is part of their disavowal of the ongoing relations of 
racial slavery, their lack of recognition of the ‘embedded reality’ of right-
lessness and the failure to incorporate black prisoners into the state. 
The same blind spots and optical illusions surface in their treatment of 
traffi cking as a form of modern slavery.
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Chapter 9
TRAFFICKING AND SLAVERY: 
A PLACE OF NO RETURN?
This chapter returns us to new abolitionist attempts to defi ne and 
combat modern slavery in the context of recasting traffi cking as a form 
of modern slavery. It looks in particular at how this discourse relies 
on particular conceptions of property and of violence that reinscribe 
the individual, private character of slavery and the idea of slavery as a 
place of no return. Once again, freedom shows itself to have different 
shades, and we fi nd ourselves inside the complex, cross-institutional, 
cross-discursive world of politics at the border. The new abolitionist 
approach to traffi cking as slavery alerts us to the risks associated with 
regarding the body as property, and to what Anne Phillips calls ‘the 
pervasive individualism in the claim to a property right’ (Phillips 2013, 
137). Understanding traffi cking as a new form of slavery (or as a form 
of new slavery) often involves an intense focus on the narrative of the 
victim and on the circumstances of the female body. The woman traf-
fi cked into slavery has become the paradigmatic chattel of the new 
slavery. This brings us back to the discourses of ‘unhumanising’ and 
‘debasement’ that haunted the antislavery writings of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, and reanimates the idea that slavery is a pro-
cess of converting people into things (O’Connell Davidson 2016, 230). 
At the same time, it pushes into the background more complicated 
questions about labour, and about citizenship and belonging. Antislav-
ery discourse continues to be structured around the question of who 
is eligible for freedom. What gives the production of a victim through 
a narrative of excessive dependence such traction in the current con-
text of traffi cking and migration? How is that traction related to the 
new abolitionism and its own investments in the role of the state, the 
veneer of humanitarianism and sexualised xenophobia?
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THE PROPERTIES OF SLAVERY
This chapter seeks to interrogate what it means to claim that the bru-
tally exploited and the radically excluded are the property of others. 
Modern slavery discourse focuses on ‘the individual lived experience 
of enslavement’ (O’Connell Davidson 2016, 248) where slavery ‘at its 
most essential is about control’. In 2012, Kevin Bales and others in 
the Research Network on the Legal Parameters of Slavery produced 
the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines on the Legal Parameters of Slavery. These 
guidelines use the 1926 Convention of the League of Nations as the 
basis for their defi nition, meaning that they start from the premise of 
ownership and the rights and powers attaining to the right of owner-
ship. They take these powers attaching to the right of ownership to 
mean powers that constitute control over a person in such a way as to 
deprive that person of his or her individual liberty with the intention 
of exploiting them. The exercise of this control is usually supported 
by and obtained through force, deception or coercion. For Bales, this 
mixture of control, ownership and force sets the parameters of ‘the 
fundamental social and economic relationship between two people 
that constitutes slavery’ (Bales 2012b, 283). It forms, he says, a bridge 
between the lived reality of enslavement and the legal defi nition. 
‘Modern slaveholders’, Bales argues, exercise the powers attached to 
the right of ownership in the absence of the rule of law and in the con-
text of illegality. His argument is that what he calls ‘the fundamental 
powers of ownership’, control, use, management and profi t, can be 
exercised outside a legal framework (Bales 2012b, 284). He recognises 
that the slipperiness of this relationship between slavery and the rule 
of law causes problems for prosecuting slavery, and in particular for the 
new slaves’ would-be liberators, who have ‘a clear experiential under-
standing of what defi nes slavery’ that is diffi cult to couch in legal terms 
(Bales 2012b, 285). For Bales, what is required is some way of bringing 
together these experiential understandings that apply ‘in the work of 
liberation and reintegration’ and legal defi nitions, so that liberation can 
lead to legal action (Bales 2012b, 285).
The development of antislavery politics requires the recognition that 
slavery is expressed in many forms, but is, at the same time, a ‘patterned 
activity’. Slavery has ‘overarching themes of violence, possession, and 
exploitation’, and the traffi cking-as-slavery discourse works hard to 
identify these themes in the stories they tell about the victims of slavery, 
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subjected to their traffi ckers and pimps (Bales 2012b, 285). They need 
to identify the two people caught up in a social and economic relation-
ship within which one of the parties exercises ownership and control 
over the other without recourse to the law. Slavery, as Bales admits in a 
footnote, is now illegal in every country. This gives the new abolitionists 
some pause, but they do not allow it to disturb them too much. Instead, 
they reconceive slavery as a crime, a hidden activity, in which victimisa-
tion is not an event, but a process of violent exploitation that can last 
for decades. It is this, Bales argues, that means that the victims of slav-
ery are ‘normally unable to report that they are victims of crime’ (Bales 
2012b, 286). At the same time, he claims that no country is immune to 
this crime, ‘and documented cases and victims numbering in the thou-
sands are found in North America, Europe, Japan, and other developed 
countries in spite of reasonably functioning legal systems’ (Bales 2012b, 
287). It is not clear where these thousands of documents came from 
when the victims themselves are unable to report the crimes, but this 
re-imagining of slavery as an act of criminal violence helps to reinforce 
the experiential understanding of liberation and reorients slavery’s rela-
tion to the law. Bales argues that in this new criminal context, ‘[t]o turn 
someone into a slave means keeping them where the law cannot protect 
them’ (Bales 2012b, 298), but this fails to recognise the complex ways in 
which slavery is a relation to the law, the state and sovereign power, and 
that slavery is a legal, social and political status (O’Connell Davidson 
2016). Telling a true crime story with slavery on one side and law on the 
other obscures the entangled interrelations between the two. 
The exercise of ownership and control becomes a property right 
when it can generate duties for others. Individual property rights 
require recognition by others, and so a collective context in which they 
can be exercised and realised. Private property, in the sense of manage-
ment, use and disposal, is only held by virtue of communal relations 
and the co-operation of others. Ownership can only be exercised in 
the public realm of social relations, where the owners’ expectations are 
affi rmed, legitimated and protected by law. People who are kept where 
the law cannot protect them cannot be the property of someone else. A 
defi nition of slavery that understands it as a relationship between two 
people will struggle to explain how it can be a relationship based on the 
fundamental powers of ownership, since the fundamental powers of 
ownership have to be nested within a much broader network of inter-
actions. In his attempt to combine the legal and experiential aspects of 
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slavery in his defi nition, Bales relies on the ‘bundle of rights’ conception 
of ownership, and in doing so he focuses on ‘the individual, momentary 
owner rather than the broader position or situation of ownership’. As a 
result, he ignores the complicated ways in which ownership functions 
as social justifi cation, within which, Dan Fuller argues, the owner is not 
necessarily the person with practical control over something at a given 
moment, but ‘the normative anchor of the network of relations that 
attend it’ (Fuller 2014, 18). To be considered an owner, with property 
rights in another person, an individual needs to be able to draw their 
authority from a framework of legal properties, liabilities and duties 
that persist over time, refl ecting not just the momentary distribution 
of rights but the source of their entitlements and the social importance 
of their ownership rights. Property rights are good against the entire 
world, and impose duties on everyone else, including those who did not 
take part in the transaction. They cannot be narrowed down to a rela-
tionship between two people, or rest on a criminal act that cannot give 
the so-called slaveholder any normative authority to direct what hap-
pens to the slave. As the abolitionists of the eighteenth century worked 
so hard to demonstrate, the moral basis of owning a property in the 
person is not overridden by force. This means that it makes little sense 
to identify the traffi cker or the pimp as holding property rights over 
their slaves. Instead, the new slavery argument is that, following the 
League of Nations defi nition, they exercise ‘the powers attaching to the 
right of ownership’, which does not require a legal framework because 
it is all about power, and not authority (Lott 2014). 
The essential attribute of slavery identifi ed by the new abolition-
ists is control that deprives people of their individual liberty, and 
is underpinned by force, threat, deception or coercion for the pur-
poses of exploitation ‘through the use, management, profi t transfer 
or disposal of that person’ (Bales 2012b, 283). These, for Bales, are the 
essential attributes of slavery that ‘have been and are the same across 
geography and time’ (Bales 2012b, 287). This search for the essential 
and timeless attributes of slavery is part of what Joseph Miller identi-
fi es as the inclination to fi nd coherence ‘even if only in the brutality 
of domination’ (Miller 2012, 5), but it is also a highly political move, 
which both in the eighteenth century and the twenty-fi rst works to 
project ‘the social costs and amorality of growing capitalism onto slav-
ery’ (Miller 2012, 7), which is then fi gured as ‘inhuman commerce’ and 
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criminal activity. Modern slavery is defi ned as a ‘truly globalized crim-
inal enterprise’ (Bales 2012b, 288). It is presented as operating through 
globalised fi nancial systems, criss-crossing national borders, unim-
peded by the nation state. The global traffi c in slaves, says Bales, ‘regu-
larly fl ows over and under borders’, along with drugs and weapons, 
making clandestine use of the Internet (Bales 2012b, 289). Traffi cking 
is presented as representing about ten per cent of global enslavement, 
and as highly profi table because enslaved people come from poorer 
countries and are then traded in richer countries. Bales goes on to 
point out that traffi cked individuals tend to be better educated, and 
are tricked into slavery on the basis of their willingness to seek change 
and opportunity. These attributes, on this account, seem to help them 
to retain their value, to cross borders of geography and time, but they 
also turn them into abstractions, disconnected from intentions, con-
texts and their own agency until their exploitation is understood as 
‘universal within our species’, because sexual use or the enjoyment 
of violent domination ‘require few other skills or attributes other than 
those provided by biology’ (Bales 2012b, 290). Once we are left with a 
defi nition of slavery as rooted in biology rather than history, it is clear 
that the defi nition of slavery behind the new abolitionism will always 
extract generalised masters and slaves from the specifi c situations in 
which they live, and present us with enslaved people who are ‘already 
on hand and in hand, unproblematically subject to a master’s compul-
sion to dominate’ (Miller 2012, 21). Slavery, as Miller argues, can then 
be presented as ‘an institution that is a fait accompli, accomplished, 
a done deal, general, and static’. This understanding of slavery as an 
intractable problem is at the core of the new abolitionism, allowing 
them to argue that ‘we have left slavery as an evil lurking eternally in 
the hearts of men (and women)’ (Miller 2012, 29), and not just in our 
hearts, but in our biology and in our cosmology. Slaves, says Bales, 
are ‘something like the “dark matter” in the universe – invisible, but 
exerting a strong (and negative) pull on local and national economies’ 
(Bales 2012b, 294). 
As Lott points out, the focus on the powers attaching to ownership 
and on control allows the conception of slavery to be extended to vari-
ous forms of unfree labour, whether or not a contract exists (Lott 2014). 
The new slavery discourse elides slavery with forced labour in a variety 
of industries from agriculture, mining and quarrying to brick-making, 
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carpet-making, and domestic service. According to Bales, this ‘forced 
labour for economic exploitation’ accounts for ninety per cent of slav-
ery in Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East, with the remaining ten per cent accounted for by commercial 
sexual exploitation. In the US and Europe, meanwhile, commercial 
sexual exploitation is estimated to account for fi fty to seventy-fi ve per 
cent of those in slavery (Bales 2012b, 287). In focusing on forced labour 
for economic exploitation, Bales is talking about contexts of poverty, 
hardship and rightlessness, where large percentages of the popula-
tion are living below the international poverty line of US$1.25 a day, 
in the DRC (88%), Haiti (62%), India (30%) and Uzbekistan (46%). 
As O’Connell Davidson points out, in such contexts people’s lives 
are constrained by debts, by harsh and unsafe working conditions for 
children as well as adults, and by working long hours for wages that 
often do not cover their subsistence (O’Connell Davidson 2015, 8). The 
question remains whether it is useful to characterise people living in 
these situations as slaves. As we have seen, to conceptualise some-
one as a slave often involves thinking of them as passive and inert, as 
swept along by the currents of history, but also as a sordid and labori-
ous being and as an uncanny object. The attempts by slave owners, 
masters and the wider culture to objectify enslaved people means that 
they are often understood to occupy the liminal space between human 
and thing, where they are assigned a value and their freedom is given 
a price. In this strange space in between property and personhood, the 
slaves’ story becomes one of loss, trauma and victimhood, balanced 
by the guilt of the witnesses and would-be rescuers who construct 
‘a structure of feeling’ to ‘occlude the role of capital and its practices’ 
(Rupprecht 2008, 271). They do so through dramatic displays of injured 
humanity, and a ‘generalised story of ineffable loss, passive victimhood 
and redemptive tragedy’ that has been passed on to the new abolition-
ists from the antislavery movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries (Rupprecht 2008, 266). It is a story that only makes sense in 
the context of liberal guilt, and liberal guilt, as Julie Ellison points out, 
is about race. At the same time, the ‘signifying practice of neoliberalism 
. . . is a desire to avoid the subject of race altogether’ (Ellison 1996, 346). 
As we saw in the discussion of incarceration, this is precisely the space 
of disavowal that the new slavery discourse occupies. The difference in 
the context of traffi cking-as-slavery is one of spectacle and witness, in 
5606_Brace.indd   196 12/01/18   6:04 PM
Traffi cking and Slavery: A Place of No Return 197
what is called forth by the ‘raw, empirical, statistical experiences’ of the 
racialised others that white Euro-American thinkers set out to theo-
rise. Liberal guilt ‘relies on visual practices of seeing pain and being 
seen to be affl icted by it’ (Ellison 1996, 352). Rather than being locked 
away, in the traffi cking tale of slavery lost and found, the slaves emerge 
from the shadows, and the new abolitionists are no longer indifferent 
to their misery, although they refuse to code it as black. The presence 
and absence of the slaves themselves play out in different ways, but the 
right to complex personhood is never granted to them. The suffering of 
the victims of traffi cking-as-slavery is made highly visible, and put on 
display on a stage that allows for spectacular acts of charity and for the 
work of liberation and reintegration. 
THE BORDERS OF TRAFFICKING
The difference between the incarcerated not-slaves and the traffi cked 
slaves is about the broader disavowal of race at the heart of the new 
abolitionists’ defi nition of slavery, and it is also about gender and pow-
erlessness. The women who are the victims of traffi cking are uprooted 
and understood apart from their troublesome poverty by the new abo-
litionists, in a move that they do not make for young and dangerous 
black men who need to be locked down. The discourse of new slavery 
renders these women characterless and purposeless, but does not sub-
ject them to collective scorn and contempt. However, the narrative of 
pain and guilt, of knowing and not-knowing, takes place against the 
same backdrop of the punitive ethos of the state and of carceral vio-
lence. The carceral space they inhabit is different, but their purposeless 
waiting on the margins of developed economies is part of what has 
been characterised as the ‘circuitry of carcerality’ that encompasses not 
just prisons, but also immigration detention centres and camps, and 
the experience of confi nement ‘where they are increasingly the subject 
of discourses and practices conceived with criminals in mind’ (Gill et 
al. 2016, 6). The traffi cked woman who has become the paradigmatic 
chattel of new slavery discourse is often imagined to be white, while 
the ‘slavery’ (forced labour for economic exploitation) of dull economic 
compulsion associated with people, particularly men in the Caribbean 
and Latin America, is racialised as black. For them all, once they are 
seen as slaves, their self-possession, property-seeking, work and voice 
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are effaced, and they come to history ‘under the heading of trauma’ in 
ways that reinforce myths of black passivity and bolster white specta-
torship (Rupprecht 2008, 19). 
The current discourse around traffi cking and slavery brings us back 
to the limits of enslavability, and questions of self-possession, labour 
power, race and property that structure the meanings of slavery and 
freedom. It also returns us to a vision of antislavery protests as morally 
motivated and advanced by a select band of saints who write labour 
and commerce out of history in their construction of ‘victims of avarice’. 
Women who migrate for work or who sell sex are not seen as engaged 
in the market as market actors, but are placed outside the pathways and 
webs of trade unless they are deceived or coerced. Their own labour is 
read as bringing them no security, and their work is detached from any 
of the honourable or industrious elements of labour, so that they are 
understood to be uncivilised by the work they do. In the new abolition-
ist reading of traffi cking as slavery, the victim of traffi cking is a slave 
whose actions are not at her own disposal and whose liberty has been 
appropriated. She turns herself over to her master completely, handing 
over control and responsibility to him. In this deeply disempowering 
narrative, the focus is on the individual traffi cker and his victim, the 
relationship between two people that is at the heart of the new aboli-
tionist conception of slavery. What get lost are the ways in which the 
women are continually enmeshed in exchanging goods for services and 
participating in masterless capitalism and its creative destruction. The 
new abolitionist narrative reinforces this erasure through a particular 
vision of rational labour that is inseparable from self-government and 
not available to poor women whose rights are readily denied, infringed 
or transgressed. Their place in the political economy of capitalism is one 
where their rights are not secured, but provisional and contingent, and 
dependent on the behaviour and disposition of other citizens.
In writing the women’s labour out of the story, the traffi cking-as-
slavery discourse renders itself incapable of coming to grips with the 
women’s experience of mobility, and of understanding the spaces they 
are forced to inhabit, between citizenship and belonging. Instead, any 
analysis of human traffi cking needs to begin with the recognition that 
it occurs within a larger context in which labour migration is a reason-
able pursuit. As Nandita Sharma argues, there are fundamental anti-
migrant assumptions underpinning the anti-traffi cking agenda and its 
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presentation of migration as crisis-producing rather than life-saving 
(Sharma 2005, 89). This is turn requires recognition that people have an 
interest in their own labour, but make choices in constrained contexts 
for agency. Smuggling, as Sharma points out, is a business built by the 
poor for the poor and it is the state, rather than the individual traffi cker, 
that is the locus of force and the coercion of forcible return and depor-
tation (Sharma 2005, 95). An understanding of traffi cking that focuses 
on the violence of the state and on coercive immobilisation, captivity 
and confi nement reveals the new abolitionist refusal to see the afterlife 
of slavery in labour subordination and immobilisation, and in the state 
power that disciplines the mobility of labour (De Genova 2010). Immi-
gration and refugee policies are about the denial of permanent status, 
wrenching open a gap between citizenship and belonging, and opening 
up a space that is still haunted by the fi gure of the slave who is denied 
an interest in his or her own labour, is excessively dependent on others 
and whose incorporation is subordinate (De Genova 2010; Anderson 
2013). The traffi cking-as-slavery discourse works hard to shut down 
the possibility of agency under oppressive conditions and its disrup-
tive potential. The focus on the individual suffering and the body of 
the victim is part of the pervasive individualism of using property and 
slavery to frame the experience of mobility and it serves to obscure the 
lack of safe migration routes for women trying to exercise their freedom 
of movement (Sharma 2005).
People who are designated as victims of traffi cking or as slaves are 
those whose mobilities, like Mary Prince’s, are rendered suspect in a 
globalising world, as political elites attempt to defend and redefi ne ‘the 
boundaries of production, belonging and entitlement’, using ‘technolo-
gies of selection, expulsion and immobilization specifi c to the late mod-
ern state’ to leave some people on the outside and to consolidate the 
subordinate and degraded status of others (Weber and Bowling 2008, 
356). Weber and Bowling see these processes of selection, ejection 
and immobilisation as leading to the emergence of masterless men, of 
rogues and vagabonds very much like the ‘begging drones’ who were 
eligible for slavery in Hutcheson’s 1755 scheme. Their labour is treated 
not as their own, but as the property of others, and they are constructed 
as needing to be restrained from living off the labour of others and 
making themselves a burden on the public. These vagrants, like those in 
Locke’s imaginary, are not only idle, but also fraudulent and dishonest, 
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and their poverty and their mobility are constructed as symptomatic 
of their failure to remain in their proper place and fulfi l their duties 
as a lower, labouring order (Rozbicki 2001, 40). In the context of glo-
balisation, irregular border crossing has become a ‘crime of arrival’, and 
the people earmarked for control are those with perceived low eco-
nomic value within global markets, who are unwanted and unwelcome 
(Weber and Bowling 2008). Contemporary border anxiety turns these 
outsiders, as Weber and Bowling argue, into ‘embodiments of insecurity’ 
(Weber and Bowling 2008, 367). In echoes of Hegel, they identify a ten-
sion between the demands of human beings to their rights to mobility 
and to a place on the world and ‘the strategies through which states 
seek to constrain the mobility of those designated as unwanted’ (Weber 
and Bowling 2008, 371). The work of perpetual boundary-setting and 
keeping that allows some but not others to enter into a civilised moral 
world of rational labour and ethical incorporation is now carried out 
at the state border, where the disreputable and disruptive poor are 
detained and deported. 
Once traffi cking is put into this context of border crossing and 
border insecurity, it becomes very diffi cult to ignore the ‘raciological 
thinking’ that underpins states’ immigration policies. As Weber and 
Bowling argue, ‘phenotypical and economic characteristics combine in 
conceptions of difference and in the practices of sorting the superior 
from the inferior’ (Weber and Bowling 2008, 364). They identify what 
they call ‘xeno-racism’, which draws on tropes of class and skin colour, 
and the link between poverty and racial difference, to operate against 
refugees and asylum seekers irrespective of their colour (Weber and 
Bowling 2008, 366–7). Once again, racialisation shows itself to be a 
refl exive, relational process, and xeno-racism is used to place migrants 
outside politics and the possibility of resistance. Through the legal 
conventions and rules established at the border, as well as through 
monitoring, surveillance and brute force, the state grants certain pre-
rogatives to itself, but denies them to migrants, allowing one side to 
place constraints on the other, establishing a form of political associa-
tion that is objectionable in the terms Ypi applies to colonialism (Ypi 
2013). This makes extracting traffi cking-as-slavery from its racialised 
framing a diffi cult operation, and one that cannot be performed by 
using ‘vulnerability’ as a proxy without considering how that vul-
nerability is constructed, enforced and maintained and insecurity is 
embodied.
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THE ICONIC VICTIM
The contentious politics of border control and the criminalisation of 
migration create another strange place that is located in the world, but 
not in history, and migrants and the internally excluded fi nd themselves 
caught somewhere between the state of nature and civil society, where 
their persons are disfi gured and incapacitated, and they can only come 
out of the shadows when they are conjured up as victims by the new 
abolitionists. Out of this dangerous space, fraught with the risks of 
deportation, labour subordination and immobilisation, the idea of the 
perfect or iconic victim emerges. The Traffi cking Victims Protection Act 
of 2000 created a new ‘T’ visa that allowed victims of traffi cking to apply 
to stay in the US if they suffered as a result of a severe form of traffi ck-
ing in persons and complied with any reasonable request for assistance 
in the investigation or prosecution of acts of traffi cking. This creates a 
situation where, as Jayashri Srikantiah points out, ‘[t]he same agent or 
prosecutor who decides whether a victim would be a good witness also 
decides whether the individual is a victim for the purposes of the T visa’. 
This means that the victim story needs to be an ‘effective prosecutorial 
story’ that fi ts the stereotype of a passive victim of sexual exploitation 
who enters the US under the complete control of the traffi cker. To tell 
an effective prosecutorial story, the victim needs to have been forced, 
defrauded or coerced into commercial sex, involuntary servitude, debt 
bondage or slavery, and the traffi cker needs to be maximally culpable 
(Srikantiah 2007, 160). The iconic victim has to confi rm through her 
suffering that slavery at its most essential is about control, that she has 
been deprived of her individual liberty and been subjected to violence, 
possession and exploitation. The good, co-operative witness affi rms the 
clear experiential defi nition of slavery as it is identifi ed by new slavery 
discourse and by federal agencies, and she is rescued from her plight 
instead of escaping it (Srikantiah 2007, 187). 
This focus on the girl or woman who is traffi cked for sex allows her 
to emerge as a slave rather than an unwanted vagrant. She is not crim-
inalised in the same way as her male counterpart who is an unskilled 
Mexican labourer facing civil immigration penalties and coded as an 
intruder, a trespasser and a lawbreaker (Srikantiah 2007, 190). In con-
trast, she is completely under the traffi cker’s control, robbed of her 
free will and ‘blameless for any illegality surrounding immigration 
status’ (Srikantiah 2007, 195). As long as she co-operates with law 
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enforcement and federal agencies, her victim status offers her some 
kind of protection. Humanitarian assistance rests on her compliance 
and her difference from other illegal aliens and criminalised migrants. 
It is that difference in status, the insistence that others must be exer-
cising powers attached to ownership over her, that allows her (and 
not them) to be defi ned as a slave. Her complete passivity, which, as 
Srikantiah points out, resonates so closely with stereotypes of foreign 
women and women of colour (Srikantiah 2007, 202), blots out the 
possibility of her consent, and encourages an understanding of slavery 
as the exercise of control that can exist outside a legal framework. She 
is treated as if she is owned, and is passive until she is rescued, when 
her free will is restored and she completes the passage out of slavery 
into a brave new world of liberation and reintegration. A human being 
on the move and in search of a new place in the world only becomes 
a slave in certain relations to others. In the case of conjuring the vic-
tim of traffi cking as a slave, those others include the state, her fellow 
migrants and her would-be rescuers, and never just her traffi cker.
The iconic, passive and blameless victim can be easily character-
ised as a slave, but she is remarkably diffi cult to identify. Her existence 
ignores the multiple roles that people play in the smuggling and traf-
fi cking industries, and in the markets for commercial sex. Some women 
traffi cked to Italy from Nigeria, for example, as Eva Iacono’s research 
has shown, become entrepreneurs in the sex markets in the destination 
countries by becoming madams. Iacono found that during the recruit-
ment phase Nigerian traffi ckers were relatives, boyfriends, friends or 
husbands who offered the women assistance to travel abroad. Madams 
are often former traffi cking victims who move on to organise traffi ck-
ing networks themselves, and appear as friends rather than exploit-
ers and are accorded respect because of their experience (Iacono 2014, 
113). Iacono argues that this means that the area between victim and 
perpetrator is not empty, but populated by individuals who are both 
in the same trap. Victims are driven to become both partners in crime 
and independent agents over time, moving up through the traffi cking 
hierarchy. Nigerian traffi cking can be understood as a female business, 
with the madam embodying entrepreneurship and success because 
she ‘has achieved a recognised social position of power and authority 
through her personal economic adventures’ (Iacono 2014, 118). Iacono 
describes a phone conversation with a madam known as Aminat who 
told her how she was helped to arrive in Italy and paid off the money 
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that was asked from her. ‘When I fi nished paying’, she said, ‘I became 
a free woman, and I started to earn money for myself.’ She went on to 
invest that money in the traffi cking business to bring other women to 
Italy to work on the streets (Iacono 2014, 119). In doing so, she was fol-
lowing a career pattern that she knew was feasible. The clearing of her 
debts changed her status within the criminal network and gave her a 
new role in relation to the women she brought in. She became ‘a refer-
ence point for understanding the new cultural codes in the destina-
tion country’, invested with the power to protect the women, to bestow 
patronage on the women she trusted, and to turn them into favourites, 
assistants and wardens over the other women (Iacono 2014, 122). All 
the women are embedded in a social setting that is built around lay-
ers of trust, complicated loyalties and tangled connections. Sometimes, 
the madam is both victim and persecutor because she herself is being 
exploited by others, and forced to engage in the traffi cking business by 
her family, who are hoping to improve their standard of living in Nige-
ria through their traffi cked daughter in Europe. There are elements of 
control, of powers attached to ownership and of use, management and 
profi t at work in Iacono’s stories of Nigerian women involved in traf-
fi cking, but they do not tell the whole story of the women’s agency and 
connections, and they do not cohere into a single narrative of slavery 
and the deprivation of liberty. 
The prevalent constructions of human traffi cking rely on gender and 
racial stereotypes that work together to discount women’s agency, to 
establish an unreachable standard of victimhood, and to prioritise the 
traffi cking of white women (Lobasz 2009, 322). Human traffi cking is 
socially constructed on unreliable data and through academic research 
which is often government-funded and designed to prepare the ground 
for counter-traffi cking interventions. It is framed through threats to 
national security and state borders from transnational organised crime, 
and haunted by the ‘specter of organized crime networks and menacing 
mafi osi’ (Lobasz 2009, 326). Transnational organised crime is fi gured as 
the dark side of globalisation, a threat to democracy, to the economic 
basis of society and to the rule of law. Traffi cked persons embody these 
threats, this insecurity, these border crossings. Feminist work on human 
traffi cking often presents victimisation in ‘a suffi ciently alarming way’ 
to get the public to feel strongly and governments to act and, in doing 
so, their focus is on women who are not consenting, who are misled 
about the nature of the work they will be doing and the extent of their 
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obligation to the traffi ckers. These are women who experience human 
rights violations including rape, assault, debt bondage and sexual exploi-
tation, and the response to these concerns is to introduce victim protec-
tion measures, legal assistance, medical services, housing and training. 
This victim protection and assistance is then, as we have seen, tied to 
co-operation with the authorities by the UN, the EU and the US, priori-
tising the interests of the state (Lobasz 2009, 332) and the fi ght against 
crime and border violations. 
COMBATING TRAFFICKING
Feminist engagement with this discourse is complicated and multi-
layered, and for some the fi ght against traffi cking is a fi ght against 
prostitution, a chance to affi rm the ways in which women have their 
‘sexual victimhood in common’ and how that commonality of oppres-
sion requires a transnational movement to fi ght sexual slavery (Lobasz 
2009, 335). The victim of traffi cking joins the veiled woman and the pur-
chased bride as emblematic chattel, and they are all brought together 
by a narrative that insists that the criminalisation of prostitution is a 
necessary step towards ending human traffi cking. In the US, as Lobasz 
points out, feminist abolitionists successfully lobbied George W. Bush’s 
administration for a federal ‘gag rule’ that ‘requires anti-traffi cking 
groups who receive federal monies to explicitly reject legalized pros-
titution’ (Lobasz 2009, 336). This abolitionist impulse, like new slavery, 
emphasises sexual innocence and blamelessness, and the forced depri-
vation of liberty through kidnapping and brutality ‘in order to produce a 
sympathetic victim who would be politically unpalatable to criminalize’ 
(Lobasz 2009, 340). She is a fi gure who has to be able to withstand ‘the 
test of innocence and the test of pain’ (Lobasz 2009, 342). 
The identity of ‘the prostitute’ sometimes gets fi xed, by language 
and discourse and power, as that of a victim or a slave. The way the 
rhetoric of slavery works in relation to prostitution is to focus intense 
sentiment on the deserving victims, and in the process to present 
those victims as incapable of making choices, of controlling their own 
destiny (O’Connell Davidson 2005, 25–6), as the opposite of unifi ed 
moral selves who make their own choices. They are presented as fi g-
ures ‘so thoroughly saturated and determined by power relations’ that 
they have no agency (M. Lloyd 2005, 10). This is in part because certain 
strands of feminist discourse tend to assume that the prostitute must 
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have been forcibly deprived of her freedom to dispose over her own 
body, and so been subjected to the most fundamental sort of personal 
degradation. She has no defence mechanisms against the torture she 
has experienced, and ‘the picture we have is of a body-self that has been 
so injured that it cannot recognise its true interests’ (Wolkowitz 2006, 
126). For those like Kathleen Barry (Barry 1995), who equate prostitu-
tion with sexual slavery, the body of the prostitute is ‘de-selved’. The 
risk of this focus on slavery is that the women are characterised as ‘so 
far debased to have lost all title to Humanity’ (Peckard 1788, 2). In other 
words, women who sell sex are placed outside the process of histori-
cal change and no longer treated as subjects with their own histories 
who can speak for themselves. Instead, they have to be understood as 
‘defencelessly at the mercy of another subject’ (Honneth 1995, 132–3) 
and as continually enmeshed in a process through which what most 
defi nes women as women is what is taken away from them by pros-
titution. Their security of their person is ‘stolen and sold’ (MacKinnon 
1993) in the same way as antislavery thinkers understood slavery as 
man-stealing or the theft of an entire life. For Carole Pateman, mastery 
and subjection are renewed and affi rmed through a contract that guar-
antees men’s orderly sexual access to women, so that ‘when a prostitute 
contracts out use of her body she is selling herself in a very real sense’ 
(Pateman 1988, 207, emphasis in original). It is this notion of selling 
the self that supposedly gives prostitution its unique status as a form 
of slavery and constitutes it as a denial of humanity. Like the prison-
ers in Dayan’s account, women who sell sex de-create themselves and 
experience the gradual annihilation of the person through social death 
(J. Dayan 2001).
It makes sense, Catharine MacKinnon argues, ‘to understand pros-
titution as consisting in the denial of women’s humanity, no matter 
how humanity is defi ned’ (MacKinnon 1993, 13). Women are prosti-
tuted ‘precisely in order to be degraded and subjected to cruel and bru-
tal treatment without human limits’ (MacKinnon 1993, 13). This means 
that, for MacKinnon and other radical feminists who would seek to 
abolish prostitution, sexual slavery is slavery, and radical feminist dis-
course denies the possibility of ‘any continuities between prostitution 
and other kinds of (dirty, humiliating, intimate) work’ (Wolkowitz 2006, 
127). The sexual slavery model portrays women as owned by pimps 
and traffi ckers who act as their masters. The campaigning literature is 
often slightly vague about the identifi cation of the ‘master’, who can be 
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a pimp, a brothel owner or even a client (and all of these identifi cations 
are problematic). Pimps, for example, are pictured as having total physi-
cal control over the women who work for them, enforced by physical 
violence and extending to the idea that they can sell their ‘possessions’ 
to another pimp. Shared Hope International has a list of ‘traffi cking 
terms’ on its website, where it describes ‘choosing up’ as ‘the process by 
which a different pimp takes “ownership” of a victim’ and the original 
pimp has to pay a fee to get her back (Shared Hope International 2017). 
Traffi cking in persons, with its much-vaunted links to organised crime, 
is fi gured as part of an ‘international sex slave business’, an under-
ground trade that acquires and disposes of human beings in ‘a modern 
version of the slave trade’. In the process, the women who are traffi cked 
across borders are understood to be sold, exchanged and traded, always 
without their consent and invariably for the purposes of sexual exploi-
tation. They are defi ned by Kevin Bales as ‘completely disposable tools 
for making money’ (Bales 1999, 4). 
This confl ation of slavery, prostitution, violence and traffi cking rests 
on a series of assumptions, frames the political debate in particular 
ways, and allows the ‘sex slave’ to stand as a condensation symbol. 
The fi rst assumption it condenses is that slavery the opposite of self-
ownership, refl ecting the dichotomous thinking that divides the world 
into those who exercise full autonomy and those who are completely 
disposable tools like ballpoint pens. Slaves, and chattel slaves in par-
ticular, were constructed as not owning a property in the person, as 
not having the right not to be invaded or usurped by others. They had 
no right to exclude others, to resist punishment, or to protect their 
own physical security. The chattel slave was unable to make a will, to 
bring formal criminal charges against others or to appear as a witness 
in most civil cases. The slave had no right of petition, no property and 
no right of appeal. A slave’s evidence was acceptable in court only if 
it had been extracted by torture (Williams 1998, 5). All this shows the 
ways in which the slave owners’ property in their slaves was not just 
about their individual, momentary ownership, but about the broader 
structures within which they exercised their ownership and found 
their powers to be socially sanctioned and justifi ed. The slave own-
ers and masters were in a persistent position of authority over their 
slaves, reinforced by a body of law that disfi gured and incapacitated 
their slaves. The slaves became slaves through this relation to law and 
to property, and not just through their relations to their master.
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TRAFFICKING AS SLAVERY: PAST AND PRESENT
The confl ation of traffi cking with slavery relies on the idea of men gen-
erating traffi cking and women in need of protection from them. In a let-
ter to the Daily News on 2 January 1880, Alfred Stace Dyer described a 
virtuous nineteen-year-old Englishwoman courted in London by a man 
who promised her marriage if she would go with him to Brussels, where 
she was taken to a brothel. ‘Intimidated from leaving the house, forced 
to submit her person to the last indignity that can be infl icted upon 
a woman, here she was a slave as was ever any negro upon Virginian 
soil’ (Attwood 2015, 614). Dyer coordinated the repatriation of the girl, 
and used her experience as part of his wider campaign to portray the 
treatment of traffi cking victims as ‘infi nitely more cruel and revolting 
than negro servitude [of old], because it is slavery not for labour but 
for lust; and more cowardly than negro slavery, because it falls on the 
young and helpless of one sex only’ (Attwood 2015, 615). As Attwood 
argues, this was about depicting traffi cking as an ‘exceptional atrocity’ 
because it entailed the sexual enslavement of innocent and vulnerable 
white women and girls in England (Attwood 2015, 615). Traffi cking 
was regarded as subversive of domesticity, morally and physically cor-
rupting the nation’s future mothers and homemakers. Attwood traces 
a shift in this discourse at the beginning of the twentieth century as 
sex traffi cking began to be understood in a more globalised context, 
and the women involved became embodiments of insecurity, and 
their foreign traffi ckers and pimps ‘the male parasites of evil’. Rather 
than blameless victims, these women selling sex were constructed as a 
menace, and their foreignness was a marker of their debauchery. Traf-
fi cking, Attwood argues, was positioned as a threat to imperial power, 
which was in danger of being corrupted by the ‘vicious foreign woman’ 
(Attwood 2015, 617–19). The International Agreement on Traffi cking of 
1902 allowed for the interrogation of women travelling alone at ports 
and railway stations, and interventions such as buying them one-way 
steamer tickets to send them home. Clearly set against the unsullied 
innocence of young Englishwomen, these alien women were read as 
blighted and contaminating. Current discourses of traffi cking as slavery 
play with both these tropes of corrupting innocent womanhood and of 
women as threatening others. They continue to draw on the ‘sexualised 
xenophobia’ identifi ed by Attwood as being at the heart of the earlier 
discourse she analyses, helping to structure gendered constructions 
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of what ‘rescue’ means for women selling sex, and reinforcing the idea 
that women who work in prostitution are having what defi nes them as 
women taken away from them. The understanding of traffi cking as an 
‘exceptional atrocity’, the focus on indecency, cruelty, innocence and 
vulnerability, continues to inform the construction of victims of traffi ck-
ing, minimising the differences between them through repetition.
The shift between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
and today is in part about the rise of humanitarianism and the power of 
its appeal. As Miriam Ticktin argues, humanitarians ‘engage at the level 
of the suffering body’, a body that is positioned outside time and place, 
history and politics (Ticktin 2011, 254). They put cruelty fi rst, focus-
ing on violence, pain and suffering, where ‘wounds speak louder than 
words’ in a shared story of physical pain and human sentience (Malkki 
1996, 384). ‘The key to its power and its appeal’, Ticktin goes on, ‘is its 
unquestioned universality: that is, the underlying assumption is that we 
can recognise suffering whenever we see it, because there is a common 
denominator to being human, located in our bodies, particularly in our 
bodies in pain’ (Ticktin 2011, 254). Enslavement is then understood as 
a form of torture, as subjection to pain and injury, to ‘incessant stripes, 
wounds and miseries’ (Clarkson 1786, 81). The victims of traffi cking are 
not placed in the context of gendered regimes of property or inheritance, 
of structural adjustment or of imperialist policies. Instead, the context 
for their suffering becomes ‘a certain emotional connectivity between 
spectator and sufferer’ (Chouliaraki 2010, 109), calling forth a sympa-
thetic response from those who interpret their unspoken suffering. 
Kevin Bales opens his book Disposable People with a description of Seba, 
a newly freed slave, which focuses on her body in pain, her physical 
symptoms and her beatings. ‘Sometimes I would bleed,’ she tells him. ‘I 
still have marks on my body’ (Bales 2000, 2). The slaves become broken 
bodies who require care and protection, designated as innocent and at 
the same time powerless. This kind of humanitarianism stands in for 
universalism. The assumption is that all kinds of difference lead back to 
the sameness of pain and suffering, but that assumption is built not just 
on similarity but on the difference between those who have the power 
to protect and those who need protection. We are back to the processes 
of universalising and particularising at the same time. It emphasises 
the gap between privilege and suffering, and the abolitionist belief in 
the universality of humanity and natural liberty always coexists with ‘a 
panicky and contradictory need to preserve essential boundaries and 
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distinctions’ (Coleman 1994, 9). The veneer of humanitarianism, and its 
unquestioned universality protects similarity at the expense of not rec-
ognising the inequality and the panic, and the politics, contradictions 
and disavowals they bring with them (Ticktin 2011, 261).
One of the key ways of preserving boundaries and distinctions is 
through the identifi cation of ‘exemplary victims’ (Malkki 1996, 384) 
who can make a legitimate claim to slave status by having endured 
violence intimately (Brace 2014). The process of selecting some people 
as victims of traffi cking for the ‘T’ visa is a mechanism of inequality 
and exclusion, creating exclusionary pathways for non-victims, who 
are typically men and victims of labour exploitation. The traffi cking-as-
slavery narrative that insists on the exceptional atrocity of traffi cking 
and the blamelessness of its victims refl ects a moral panic around sex 
work that has framed sex traffi cking as a more urgent concern than 
labour traffi cking (Shih 2016). At the same time, as Elena Shih points 
out, the politics of this protection and humanitarianism open up a new 
space ‘for American citizens to enact surveillance and patrol over what 
are publicly deemed as dangerous or victimized bodies’ (Shih 2016, 
69). They are positioned to police the essential boundaries and distinc-
tions and to the mind the gap between privilege and suffering. In this 
story of slavery lost and found, their presence and absence, and their 
relationship to the state, comes in and out of focus. The powers that are 
exercised over them are not just those of their evil, parasitic traffi ckers, 
or those of a punitive state, but also the ‘vigilante authority’ of indi-
vidual citizens ‘in the light of insuffi cient state response to traffi cking 
rescue and rehabilitation’ (Shih 2016, 70). Like the fugitive slave patrols 
of the nineteenth century, these vigilante rescue efforts are where the 
limits to enslavability are carefully guarded and individual citizens 
work to try to restore a social order that promises righteous domestic-
ity and limits the migrants’ interest in their own labour.
Shih’s work explores the entrepreneurialism of abolitionism, the 
selling of the experience of rescue through the idea of making a differ-
ence, of being a footsoldier of justice or a warrior of light (Ricky Martin 
Foundation 2012). Concerned citizens, styled as ‘everyday abolition-
ists’, are encouraged to fi nd out how many slaves work for them by 
taking a survey, to buy slave-free goods, to take human-traffi cking 
reality tours, to host awareness and fund-raising events, to blog, bake, 
accessorise, send Christmas cards and to donate to various organisa-
tions. In this everyday abolitionism, consumption is closely connected 
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to freedom, and to ‘women’s mission to women’. The moralisation of 
consumption promises Western women that they can participate ethi-
cally in the market, with the power to offer opportunities and hope to 
the survivors of traffi cking through their own buying choices. White 
women’s power emerges from deep within domestic space, and posi-
tions them within the economy of liberal guilt (Brace 2014, 494). At 
the same time, they are encouraged to exercise their power by rais-
ing awareness of the powerlessness of others, and of other women in 
particular. The Not for Sale Backyard Abolitionist Academy teaches 
people how to identify the characteristics of slavery, alert police and 
identify local social services. ZOE tells people to ‘know the stats, know 
the signs, know the sources’ and declares that ‘when people are aware 
of the signs of human traffi cking and know where to fi nd help, it is 
easier for human traffi cking victims to be identifi ed and then given 
assistance’ (ZOE 2016). History, ZOE International tells visitors to 
its website, is full of triumphant victories over unspeakable atroci-
ties, specifi cally ‘American slavery’ and the Holocaust. Modern every-
day abolitionists insert themselves into history at a point of their own 
choosing within a very particular redemptive narrative. They reinforce 
the rupture between past and present, and assign ‘old’ slavery to the 
past in order to frame human traffi cking as an unspeakable horror for 
the younger generation to tackle: ‘But this time we are alive. Today 
we have a chance to do something about it’ (ZOE 2016). Members 
of the Ricky Martin Foundation can become light warriors, ‘defi ned 
by honor and bravery’, whose aim is ‘to do justice and fi nd peace for 
those who have been deprived of their freedom’ (RMF 2012). This, as 
Shih points out, is hands-on, engaged and evangelical activism that 
generates a considerable amount of income through workshop fees, 
donations and merchandise. It is also about taking action, in a world 
where keeping silent means siding with the perpetrator, and aboli-
tionists seek to do more than fundraising and awareness building in 
order to ‘make a real difference’ rather than be left ‘standing idle at the 
sidelines’ (Shih 2016). 
Shih’s ethnographic work focuses on the ‘raid and rescue’ strategy 
that grows out of this rhetoric of ‘making a difference’. It is an approach 
that, as Govindan points out, collapses the distinctions between differ-
ent forms of sexual labour, exploitative labour conditions, migration, 
slavery-like working conditions, violence against women and traffi ck-
ing (Govindan 2013, 516) in pursuit of emancipation and liberation 
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for the slaves they rescue, and the possibility of performing the role 
of emancipator for themselves. Shih describes a group of college-age 
white men bringing the enslaved into existence and making them real 
by going into massage parlours as potential clients and then coming 
back to put the sites under surveillance in the dark, hiding behind 
rubbish bins, taking vague notes about the clientele which they then 
compiled into a report to send to the police, and producing a visual 
map showing the location of the brothels which they posted on Face-
book. The members of this group consistently maintained that they 
had connections to the LAPD and a rapport with law enforcement, 
who recognised that they were ‘the real footsoldiers of justice because 
we are not constrained by funding or bureaucracy to pursue justice for 
the enslaved’ (Shih 2016, 78). The underlying principles of these anti-
traffi cking interventions are victim relief and aftercare, and perpetra-
tor responsibility. They work with local law enforcement and NGOs to 
gather information and then engineer raids on brothels, with a focus 
on convictions for the perpetrators and rehabilitation for the victims, 
often creating ‘programmes that become sites of surveillance and con-
trol in and of themselves’ (Govindan 2013, 517). 
As Shih points out, the kind of vigilante abolitionism she is explor-
ing is paradoxical because concerned citizens are told both that human 
traffi cking is a growing problem and the leading atrocity for their gen-
eration to tackle, and that they cannot see it because it is by nature 
hidden and underground. The signs of traffi cking are not always easy to 
spot. In response, the abolitionist groups use ‘proxy markers’ of poverty, 
recent immigration status, sexualised femininity, and racial and ethnic 
difference as symptoms of human traffi cking. Failing to see what they 
set out to fi nd in their local brothels and on the streets just confi rms 
that they need to look deeper beneath the surface ‘to uncover the reali-
ties that had been suggested through political and moral scripts about 
human traffi cking’ (Shih 2016, 83). Their efforts to combat human traf-
fi cking through this kind of surveillance training, ‘knowing the signs’, 
puts hotel employees, border control agents, postal workers, medical 
personnel, beauty salon workers and fl ight attendants in the front line 
‘with new forms of structural power to surveil and patrol marginalized 
communities’ (Shih 2016, 84). The new generation of abolitionists are 
witnesses rather than spectators, prepared to shed a light on slavery, to 
speak out, and ‘to continue the work of vigilance and community polic-
ing’ (ZOE 2016). In the process, they enforce and extend the goals of the 
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state, polish the veneer of humanitarianism and protection, and posi-
tion themselves as agents of freedom, ‘an emancipator whose efforts 
to rescue traffi cking victims actually produce the victim as an object of 
intervention’ (Govindan 2013, 514).
This new, active abolitionism plays to the script of punishing the 
few bad traffi ckers and setting their victims free. The appeals not to 
stand idle but to take a stand are aimed at members of the justice 
generation and are part of what Elizabeth Bernstein has identifi ed as 
a culturally modernising project where the problem is the absence of 
law enforcement and the solution is ‘a vision of social justice as crimi-
nal justice, and of punitive systems of control as the best motivational 
deterrents for men’s bad behavior’ (Bernstein 2010, 58). Through tak-
ing part, the abolitionists and rescuers defi ne and reinforce their own 
autonomy as Western women and enlightened men who are civilised 
by the abolitionist work they do and the place in the world that it gives 
them. Bernstein identifi es them as part of the contemporary feminist 
model of human-rights activism ‘produced by subjects who imagine 
themselves more ethical and free than their “sisters” in the developing 
world’ (Bernstein 2010, 63). They exercise this freedom as consumers 
of goods produced by former ‘slaves’ who are now employed as jew-
ellery makers by their missionary employers, who dock their pay for 
missing daily prayers, being late for work and other minor infractions 
(Bernstein 2010, 65). This is a process of affi rming the women’s interest 
in their own labour only where it is disciplined and directed towards 
‘civilising’ goals. The property rights of the former ‘slaves’ are carefully 
differentiated from those of their ‘sisters’ in the developing world, and 
subjected to a different set of expectations, alerting us to inequality and 
to what keeps us apart, rather than to reciprocity (Phillips 2013, 45). 
Their troublesome poverty is carefully micromanaged for them. Unlike 
the prisoners of the previous chapter, they are not treated with scorn 
and contempt, but their treatment is part of the new punitive ethos, 
bringing together the consumer and the carceral. The traffi ckers may 
be keeping them where the law cannot protect them, but the victims 
conjured into being by the abolitionists are moved into a space where 
the state can discipline them and the law can punish them. 
Their labour is stigmatised in ways that mean that their property 
in the person cannot anchor them in moral and political space. Their 
mobility is coded as resistance and they are understood to be fugitives, 
hustlers and exiles (Brace 2013a, 873). They do not stay where they are 
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supposed to be, and for women in particular, that involves leaving the 
domestic duties and fi xed loyalties of the family. Migrating to work in 
domestic labour and sex work means inhabiting ‘a strange in-between 
space, between the public and the private, the domestic and the market’ 
(Pettman 1998) and women constructed as victims of traffi cking often 
fi nd themselves suspended there. The strangeness of their space con-
trasts with the righteous domesticity of the anti-traffi cking campaigns 
that aim to domesticate heterosexual men and promote feminist family 
values. Punishing the traffi ckers and setting the victims free go hand in 
hand with a focus on ending demand, using the paradigm of feminism 
as crime control (Bernstein 2010). The fi gure of the victim of traffi ck-
ing as an embodiment of insecurity is balanced by the fi gure of the 
‘security mom’ as the embodiment of security, the upper-middle-class 
white woman who ‘utilize[s] and promote[s] the carceral state in order 
to securitize the sexual boundaries of home’ (Bernstein 2012, 247). In 
this context, it is the new carceral abolitionism that carves out spaces 
for its victims where the law cannot protect them, where they are inte-
grated into the market as well as the state in ways that mark them as 
outsiders whose incorporation is subordinate, and where the family as 
an institution is shored up against them. Their rights remain provisional 
and insecure, and they remain stranded in a place of no return where 
their freedom is of a particular shade.
The ‘raid and rescue’ strategies at the heart of the new carceral aboli-
tionism are central to a security regime that imagines women as in need 
of protection from violence, and the liberated slave woman as moving 
‘from darkness to light, from animal to human’ with her rescuer as the 
sole agent of transformation (Govindan 2013, 514). They follow the arc 
of the slave narrative, but the work of ‘rehumanising’ is undertaken by 
the abolitionists who effect the transformation of the slave back into a 
person and pave their way to ‘civilization’. In these interventions, where 
the victim of traffi cking is understood to be a slave and under the con-
trol of another person, her work cannot be read as a form of self-reali-
sation or coded as a form of conscious resistance, and so the process of 
objectifi cation becomes irreversible (Cassuto 1996). The female fi gure 
of the migrant in the anti-traffi cking campaigns is defi ned by the vio-
lence she has suffered, and she is positioned outside the labour mar-
ket and its social connections, and outside the ethical life of the family. 
The underlying suggestion is that labour migration is always risky or 
reckless for women, and that their inviolability is always threatened by 
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moving abroad, so that ‘the safest option is to remain home’ (Andri-
jasevic 2007, 31). Women rescued from brothels are kept without access 
to outside help or to their own money, and children are held in secure 
environments to protect them from being re-traffi cked and to prevent 
them from returning to prostitution. Victims are constituted as ‘cogni-
tively and psychically incapable of giving meaningful consent to being 
rescued and therefore do not need to be asked for consent’ (Govindan 
2013, 527). The victim of traffi cking is dependent, as Govindan argues, 
on the fi gure of the emancipator to constitute her as both enslaved and 
as liberated. Her rescuers do the work of liberation and integration, 
aiming for a moment of transformation for the individual victim as they 
empathise with her abject suffering, her innocence and her pain. 
In Italy, undocumented migrants can have their immigration sta-
tus regularised through a special residence permit granted for reasons 
of social protection. People whose lives would be endangered if they 
were returned home are allowed to stay in Italy and obtain a residence 
and work permit on condition that they agree to leave prostitution and 
participate in a social protection programme (Andrijasevic 2003, 263). 
NGOs and other migrant rights groups, police and immigration offi -
cials can initiate requests for permits on behalf of victims of violence or 
severe exploitation. The scheme requires the women to give up work-
ing in prostitution, and the NGO involved generally places the woman 
with a family or in guest houses where they are supervised during their 
‘rehabilitation’ and often put to work as cleaners and domestic workers 
as well as in agriculture and factories. In India, the same focus is on res-
cue and rehabilitation. People’s homes can be entered and searched by 
the police and rescue offi cials, and women and girls can be taken from 
their homes against their will and either remanded to rescue homes or 
repatriated to their countries of origin. The rescue homes are privately 
run and, as Svati Shah points out, they have come under scrutiny for 
failing to provide adequate food, for keeping people against their will, 
and for teaching the women sewing as an alternative to sex work (Shah 
2004). Patrizia Testai’s research in Italy found that this rescue-and-reha-
bilitation model gave enormous power to NGOs and religious groups 
who run protection programmes for these women, whom they describe 
as not doing anything, not engaging in anything, not really working, 
sleeping – almost literally listless, characterless and purposeless – in 
contrast to their own ethical standing: ‘I realised then about the differ-
ence between their lifestyle and mine, their clothes and mine. Not all of 
them are victims, some of them just want money’ (Testai 2006).
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RESCUE AND INCORPORATION
This is a tempting aspect of the sex slavery model. It offers western 
feminists and others the chance to ‘rescue’ the powerless, and to incor-
porate them into civil society on their own terms. Women migrant 
workers can be fi gured as outside the market economy because they are 
not self-owners seeking property and outside civil society because they 
are the victims of violence. As a result, what they need is protection, 
the chance to rebuild their lives as ‘real’ women, to give up their empty 
lives as prostitutes. One of Testai’s interviewees, a male volunteer from 
a religious group, talked about his work: 
The overall aim of the programme is . . . You know what, it’s easy 
to take a woman off the street, but it’s diffi cult to rehabilitate her 
. . . she is an empty woman, deprived of her femininity, so she 
has to regain the ability to take care of her body, her hygiene, her 
sexuality . . . they are people who have lost any guideline.
And another, female, psychologist reported, ‘She is a destroyed person 
. . . She has no point of reference, she lost her dignity’ (Testai 2006). 
Those involved in these rescue programmes echo the language of the 
new abolitionists in seeing their work as liberation and reintegration, 
but also in understanding the women as disposable and as helpless 
victims who are fundamentally scarred and living lives without mean-
ing and direction. The victims of traffi cking emerge as slaves in this 
relation to society, in this public realm of social relations, where the 
expectations that others have of them are affi rmed, legitimated and 
protected. The problem of debasement creates the same risks for the 
new abolitionists as it did for their eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
forebears, bringing the focus to the rescuer, building on the tropes of 
melodrama and requiring the transformation of the individual victim. 
In the process, it sets up the polarities of victimhood and real choice, 
obscures the complex interplay of agency, poverty and restriction, and 
renders invisible the work of the poor and vulnerable, their interest in 
their own labour, and their more complicated and messy relationship 
to violence and to agency.
Women who sell sex are defi ned by the new abolitionist discourse as 
‘fi rst and foremost, victims of coercion and violence’ (Shah 2004, 798). 
The discourse constructs and then saves helpless victims, using the 
state as an instrument both of liberation and of punishment and con-
trol. The assumption that the most dangerous violence is perpetrated 
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by the individual evil traffi cker over his property means that certain 
Western feminist theorists writing on prostitution ‘are able to con-
struct an excess of vulnerability to violence vis-à-vis women living in 
the Global South’ (Shah 2004, 804). In this context, as we have seen, 
the act of sex in the context of prostitution is represented as violence, 
foreclosing the women’s histories and experiences of prostitution. As 
Shah argues, this needs to be replaced by a more expansive defi nition 
of violence that takes into account structural concerns such as class, 
education and infrastructure and aims for a less binary understand-
ing of force and choice, decentring sexuality as the arena of greatest 
privacy and intimacy, ‘and therefore greatest unqualifi ed vulnerability’ 
(Shah 2004, 810). This less binary understanding and the decentring of 
sexuality will necessarily involve giving up on the idea that traffi cking 
ought to be understood as slavery. It also means rethinking agency by 
considering multiple motivations that exceed rational calculation, and 
by allowing agency a history, treating it as a concept that people in the 
past and in the present ‘have defi ned and deployed in quite different, 
and sometimes disorienting, ways’ (Thomas 2016, 335). Lynn Thomas’s 
argument is that agency needs reformulating so that it is no longer used 
as a ‘safety’ argument, ‘shoehorning all historical subjects into the like-
ness of autonomous, enlightened individuals’ who can serve as char-
acters in the rescue narrative of transformation (Thomas 2016, 326). 
A more complicated conception of agency is able to attend to what 
Thomas calls ‘multiple, intersecting and shifting forces and concerns’ 
(Thomas 2016, 330) that help to explain poor and vulnerable women’s 
relationship to their interest in their own labour and to structural vio-
lence. Like Mary Prince and Harriet Jacobs, they are negotiating their 
mobility in conditions of oppressive freedom and fi nding their agency 
used as an instrument of oppression against them. They show us again 
the complications of what can be identifi ed as agency, and of striving to 
be an agent without appearing to be one. 
There are a whole range of problems with defi ning the concept 
of traffi cking, closely related to the diffi culties of defi ning slavery. 
It is diffi cult to treat as a separable, isolated phenomenon, or as a 
single act leading to a particular outcome. As O’Connell Davidson 
points out, traffi cking is a process that can be organised in a variety 
of ways and involves a package of unfreedoms, so that it is much bet-
ter understood as a continuum of experience than as a dichotomy 
(Anderson and O’Connell Davidson 2002). The Traffi cking Protocol of 
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2003 assumes a neat demarcation between voluntary and involuntary 
migration which fails to recognise the complex variety of social rela-
tions between irregular migrants – the ways in which people can be 
tricked, deceived or coerced at different points in the process. Nurses 
brought into Britain legally by agencies from the Philippines to work 
in the NHS, for example, can fi nd themselves deceived about their 
working conditions and their wages, and women who are aware that 
they may be going to work in a brothel may not understand that they 
are going to be debt-bonded. The new slavery rhetoric for under-
standing traffi cking assumes that it can see the difference between 
‘total control’ and choice, and misses the blurriness of the distinctions 
between voluntary and involuntary, legal and illegal migration, and 
the ways in which one can fade into the other. In its labelling of some 
as traffi cked and others as smuggled the state (and the UN) assumes 
a neat demarcation between voluntary and involuntary migration, 
between wanted and unwanted migrants, and helps to create and 
sustain a moral framework that decides who is degraded, and who 
has been tricked or deceived. The state is also implicated in select-
ing and legitimating whose labour power counts as improving, ratio-
nal and industrious – so not only who belongs, but also who owns 
their labour power as a form of private property, and so enjoys relative 
autonomy. In the process of making such distinctions the state con-
structs a hierarchy of acceptability and incorporation that risks natu-
ralising people’s status as outsiders and victims. Once that status is 
fi xed, the people can only be incorporated into civil society in specifi c 
ways, through a potent mix of sentiment, coercion and exploitation 
that reinforces gendered and racialised norms. The assumption that 
women’s static feminine identity has been taken from them, turned 
them into property and left them empty makes the focus on the new 
slavery a non-political analysis, as does its insistence that this more 
authentic identity needs to be restored to them. The coherence of 
antislavery and anti-traffi cking campaigning comes from the focus on 
the brutality of domination and an analysis that places slavery out-
side capitalism. The campaigners work with structures of feeling and 
assumptions about enslavability, self-possession, labour power, race 
and property that deny the women designated as slaves their complex 
and socially recognised personhood, a place in the world and the pos-
sibility of pursuing their own projects (Mills 2015). The subjects of the 
traffi cking-as-slavery discourse are so hollowed out that their human 
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and labour rights cannot ground their membership of a civilised moral 
world. The new abolitionism, in its abstraction from the realm of social 
relations, from the contexts of migration and from the constrained 
contexts for women’s agency, ignores the ways that a ‘new but still 
male-dominant global culture may be emerging, relying on the labor 
of a new transnational labor force that is feminized, racialized and 
sexualized’ (Jaggar 2005, 67). This is not about invisible ‘dark matter’ 
or about the individual compulsion to control, but about this broader 
political economy and the function of borders as ‘an instrument of 
security controls, social segregation, and unequal access to the means 
of existence, and sometimes as an institutional distribution of survival 
and death’ (Balibar 2001, 16). 




The politics of slavery have shifted their ground again, and in the 
twenty-fi rst century the optics are different, and the ‘additive mixture’ 
of all the light has created a particular prism through which to view the 
pasts, presents and futures of slavery. The shadows have a colour. It is 
no longer possible to fi nd people defending slavery or making argu-
ments for gradual rather than immediate abolition. Slavery as an idea 
has become the epitome of a moral wrong, and an ‘appalling anach-
ronism’ (O’Connell Davidson 2015, 9). At the same time, we live in a 
world saturated with inequality, violence, exploitation, oppression, bru-
tality and indifference, and in a history full of fi ts and starts and repeti-
tions, of memories and rememories. In order to understand the current 
politics of slavery, we need to spend some time in the discomfort of 
slavery as a part of our shared property-history, not as the special prop-
erty of people racialised as black. The politics may be different, but the 
debates between the modern abolitionists and those who focus on the 
afterlives of racial slavery are still about the waving line between slavery 
and servitude, the mobile borderlands between personhood, subper-
sonhood and humanity, and what it means to live in those spaces and 
to seek to escape them. In the eighteenth century debates over slav-
ery, Hegel located history outside Africa and inside Europe (Purtschert 
2010, 1046), and set up the spatio-temporal difference between a time 
of development and a time of non-development. Africa, he declared, ‘is 
no historical part of the world; it has no movement or development to 
exhibit’. It was, Hegel went on, still involved in the conditions of mere 
nature, on the threshold of the world’s history. As we have seen, this 
sense of Africa as a state of nature is very clear in the abolitionist and 
anti-abolitionist writings of the late eighteenth century, where ‘Africa’ 
emerges as a space of abundance and plenty, defi ned by the conditions 
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of mere nature. Conservative identity politics, of the sort that chooses to 
quote from William Wilberforce, is committed to defending the existing 
hierarchical social order and inequalities of social prestige and status. It 
still trades in this understanding of history, in which Africa remains in 
a kind of state of nature, suspended between the affective innocence of 
subsistence and the impossibility of progress. 
This same narrative that underpinned the proslavery arguments of 
the eighteenth century can be compatible with what has come to be 
understood as antislavery discourse. There is something about ‘slavery’ 
as an idea that has no historical part in the world, and has no move-
ment or development to exhibit. Its association with this European-
constructed Africa is part of the process of taking slavery outside of 
history, of making slavery itself (as Purtschert says about Africa), ‘a 
place of no return’ (Purtschert 2010, 1046). The slave never becomes 
a protagonist of spirit, who can keep developing, but remains a ‘limit-
fi gure’ (Purtschert 2010, 1047) without the possibility of an inner world. 
The ‘slave’ as constructed by the new slavery discourse exists behind 
a curtain, hidden in plain sight, the victim of a ‘beast that lurks in the 
shadows’ as Lisa Kristine puts it in her TED talk, and the slave is always 
a fi gure who illuminates the difference between what Purtschert calls 
‘a progressive modernity and its stagnating Others’ (Purtschert 2010, 
1049). By contemplating slavery as an abomination, and its abolition as 
having decisively made the world a better place, liberals can fi nd cause 
for hope, ‘now no less than in the nineteenth century’. Miller draws 
attention to the result of this approach: ‘we end up lamely lamenting 
the fates of the enslaved, or condemning slavers as congenitally evil’. 
Slaves, Abraham Booth argued, are ‘the proper objects of benevolence’ 
(Booth 1792, 23). Looking back at the ‘old’ slavery, our retrospective 
judgement leaves the enslaved ‘hopelessly inert’ and the slavers ‘hope-
lessly driven’, undermining the possibility of thinking historically, of 
uncovering the meanings and motivations of those involved. We need, 
as Miller insists, to see them ‘more fully than as victims’. When we 
don’t, we end up seeing slavery as inherently static, a place of no return, 
and it becomes an intractable, moral problem, an evil that lurks within 
our hearts, a beast in the shadows. By taking the slavery out of history, 
and the history out of slavery, we end up ‘airlifting the perpetrators and 
victims out of the deep structures of intersectional racism-sexism that 
ensnare all of us’ (Fogg-Davis 2016, 98). This book has attempted to put 
slavery back into history, and into the history of political thought, and 
5606_Brace.indd   220 12/01/18   6:04 PM
Glimpses of Slavery 221
the history back into slavery, and in the process to challenge the ahis-
toricism and the air-lifting of new abolitionist discourse. 
Slavery, Kevin Bales insists, should not be confused with anything 
else, but treated as a separate and distinct type of human rights abuse. 
Like the eighteenth-century abolitionists, Bales focuses on the slaves’ loss 
of control over their labour power and describes slavery as theft: ‘Slavery 
is an obscenity. It is not just stealing someone’s labor; it is the theft of an 
entire life’ (Bales 1999, 7). This is a close refl ection of eighteenth-century 
arguments about the injustice of slavery and its relationship to owning 
a property in the person. It sets up slavery as a description of radical 
unfreedom, and then sets that unfreedom against the freedom of con-
tract, as if owning a property in the person equates to freedom from ser-
vitude (Shilliam 2012, 597). In her TED talk Lisa Kristine focuses on all 
kinds of ‘others’ working in appalling conditions, including women and 
children breaking rocks. When she encountered them on her journey 
into modern slavery, she wanted to cry, but waited until she got home 
before she really felt her heart break. In the face of their suffering, she 
talks about how she had to rely on Free the Slaves to work within the 
system to help them, and how she trusted them. After Free the Slaves’ 
intervention, the same women did the same backbreaking work, still for 
a scanty subsistence, but, Kristine declared, ‘they do it for themselves, 
and they do it in freedom’ (Kristine 2012). This is part of the story of 
abolition as rupture, as the moment that the past became the future, 
the happy-ever-after story of ‘as soon as Compact enters, slavery ceases’. 
Late-eighteenth-century political economists were prepared to admit 
that slavery was a basic relation of commercial society, but after emanci-
pation the claim that ‘entry into the market held an immanent potential 
for the realisation of fuller freedom’ (Shilliam 2012, 594) required the 
exorcising of the enslaved African from an understanding of the process 
of commodifi cation. Commerce had to be distinguished from the inhu-
manity of slavery, and the story of capitalist modernity had to be one of 
contract, consent and freedom. It is this story of consent and freedom 
that the new slavery discourse reinforces and reinscribes for the twenty-
fi rst century. 
Modern slavery abolitionists do not ask what it is that renders black 
men, women and teenagers particularly exposed and unprotected, or 
think about how their vulnerability is politically induced (Sheth 2016, 
91). At the same time, the new slavery discourse still wants to hold 
on to the ‘thingifi cation’ of slavery, the idea that slaves are treated as 
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inanimate objects. Women in Thailand, declares Bales, are ‘things, mark-
ers in a male game of status and prestige. It is thus no surprise that 
some women are treated as livestock – kidnapped, abused, held like 
animals, bought and sold, and dumped when their usefulness is gone’ 
(Bales 1999, 48). Tryon Woods argues that the modern slavery discourse 
appropriates black suffering as the model for grievance and injustice, 
for rightlessness and exploitation and dispossession and social death, 
and then uses abstract black suffering to make non-racial political 
demands. It emphatically has nothing to do with the black struggle or 
with actually existing black communities: ‘their invocation of late capi-
talism’s ills as ‘slavery’ demands a comprehensive disavowal of the facts 
of the ongoing relations of racial slavery, all the while parasitically con-
suming its supposed carcass to sustain the anti-traffi cking movement’ 
(T. P. Woods 2013, 131). As Joseph C. Miller argues, the abolition cam-
paigns of the late eighteenth century were highly political, and within 
them ‘reformers had projected the social costs and amorality of grow-
ing capitalism onto slavery in the politically safely remote West Indian 
colonies’ (Miller 2012, 7). Bringing the fi gure of the ‘modern slave’ back 
in as an ‘unthought category’ has some interesting effects. Rather than 
tackling the politics of retribution and fear, modern slavery discourse 
refuses to engage with ‘the intensity of the antagonism’ by considering 
‘black invisibility and namelessness’ (Wilderson 2010, 236–7), and the 
possibility that we need to question the adequacy of exploitation as a 
category of oppression. This means that it returns us constantly to the 
conundrums of defi ning slavery and to imagining inversions of our-
selves. All we can see are their surroundings, ourselves and fi gments of 
our imagination. In the new slavery social imaginary, where working in 
brutally exploitative conditions for subsistence wages can be working 
‘in freedom’ and for themselves, slaves are categorised as people denied 
the waged status of free labour, and the categories of consent and con-
tract are left intact.
In order to undo the exorcism of the slave from history, we need 
to think carefully about race and gender domination and violence 
and whether they are ‘constitutive to liberalism to a degree that defi es 
redemption’ (Balfour 2016, 84). Bringing the slaves back into our conver-
sations about freedom and modernity, and giving slavery a history and a 
politics of its own, alters our conceptual frames much more radically than 
the discourse of new slavery allows. Racial and gendered domination and 
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violence, and the production of vulnerability, are structured and consti-
tuted through the complicated pasts, presents and futures of slavery. The 
freedom and status of personhood and its roots in property, possession 
and exchange can only be understood through the lens of slavery and 
the uneven distribution of the category of the human. In order to under-
stand how it is that our ideas of universal human freedom can separate 
‘some people whose liberties matter from others not to be included in 
that favoured category’ (Sen 2009, 116), we need to step into the space 
between personhood, subpersonhood and humanity and confront the 
ways in which the zone of freedom is rooted in property rights, and in the 
codifi cation of persons as property. 
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